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Abstract  
 
Since its creation in 1992, the Premier League has sold exclusive media rights for live 
football matches to broadcasters on behalf of member clubs. The collective selling method 
removes any price competition between the clubs, whom would otherwise compete 
against each other to sell rights to their matches (commonly seen in other European 
Leagues). A key issue with monopoly power is that the Premier League could distort the 
market for its product or abuse its dominant position in the market as the sole seller of the 
rights (contrary to Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the European Union). In defence, 
the Premier League argued that matches broadcast live on television can be considered as 
a substitute for watching at the stadium. A Competition Commission investigation 
concluded that the potential benefits of collective selling arrangements are for the 
redistribution of revenue to promote solidarity at all levels of football. After some 
amendments to the auction process, collective selling continues. 
 
Contributing to the applied industrial economics literature, this thesis examines the key 
arguments for using collective selling methods in the Premier League. Results from 
empirical economic analysis find firstly, that there is no evidence to suggest a negative 
impact on match day revenue from live broadcasting and the revenues from rights sales 
heavily outweigh such an impact. Secondly, that sharing revenue between clubs will only 
enhance solidarity (competitive balance) if the amount shared is much larger than at 
present, however, a greater uncertainty of match outcome reduces demand for spectating 
at the stadium whilst increasing demand for television viewing. Finally, the impact of 
investment in talent is far greater for weaker teams whilst participating in the Champions 
League and Europa League has no impact on domestic league performance. This thesis 
concludes that the Premier League should offer a greater number of rights to broadcast 
matches and should increase the amount of revenue shared (including revenues from 
European Competitions) in order to increase competitive balance. This would increase the 
number of television viewers for live football broadcasts but would likely reduce the 
numbers of fans spectating at the stadium. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Professional sports leagues, particularly European football, have received growing demand 
for their product in recent years. Although revenue streams in such leagues have 
strengthened, some of the member clubs consistently report large debts and annual losses 
(Deloitte, 2013). In 2012, a Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) announcement 
revealed financial regulation changes that affect member firms (Financial Fair Play). An aim 
of these regulations, amongst other things, is to improve the economic and financial 
capability of the football clubs under the UEFA remit. This announcement ratified concerns 
over the debts of professional football clubs in Europe.  
 
Of Europe’s elite professional football leagues, the English Football Association Premier 
League (Premier League) is considered the wealthiest by revenue (£2.057 billion total 
revenue in 2011). The Premier League, since its creation in 1992, has attracted large 
audiences and with it large revenues for the rights to broadcast live matches on television. 
In order to protect this key revenue stream, the twenty Premier League clubs act 
collectively in the sale of broadcast rights, worth £594 million per year, 2010 – 2013 
(Deloitte, 2011). During this period, the quantity of broadcast games is restricted to roughly 
one third of the total 380 matches played per season. Unlike other elite European leagues, 
such as in Italy and Spain, individual clubs are prevented from selling the rights to their own 
games directly to a broadcaster, even though these would not otherwise be broadcast. 
 
The Premier League is acting as a cartel, restricting output and depriving consumers of the 
benefits of viewing more football matches in such a way that only pay-TV companies, such 
as BSkyB, can afford to purchase the rights. Although contrary to Government competition 
guidelines, restrictive practices have been allowed to continue. Until 2007, UK football fans 
could only watch live Premier League matches on television by subscription to Sky Sports, 
owned by BSkyB. An investigation under Article 81(3) assessed the potential benefits to 
collective selling arrangements by redistribution of revenue to promote solidarity at all 
levels of football (European Commission, 2002). The Commission ruled that there was a 
need to remove the exclusivity of BSkyB by managing the auction such that rights have to 
be sold to more than one broadcaster, similar to a situation that was seen when BBC and 
ITV purchased broadcast rights before 1992. Despite this regulatory intervention, the 
power of the single seller and the dominance of BSkyB arguably still distort the market for 
Premier League football (Ross, 2003). 
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 The Premier League stated that this collective arrangement is an efficient way to organise 
the selling of broadcast rights, benefiting all parties concerned (European Commission, 
2001). The main argument put forward by the Premier League is that matches broadcast 
live on television can be considered as a substitute for watching at the stadium. Restricting 
the quantity of live broadcasts limits the potentially negative effect of lower attendance at 
the stadium and limits the reduction of fan support due to overexposure in the long run. 
The Premier League has argued that increases in broadcasting would be offset by the loss 
of gate receipts at the matches, as attendances would fall (FA Premier League, Statement 
of Case, Restrictive Practices Court, 1999).  
 
The UK Restrictive Practices Court found in favour of this collective selling method for 
selling right to live matches ("Premier League Judgement," 1999). The intuition is that a 
collective selling method would better promote financial equality amongst member clubs 
and therefore promote competitive balance in the league (Szymanski, 2001). The 
underlying assumption for this matter to be deemed in the public interest is that revenue 
sharing will have a positive impact on competitive balance, and that competitive balance 
will in turn increase spectator demand for matches. Despite these arrangements to protect 
revenue streams, member clubs have reported increasing debt levels and annual losses. 
The total league debt was £2.23 billion in 2011, partly due to a collective annual loss of 
£400 million driven by £1.48 billion expenditure on wages (Deloitte, 2013). During the 
same year (2011), only four clubs posted a pre-tax profit and only one club posted a pre-tax 
profit that was larger than their net debt.  
 
This study analyses the key arguments for collective behaviour and investigates the issues 
surrounding the balance between the performance and debt of football clubs in the English 
Premier League. To meet this aim, four main research objectives are addressed.  
 
The original contribution of these research objectives are as follows: 
 
• Revenue sharing and competitive balance: Estimate the impact of revenue sharing 
on competitive balance when the weighting between profit and winning is brought 
in to the firm objective function. 
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• Outcome uncertainty and demand: Simultaneously estimate the impact of Premier 
League match outcome uncertainty on stadium demand and television audiences.  
 
• Broadcasting and match day revenue: Estimate the impact of live broadcasting of 
Premier League matches on match day revenue whilst mitigating the problem that 
broadcast matches are already likely the most popular matches. 
 
• Investment and performance: Estimate the impact of wage expenditure and 
participation of secondary competitions on Premier League match results. 
 
To identify the gap in the existing literature that provides the original contribution of this 
thesis, chapter two provides a concise review of existing evidence surrounding the four 
research questions above.  
 
Chapter three examines the relationship between revenue sharing and competitive balance 
in the Premier League. There have been a number of recent advances in the literature, 
including the strategic use of managerial incentive contracts, and the use of a utility 
function combining profit and win behaviour. The original contribution of this chapter is to 
analyse the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance endogenising the weight 
given to profit or wins by each club which is solved by a two-stage game. The analysis 
builds on existing contest models, such as Dietl et al. (2011), by introducing an endogenous 
choice for strategic delegation into the club objective function, as suggested by Hirai and 
Kawashima (2009). This allows clubs in the league to make different decisions, given 
differing levels of revenue sharing. In addition, an industry concentration measure is used, 
alongside a measure of distributional dispersion, a unique competitive balance ratio 
constructed by Humphreys (2002), and a measure of fluidity, to measure the degree of 
competitive balance in the Premier League over time and how this compares to other 
leagues in Europe. 
 
If revenue sharing has an impact on the competitive balance of the Premier League, then 
competitive balance should affect demand if the reasoning behind the European 
Commission’s ruling is to be accurate. The original contribution of chapter four is to build 
towards a consensus view on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis in the English Premier 
League. Firstly, the impact of outcome uncertainty is estimated for both stadium 
attendance and television audiences. Testing the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH) 
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on both types of demand during the same time period and for the same sporting 
competition has only been completed previously by Buraimo (2008) (for English football) 
and Buraimo and Simmons (2009b) (for Spanish football). Secondly, the chapter tests the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis with different measures of outcome uncertainty that 
are commonly used. The approach from Coates, Humphreys, and Zhou (2014), for example, 
is used to test the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis with the probability of the home 
team winning. This is tested and compared with the probability of a draw and the absolute 
difference of win probability, used by Buraimo and Simmons (2009) and Forrest et al. 
(2005).  
 
The Premier League restricts the quantity of matches sold for broadcast to protect the 
revenues of member clubs. Despite a range of literature that considers the issue, there is 
no consensus over the marginal impact of broadcasting live matches, even within the same 
time periods. Estimation methods in a number of the existing studies are considered 
robust, however, some have failed to acknowledge an endogeneity problem. There is a 
need to contribute to the debate around the size of the effect on stadium attendance when 
acknowledging the argument that broadcast matches are chosen for their popularity. The 
original contribution of chapter five is to further the debate around the impact of live 
broadcasting on gate attendance: Firstly, the effect of live broadcasting on match day gate 
revenue is estimated (rather than attendance) using a fixed effects panel method on a four 
season long dataset from 2004 to 2008. This more recent data include the first year that 
Setanta acquired broadcasting rights (due to the European Commission’s involvement) 
widening the broadcasters involved in bidding for broadcasting rights. Match day revenue 
is used as the dependent variable to account for changes in match day ticket prices due to 
varying popularity.  Secondly, the model is estimated for the Premier League as a whole 
and further estimations across the distribution of match day revenues. This shows the 
marginal impact of broadcasting differs as the desirability of the matches to be broadcast 
differ. The method attempts to mitigate some of the underlying endogeneity problem that 
the most popular matches are the matches televised. 
 
Despite policies to protect revenues, annual losses and accrued debt is prominent and 
usually driven by wage expenditure in order to gain a competitive advantage. There is also 
a call for further clarity on the impact of participation in additional competitions on 
domestic league performance. Although there is a wide evidence base surrounding 
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prediction of football match outcomes, there is no consensus over the precise marginal 
impact of wage expenditure on league performance nor is there a robust estimate of the 
impact stemming from participating European League competitions. Studies that test this 
hypothesis are either not robust enough to control for other factors influencing match 
performance (Cox, Gilmore, and Graham, 2015) or are robust but focus on FA Cup or 
League Cup participation rather than European League competitions (Forrest, Beaumont, 
Goddard, and Simmons, 2005; Goddard, 2005; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004). The 
original contribution of chapter six is to analyse the factors affecting a match win, including 
expenditure on playing talent and participation in European League competitions. Club 
performance in the Premier League is estimated using an ordered Probit model to forecast 
match results in line with the work of Forrest, Beaumont, et al. (2005), Goddard (2005) and 
Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004).  
 
Chapter seven pulls together the empirical results to consider the implications of the thesis 
findings as a whole. Dissemination stemming from research in this thesis is indicated along 
with a summary of limiting issues and potential for further research. 
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Chapter 2 – Review of literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter one outlined why collective selling methods of broadcast rights by the Premier 
League is worthy of further study in an economic context. This chapter analyses the 
strengths and weaknesses of existing methods and findings contributing to the debate 
around collective selling in the professional sports market. From the existing evidence, this 
chapter identifies the unique contribution of this research study.  
 
Seminal papers by Rottenberg (1956), Neale (1964) and Sloane (1971) addressed the 
economic implications of the structural features of professional sports markets. Neale 
(1964) distinguished between sporting competition and economic competition to address 
the paradox that a monopoly is less profitable than competition in sports industries. It is 
the work of Neale (1964) that has allowed legislators to accept that sports leagues should 
have the power to practice collective decision making behaviour. Where this would usually 
appear as anti-competitive behaviour, Neale (1964) argued that the “firm” in professional 
sports markets is the league not the individual clubs. A sports league, as a firm, then 
competes against other types of sports for fans. This leads to the idea that clubs must 
cooperate with each other in joint production of matches in a league competition. The 
league itself is therefore a natural monopoly provider, so will be the only supplier in the 
market. Sloane (1971) disputed the conclusion of Neale (1964), by arguing that joint 
decisions of production and price are not enough to elevate the league to the status of a 
firm, the league is thus a cartel. This defined the professional sports league as a collection 
of clubs organised in such a way as to sell their product via a single outlet. A collective 
selling method could distort the market for its product or lead to abuse of a dominant 
position in the market as the sole seller, breaching competition authority regulation. 
 
Sloane (1971) further questioned the assumptions of Neale (1964) and of Rottenberg 
(1956) that sports clubs behave in the conventional profit maximising manner, suggesting 
these assumptions are misplaced in certain sports leagues. For example, the English 
Football Association Premier League is deemed one of the richest professional sports 
leagues in the world, yet only one team out of twenty reports a profit on a regular basis 
(Deloitte, 2009). The driving ambition of these clubs then is success on the playing field. 
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The pursuit of non-profit objectives justifies intervention from a governing body in order to 
protect profits of member clubs. 
 
Whilst these seminal papers form a basis for research surrounding the economics of sport, 
the evidence differs by purpose and methodology across the research objectives in this 
study. Early ideas of Neale (1964), Rottenberg (1956) and Sloane (1971) are formalised in a 
theoretical mathematical framework, coined as a contest model, as in El-Hodiri and Quirk 
(1971).  This contest model is used to investigate the structure of professional sports with a 
view to highlight how the operating rules justify exemption of professional sports leagues 
from aspects of anti-competition law in the USA. Revenue is considered to be gate receipts 
for live matches, as a function of the size of the market area and the probability of the 
team winning. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) stated that revenue at the gate is adversely 
affected as the probability that one team will win tends towards one, however a club has a 
strong motive to be more superior to the next (just not too superior). The revenue of each 
team in a league is affected by the access to playing talent and the decisions of rival teams 
in the league. The joint decision problem is described as a zero sum, n team, game. The 
theoretical evidence adapts to empirical testing, gaining complication with every 
adjustment made to the framework model. Whilst advances in the overall understanding 
are apparent , there remain areas without consensus surrounding the impact of revenue 
sharing on competitive balance (discussed in section 2.2). 
 
The hypothesis that a more balanced sporting competition leads to a greater interest in the 
event stems from the seminal work of Rottenburg (1956). This argument, known as the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, implies that observing a sporting contest between 
teams with an unpredictable outcome is preferred by fans (Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert, 
1992). A sports league where the outcome of all matches are highly uncertain would be 
deemed a balanced league, this balance stems from a close matching of the ability of 
member clubs. The empirical evidence testing the hypothesis most commonly focuses on 
stadium gate receipts. As broadcast matches become more lucrative and more popular, the 
evidence focuses on both stadium and television demand. The results that provide support 
for and support against the hypothesis usually differ because of the method used, the 
measure of outcome uncertainty used, or the sporting contest of concern. Due to the lack 
of consensus surrounding the Premier League, the impact of outcome uncertainty still 
attracts debate as methods and measures are improved (discussed in section 2.3).  
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The empirical literature surrounding professional team sports focuses mainly on analysing 
the factors affecting the demand. Early studies of demand for sports restricted attention to 
one specific determinant that may affect stadium attendance. As highlights of football 
matches were the only televised football, the impact of live television broadcasting of 
matches is largely ignored until the end of the last century, with the exception of a handful 
of papers. Hart, Hutton, and Sharot (1975) noted that little quantitative research had been 
undertaken in the sports economics field.  Hart, Hutton and Sharot (1975) modelled match 
day attendance for English First Division matches between 1969 and 1972. Other factors 
that may influence attendance at the stadium such as weather, seasonality and televised 
Rugby Internationals are mentioned but treated as random disturbances. This 
acknowledged that a televised sporting event is specifically an alternative attraction to the 
original event. Since this, the existing evidence has grown in number and made use of 
improved methodologies to address the complications of stadium demand for professional 
sports events. Discussion continues around the complication of endogeneity in section 2.4.  
 
Within the empirical literature, there exists a strong body of literature concerned with the 
prediction of match results. The majority of the existing studies focus on forecasting match 
results to test the efficiency of prices set by bookmakers in gambling markets (Hill, 1974). 
Using similar approaches to forecasting models, a number of studies model match 
outcomes to estimate the influence of factors (managerial change, artificial pitches, etc.) 
on the team performance. For example, Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) modelled 
match results of English League football from 1989 to 1999 by an ordered Probit 
estimation. The study showed that elimination from the FA Cup had a negative impact on 
team performance in the domestic league. The existing studies apply three main 
methodologies (a Poisson distribution, Logit distribution, and a Probit distribution) 
depending on the research aim. Whilst there is a focus on forecasting match results, there 
is less of a discussion around factors that impact these results (as discussed in section 2.5).  
 
This chapter continues by discussing the existing evidence surrounding the specific contexts 
of the research questions. The chapter is split into corresponding sections as follows: 
Revenue sharing and competitive balance; outcome uncertainty and demand; live 
broadcasting and match day revenue; and investment and performance. The final section 
concludes. 
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2.2 Revenue sharing and competitive balance 
 
The professional sports league is similar to an all pay auction (Szymanski and Kesenne, 
2004). Firms bid for investments in playing talent and receive a probability of success based 
largely on the stock of talent acquired relative to the talent acquired by the other firms. 
Firms are competing not for a fixed prize, as in an auction, but to receive revenue as a 
function of sporting success. A further difference from an auction is that the highest 
payment, by talent or effort, is not guaranteed to win. This form of contest model is used in 
El-Houdiri and Quirk (1971) to formalise the earlier ideas of Neale (1964), Rottenberg 
(1956) and Sloane (1971). This is now the standard analysis of competitive balance in sports 
leagues.  
 
Existing research investigating the relationship between sharing revenue and competitive 
balance stems from the formalisation of the contest model of the professional sports 
league presented in El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971). The study investigated the structure of 
professional sports with a view to justifying exemption of professional sports leagues from 
aspects of anti-competition law in the USA. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) created a simplified 
model of a sports league with n-teams. Each team is assumed to maximise the net present 
value of revenue and has an endowment of playing talent which is homogenously 
discounted over time. Revenue is considered to be gate receipts for live matches, as a 
function of the size of the market area and the probability of the team winning. El-Hodiri 
and Quirk (1971) stated that revenue at the gate is adversely affected as the probability 
that one team will win tends towards one, however a club has a strong motive to be more 
superior to the next (just not too superior). The revenue of each team in a league is 
affected by the access to playing talent and the decisions of rival teams in the league. The 
joint decision problem is described as a zero sum, n team, game. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) 
suggested prohibiting the sale of player contracts among teams would allow for 
convergence of playing strengths over time.  
 
Adaptation of this model provides the basis for academic discussion in this area. Fort and 
Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) confirmed the results of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) that 
under certain conditions sharing revenue has no impact on the allocation of players in a 
sports league and thus no impact on competitive balance. Fort and Quirk (1995) examined 
the impact of cross subsidy devices. These devices are split into three categories: rules on 
labour; revenue distribution; and number or location of clubs. The model used assumes 
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profit maximising by all clubs, income maximisation by playing talent, and that the market 
clears to reach an equilibrium. This is a simplified version of the n-team framework in El-
Hodiri and Quirk (1971), using two teams. One team is assumed to be the large market club 
and draws a larger marginal revenue, the other is a smaller market club based on the local 
population size. Results suggest that introducing the sharing of TV revenue enhances the 
competitive balance in the league and this increases league profits. However, sharing of 
gate revenue is shown to have no effect on competitive balance. Fort and Quirk (1995) 
argued that an enforceable salary cap is the only cross subsidisation policy that will 
improve competitive balance in a league. However, a salary cap would force clubs to fail on 
maximising revenues. 
 
The idea that both teams face equal marginal costs in increasing the team’s win percentage 
by purchasing playing talent assumes no externalities of market size. One team has a larger 
market size than the other by assumption. Vrooman (1995) showed that under this equal 
marginal cost assumption, playing talent flows from the large market team to the small 
market team. This occurs because the benefit to the large market team outweighs the 
losses to the small market team when the teams have an equal amount of talent, and both 
parties gain by talent transfer until the competitive balance is a 60 per cent chance of 
winning to 40 per cent chance of winning for the large market club and small market club, 
respectively.  Removing the constant marginal cost assumption and assuming a zero sum 
game, Vrooman (1995) found that sharing revenue by gate receipts between the two 
teams will not affect competitive balance if the revenues shared are win-elastic. If a 
proportional increase in the team’s revenue is larger than the proportional increase in the 
number of wins, then the team shows win-elastic revenues. Vrooman (1995) concluded 
that only the sharing of winning-inelastic revenues would improve the league competitive 
balance.  
 
Conversely to Vrooman (1995), Kesenne (2000) showed that revenue sharing improves the 
league competitive balance under both profit maximising and utility maximising 
assumptions of the firm. Using a league model with n-number of clubs, Kesenne (2000) 
argued this solution is not found in existing research because these previous models do not 
account for the absolute quality of the teams as a determinant of revenue. Kesenne (2000) 
showed the demand for playing talent reduces if revenues are shared amongst profit 
maximising teams as there is a reduced incentive to buy additional playing staff if the 
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marginal revenue received by the employment of each player has to be shared with 
competing firms. The redistribution of talent amongst clubs remains unchanged only if the 
shift in demand results in the same equilibrium for all clubs. Kesenne (2000) argued this 
cannot hold and shows that revenue sharing will improve the balance in the league by 
redistributing talent from better performing clubs to worse performing clubs. The larger 
market clubs will reduce their labour demand to a greater extent than the smaller market 
clubs, thus after revenue sharing, talent distribution is more equal. As mentioned in section 
2.1, Sloane (1971) argued that sports clubs do not behave in the conventional profit 
maximising manner, rather the firm objectives include other things such as winning a 
sporting contest. These objectives are described as utility maximising. Using this objective 
over a profit maximising objective, Kesenne (2000) removed the assumption that firms are 
constrained to make at least zero profit. This allows firms to make a negative profit. As in 
the case for a profit maximising league, assuming a utility maximising objective results in a 
more balanced league by talent redistribution from larger to smaller clubs when revenue is 
shared more evenly. By allowing a negative profit, Kesenne (2000) showed that profit levels 
do not affect revenue sharing and competitive balance. 
 
Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) adapted the early model of Quirk (1971) to 
reflect certain issues in American sports leagues.  Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) adapted 
the model to reflect issues in European leagues using non cooperative game theory. Like 
Kesenne (2000), Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) also argued that revenue sharing will affect 
competitive balance. However, unlike Kesenne (2000), Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) 
showed that an increase in revenue sharing will have an adverse impact on competitive 
balance under assumptions that are deemed more reasonable to the industry. The supply 
of playing talent is considered to be elastic, allowing for a closer description of football 
leagues in Europe. A more elastic supply of players is described as a reasonable assumption 
for football leagues in Europe as players move freely between leagues as no league is 
particularly dominant (Szymanski, 2003). Competitive balance is measured by the ratio of 
win percentage between the competing teams in the league. Szymanski and Kesenne 
(2004) showed that revenue sharing reduces the incentive to win, thus reducing 
investment in match winning talent. Furthermore, the result shows the reduced incentive 
affects small market teams more as the loss of gate revenue would be greater for the 
opponents of the small market teams if these teams are more likely to win. Thus, the 
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sharing of gate revenue reduces the total investment in playing talent across the league 
and reduces the league’s competitive balance. 
 
Robinson and Simmons (2014) provided rare empirical evidence of the effect revenue 
sharing has on talent distribution. Using data from the English Football League 1969 to 
1995, the study showed that a greater number of quality players transferred towards more 
successful teams between 1983 and 1995. The league had a revenue sharing policy in place 
until 1983, showing that revenue sharing has a positive impact on league competitive 
balance. 
 
Following the Nash behaviour approach of Szymanski and Kesenne (2004), Runkel (2011) 
investigated the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance within a two team 
contest model. One team is considered to have a larger potential market size than the 
other. Runkel (2011) showed how the impact of revenue sharing changes when 
assumptions about the probability of a team winning the league change. Szymanski and 
Kesenne (2004) assumed that the ratio of talent a club owns compared to the total stock of 
talent in the league represents the team’s probability of success. The contest success 
function used in Runkel (2011) followed the same principle but replaces the stock of talent 
with performance. The performance measure is one that accounts for not only the stock of 
talent (the input) but how well this creates the output of winning (the production 
technology). Results show that in the case of clubs facing an inelastic supply of playing 
talent, revenue sharing reduces competitive balance regardless of the shape of the contest 
success function. However, in the case of clubs facing an elastic supply of playing talent, 
revenue sharing will increase competitive balance if the contest success function assumes 
the elasticity of performance with respect to a revenue sharing parameter is the same for 
both teams. Here, the sharing of revenue will reduce the performance of a team with a 
larger potential market to a greater extent than for the smaller market team, thus 
competition in the league becomes closer balanced. 
  
Results change, as seen in the existing evidence above, by changes in assumptions 
(Kesenne, 2005). Notably, the results will change with: the revenue function used; the 
assumption on firm objectives; the elasticity of supply; and the type of revenue sharing 
method. Revenue is shared by splitting gate receipts between competing teams in a 
number of North American sports leagues. This is not the case for other contexts, such as 
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Premier League football. Here, the revenue received from the sale of broadcast rights is 
shared rather than gate receipts. The arrangement for sharing of revenue changes the 
impact on competitive balance. Results from Kesenne (2005) show that a club with a higher 
stock of playing talent will reduce its demand for talent less than a club with fewer playing 
talents and hence. The pool sharing method of revenue distribution worsens competitive 
balance if all clubs are profit maximising. If a league is a mixture of profit maximising and 
win maximising firms then the impact of revenue sharing would increase competitive 
balance (Kesenee, 2005). The assumption is that win maximising clubs are often the ones 
that are financially less successful than those that profit maximise. Poorer clubs will 
increase their demand for playing talent and richer clubs will reduce their demand when 
revenue is shared.  
 
Feess and Stähler (2009) used the contest model to show the impact of revenue sharing on 
competitive balance when there are n heterogenous clubs that profit maximise. Their 
results show that revenue sharing does not affect competitive balance, agreeing with a 
number of previous results, such as El Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1955), 
Vrooman (1995). This result however only holds when clubs are homogenous in the impact 
of absolute team quality and not when relative team quality is considered. Thus, Feess and 
Stahler (2009) found that revenue sharing amongst clubs will increase competitive balance 
if clubs differ in terms of the impact of absolute quality on revenue.  
 
Vrooman (2011) addressed the impact on competitive balance of revenue sharing, salary 
caps, and other club and fan payoffs, with profit maximising and win maximising 
assumptions. The Premier League distributes revenue from broadcast rights partly by 
providing an equal share to each member club and partly in accord with the final league 
position (merit payment). Results show that a revenue sharing regime based on providing 
an ‘equal share’ and a ‘merit payment’ (in the ratio of 50/50) has increased competitive 
balance for some European football leagues such as the Premier League. Dietl, Grossmann, 
and Lang (2011) developed a contest model combining the profit maximising and win 
maximising assumptions. This weighted sum of profits and wins reflects the tendency for 
owners in European sports leagues to forgo profits in search of winning. Dietl et al. (2011) 
showed that preferring more wins or more profit will affect the club’s investment in talent 
and thus the league’s competitive balance. Results show that revenue sharing enhances 
investment incentives, thus improving competitive balance, when the large market team is 
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dominant. This occurs as sharing revenue is positive and stronger for the small market club 
than for the large market club and thus investment in talent is greater for the smaller team, 
increasing competitive balance. If however, revenue sharing has a negative impact on 
marginal revenue, then the reverse is true and revenue sharing will reduce competitive 
balance, as found in Szymanski and Kesenne (2004). 
 
In a step forward in the analysis of the impact of revenue sharing, Hirai and Kawashima 
(2009) showed that club objectives are partly formulated by reference to the arrangements 
for sharing revenue. Their research was motivated by the observation that North American 
sports leagues tend towards a profit maximising objective and European sports league tend 
towards a win maximising objective. Moreover, clubs are often not controlled by owner-
managers, rather the owner and manager are separate individuals with different 
objectives. Hirai and Kawashima (2009) presented the n-club contest model as used in the 
studies mentioned above with an owner (the profit maximiser) and the manager (the win 
maximiser) adopting formulations similar to the models found in the strategic delegation 
literature. The strategic use of managerial incentive contracts has been introduced by 
Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (the VFJS 
model). In these papers, each firm’s owner has the option to compensate the manager 
with an incentive contract combining own profits and sales or revenues, in order to direct 
them to a more aggressive behaviour in the market.  
 
The research in chapter three aims to bring more clarity to the issue in the specific context 
of the Premier League. Given a number of recent advances in the literature, including the 
use of strategic managerial incentive contracts, and the use of a utility function combining 
profit and win behaviour, the analysis focuses on these innovations relevant to the current 
environment. The impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance is analysed in chapter 
three using a contest model with managerial incentive contracts, and endogenises the 
weight given to profit or wins by each club and solves for a two-stage game (Hirai and 
Kawashima, 2009). This allows differing levels of revenue sharing and for clubs in the 
league to make different decisions.  
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2.3 Outcome uncertainty and demand  
 
The hypothesis that a more balanced sporting competition leads to a greater interest in the 
event stems from the seminal work of Rottenberg (1956). This argument, known as the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, implies that observing a sporting contest between 
teams with an unpredictable outcome is preferred by fans (Knowles et al., 1992). A sports 
league where the outcome of all matches are highly uncertain would be deemed a 
balanced league, this balance stems from a close match of the ability of member clubs. 
Rottenberg (1956) identified a number of imperfections in the labour market in the 
American Baseball industry. Key to this is the reserve clause: When a contract is renewed a 
team can’t pay the player less than 75 per cent of their current salary. In return, the player 
is obligated to play exclusively for the team they are under contract with. Any negotiation 
for alternative team employment happens between the teams, not the player and 
interested team. The labour market is segmented into three distinct markets due to this 
practice. 
 
“The market for baseball players has really divided into three markets. One is the market 
for free agents, in which the player is the seller; another is the market for players who have 
already signed their first contracts, in which teams are both the sellers and the buyers; the 
third is the market for current services of contracted players, in which the player is the 
seller and the team that holds his contract is the buyer.” Rottenberg (1956) p 245.  
 
A common defence of the reserve clause was to aid the equal distribution of playing talent 
across the teams in a league. A more equal distribution of talent is if required to promote 
uncertainty of outcome as outcome uncertainty is needed for a consumer to be willing to 
pay to spectate the game. If the distribution of talent was not controlled, more wealthy 
teams would outbid less wealthy teams for the best players, thus creating a league with 
more certain champions. Rottenberg (1956) commented that empirical observations show 
that distribution of playing talent enforced by the reserve clause has not stopped teams 
outbidding each other for the services of players. More likely, it is the idea that the 
competing teams collaborate jointly to produce a game as a spectacle that will eventually 
stop wealthier teams buying the best talent. If the spectacle becomes less interesting due 
to greater pre game knowledge of the possible winner, gate receipts are likely to drop. 
Thus, beyond a certain point, buying talent will reduce the contribution to the joint 
production of a match. However, these observations are based on a baseball industry that 
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receives the majority of revenue from gate receipts.  
 
Neale (1964) argued that legal leniency for professional sports teams is acceptable given 
the unique joint production of the spectacle. He suggests that less competition would lead 
to lower profits. This is because the ticket receipts depend on the competition among the 
players of the teams rather than the between the firms running the teams. Each team in a 
league will gain, what is described as free advertising, if the league standings are closer and 
the standings frequently change.  
 
“…the product of professional sporting activity is not merely (1) the match, but also (2) the 
"league standings" (or championship), the progress towards a championship or changes in 
the standings, topics of conversation, and press reports. Furthermore, (3) a business firm - 
Joe Louis or the New York Yankees - cannot produce any of these streams of utilities 
alone.” Neale (1964), p 4. 
 
Discussion stemming from these two seminal papers provides early empirical evidence 
testing the hypothesis that outcome uncertainty is needed for a consumer to be willing to 
pay to spectate. Most commonly, the focus is on stadium gate receipts, less commonly and 
more recently the focus is on television demand. The impact of outcome uncertainty on 
stadium attendance still attracts debate driven by no apparent consensus across all 
sporting contests. Instead there appears localised patterns of similar results. Table 2.1 
shows details of the evidence concerned with this hypothesis. The table separates 
American Sports, European Football and other sporting leagues from around the world.  
 
Concerned with the impact of outcome uncertainty in Major League Baseball, Beckman, 
Cai, Esrock, and Lemke (2011), Lemke, Leonard, and Tlhokwane (2009), Coates et al. (2014), 
and Meehan, Nelson, and Richardson (2007) found against the UOH. These studies all use a 
censored normal regression technique to account for sell-out crowds at the stadium. In 
examining the optimal level of externality in competitive balance in Major League Baseball, 
Rascher (1999) found evidence that supports the UOH. This study uses a fixed effects 
ordinary least squares method of computation. Using Monte Carlo simulations to forecast 
game outcomes, Tainsky and Winfree (2010) found no impact of outcome uncertainty on 
match attendance. Similar to Rascher (1999) and twenty other studies in Table 2.1, 
however, they do not take account of sell-out crowds. More recently, extending the time 
series  
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Table 2.1 (part 1) Empirical testing of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH). 
Author(s)                                Sport Date Dependent variable UOH measure Computation Functional form UOH result 
American Sports        
Rascher and Solmes (2007) American National Basketball Association 2001 - 2002 Attendance f (win%) Censored Normal  Quadratic For 
Beckman et al. (2011) American Major League Baseball 1985 -2009 Attendance Betting Odds Censored Normal Quadratic Against 
Lemke et al. (2010) American Major League Baseball 2007 Log attendance Betting Odds Censored Normal  Quadratic Against 
Coates, Humphreys and Zhou (2014) American Major League Baseball 2005 -2010 Log attendance Betting Odds Censored Normal  Quadratic Against 
Meehan et al. (2007) American Major League Baseball 2000 - 2002 Attendance Win % Censored Normal Regression Linear Against 
Rascher (1999) American Major League Baseball 1996 Attendance Betting Odds,f (win%) Fixed effects OLS Quadratic For 
Tainsky and Winfree (2010) American Major League Baseball 1996 - 2009 Log attendance f (win%) Probit, Mote Carlo Linear No impact 
Coates and Humphreys (2010) American National Football League 1985 - 2008 Log attendance Point Spreads Tobit  Quadratic Against 
Paul et al. (2007) American National Football League 1991 - 2002 TV audience Win % OLS Linear For 
Paul et al. (2011) American National Football League 2009 - 2010 Fan rating Margin of victory OLS Linear For 
Tainsky et al. (2014) American National Football League 2005 - 2009 TV audience Betting Odds, win % OLS Linear Local market: no impact. Non local market: For 
Coates and Humphreys (2012) American National Hockey League 2005 -2010 Log attendance Betting Odds Censored Normal Regression Band /step Against 
Mills and Fort (2014) NBA, NFL, NHL, MLB 1900 - 2000 Log average attendance Win % Times series, break point  Linear 
Against: NHL, MLB. For: 
NBA, NFL 
        
European Football        
Peel and Thomas (1992) English Football Division 1-4 1986 - 1987 Log attendance Betting Odds OLS Quadratic Against 
Forrest and Simmons (2002) English Football PL - Division 4 1997 - 1998 Log attendance Betting Odds Fixed effects OLS Quadratic Against 
Buraimo and Simmons (2008) English Premier League Football 2000 -2006 Log attendance Betting Odds Random Effects Tobit Model Quadratic Against 
Forrest, Beaumont, Goddard and 
Simmons (2005) English Premier League Football 1997 - 1998 Log attendance Betting Odds Fixed effects OLS Quadratic Against 
Forrest, Buraimo and Simmons (2005) English Premier League Football 1993 - 2002 Log TV audience Points difference OLS Linear For 
Buraimo (2008) English Premier League Football 1997 - 2004 Log attendance / Log TV audience Points difference 
Prais–Winsten 
regression / 2SLS Linear No impact 
Buraimo and Simmons (2015) English Premier League Football 2000 - 2008 Log TV audience Difference in win prob Heckman (FE) Linear No impact after 2002 
Falter et al. (2008)  French Football Ligue 1   1996 - 2000 Log attendance f (points) Fixed effects OLS Linear No impact 
Pawlowski and Anders (2012) German Football Bundesliga  2005 - 2006 Log attendance Betting Odds Tobit  Linear Against 
Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) German Football Bundesliga  1996 - 1997 Log attendance Betting Odds Tobit  Quadratic Against 
Benz et al. (2008) German Football Bundesliga  1999 - 2004 Log attendance Betting Odds,f (standings) Censored quantile regression Quadratic No impact 
Buraimo and Simmons (2009) Spanish Football Primera division  2003 - 2007 Log attendance / Log TV audience Betting Odds 
Prais–Winsten 
regression / 2SLS 
Quadratic / 
absolute 
difference 
Against (Stadium) / For 
(TV) 
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Table 2.1 (part 2) Empirical testing of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH) 
 
        
Other Sports        
Borland (1987) Australia Football  VLF 1950 - 1986 Log attendance f (win%, standings) Logit Linear No impact 
Madalozzo and Berber Villar (2009) Brazilian Football League 2003 - 2006 Log attendance Standings Fixed and Random effects OLS Linear No impact 
Peel and Thomas (1997) British Rugby League 1994 - 1995 Attendance Betting Odds (Handicap) OLS Linear Against 
Sacheti et al. (2014) International Cricket 1980 - 2011 Log average attendance Test ratings Fixed effects OLS Quadratic No impact 
Jang and Lee (2014) Korean Professional Football League 1987 - 2011 Log average attendance Win % OLS Quadratic For 
Owen and Weatherston (2004a) New Zealand First Division Rugby Union 2000 - 2003 Log attendance Betting Odds OLS Quadratic For 
Owen and Weatherston (2004b) New Zealand Super 12 Rugby Union 1999 - 2001 Log attendance Betting Odds OLS Quadratic For 
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Table 2.2 (part 1) Model variables included in existing UOH literature 
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American Sports                         
Rascher and Solmes (2007) 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Beckman et al. (2011) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lemke et al. (2010) 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Coates, Humphreys and Zhou (2014) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Meehan et al. (2007) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Rascher (1999) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Tainsky and Winfree (2010) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Coates and Humphreys (2010) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Paul et al. (2007) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paul et al. (2011) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Tainsky et al. (2014) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Coates and Humphreys (2012) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mills and Fort (2014) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                         
 
European Football                         
Peel and Thomas (1992) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forrest and Simmons (2002) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Buraimo and Simmons (2008) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forrest, Beaumont, Goddard and Simmons (2005) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forrest, Buraimo and Simmons (2005) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Buraimo (2008) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Buraimo and Simmons (2015) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Falter et al. (2008)  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Pawlowski and Anders (2012) 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Benz et al. (2008) 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Buraimo and Simmons (2009) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2.2 (part 2) Model variables included in existing UOH literature 
 
Other Sports                         
Borland (1987) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Madalozzo and Berber Villar (2009) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Peel and Thomas (1997) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Sacheti et al. (2014) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Jang and Lee (2014) 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Owen and Weatherston (2004a) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Owen and Weatherston (2004b) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
                         
 11 7 11 8 8 4 19 27 12 9 2 1 18 17 17 11 1 6 13 1 7 1 5 6 
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breakpoint literature regarding annual league-level attendance and the impact of outcome 
uncertainty, Mills and Fort (2014) presented evidence that agrees with Beckman et al. 
(2011), Lemke et al. (2010), Coates et al. (2014), and Meehan et al. (2007).   
 
Paul, Wachsman, and Weinbach (2010) measured the impact on outcome uncertainty of 
spectator preferences towards matches in the American National Football League using a 
fan ratings survey. The evidence shows that a greater margin of victory reduces fan interest 
in the match. Paul et al. (2010) and Mills and Fort (2014) both found in favour of the UOH 
for NFL. However, using stadium attendance numbers and a method to account for sell out 
matches, Coates and Humphreys (2012) showed evidence against the UOH for NFL games. 
Thirteen of the studies in Table 2.1 use a quadratic function to estimate the marginal effect 
of the UOH on demand for a football match. A linear or a quadratic functional form 
assumes that a more complex relationship does not exist. Coates and Humphreys (2012) 
argued that spectator preferences are not symmetric, given that spectators do not dislike a 
team’s loss to the same degree as they like a victory. The measure of match uncertainty is 
split into bands or steps and allowed to vary more flexibly across values of stadium 
attendance to account for reference-dependent preferences , whilst the marginal impact of 
competitive balance upon attendance is allowed to vary at different levels of competitive 
balance. Using this method, so far unique to the literature, Coates and Humphreys (2012) 
found against the UOH for National Hockey League games.  In analysis of American 
Baseball, Hockey and Football, all the studies that account for a possible sell-out crowd find 
against the UOH. Rascher and Solmes (2007) have estimated the optimal probability of the 
home team winning which attracts the largest attendance in American National Basketball 
Association matches. Rascher and Solmes (2007) and Mills and Fort (2014) found that a 
more balanced match increases stadium attendance, supporting the UOH in the NBA.  
 
Outside of North American sports, studies focusing on football in Brazil (Madalozzo and 
Berber Villar, 2009), Australian rules football (Borland, 1987), and international cricket 
(Sacheti, Gregory-Smith, and Paton, 2014) found no evidence of outcome uncertainty on 
stadium attendance. Sacheti et al. (2014) distinguished between uncertainty of outcome in 
the short run and uncertainty of outcome in the long run, showing that controlling for team 
strength as an absolute measure is important in estimating the impact on outcome 
uncertainty in International Cricket. Jang and Lee (2015) analysed structural changes in the 
Korean Professional Football League between 1987 and 2011, finding that a more uncertain 
 21 
match (measured by the team’s win percentage) will increase stadium demand. Owen and 
Weatherston (2004a) and Owen and Weatherston (2004b) tested the UOH in New Zealand 
First Division Rugby Union to refute a specific policy proposal to exclude an All Blacks team 
from the league, finding in favour of the hypothesis. Using spread betting odds for rugby 
league in England, Peel and Thomas (1997) is the only study in this group (Table 2.1) to find 
a negative relationship between uncertainty of winning and stadium attendance.  
 
Studies testing the UOH on football in European countries use pre match fixed betting odds 
as a measure of outcome uncertainty. This follows a study on English Football Divisions 1 to 
4 during the 1986 – 1987 season by Peel and Thomas (1992). As betting odds are often 
subject to bias derived from book keepers profits, Forrest and Simmons (2002) corrected 
for this bias in a study of the same leagues during the 1997 – 1998 season. Czarnitzki and 
Stadtmann (2002) acknowledged the problem of not being able to observe true demand 
for stadium attendance due to the capacity constraint of a stadium when analysing German 
Bundesliga football for the 1996 – 1997 season. They, along with four of the twelve studies 
in this section (Table 2.1), use a method to account for sell-out crowds. Benz, Brandes, and 
Franck (2009) advanced the literature by recognising heterogeneity in fan demand. To 
account for behavioural differences amongst consumers, they use a method that allows the 
impact of outcome uncertainty to vary across quantiles of stadium attendance. However, 
the study finds no evidence to support the UOH. 
 
The lack of consensus over the impact of outcome uncertainty and match attendance is 
more apparent when taking a broader view of sporting contests. There is an emerging 
consensus in the specific context of European football leagues.  The existing evidence 
provides no support for the UOH (Buraimo, 2008; Falter, Perignon, and Vercruysse, 2007; 
Benz et al., 2009).The evidence in English football against the UOH includes Peel and 
Thomas (1992), Forrest and Simmons (2002), Buraimo and Simmons (2009b), and Forrest, 
Simmons, and Buraimo (2005).  
 
Stadium attendance is only part of the total demand for a professional sports match. Live 
rights for a match are often sold to broadcasters. When a match is broadcast live, the 
demand includes stadium attendance and the television audience. Other media is also 
available, such as radio broadcasts and illegal streaming. The prominence of sports 
broadcasting and the recent availability of audience data have led to a handful of studies 
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focusing on the impact of the UOH on TV demand. Buraimo (2008) modelled match-day 
attendances and television audiences using data from tier-two of English league football, 
finding that while televised matches reduce stadium attendances, larger stadium 
attendances have positive impacts on the size of television audiences.  
 
More recently, Buraimo and Simmons (2015) found that outcome uncertainty had little 
impact on television audiences of Premier League matches from 2002 to 2008 . The study 
used the absolute difference in each team’s win probability to measure outcome 
uncertainty. When including the team’s wages in the modelling, the study found that this 
(as a measure of the quality of footballing talent on the pitch) was far more important to 
the television viewer than the closeness of the match outcome. Paul et al. (2010) found 
evidence of within-match uncertainty affecting TV audiences in American National Football 
League matches from 1991 to 2002. Tainsky, Xu, and Zhou (2012) used broadcast ratings 
for National Football League playoff games to test the UOH in teams’ local markets, as well 
as national markets of the competing teams. Forrest, Simmons, et al. (2005) modelled both 
the choice of which games to show and the size of audience attracted by each game for 
Premier League matches between 1993 and 2002. Buraimo and Simmons (2009b) is the 
only study to analyse the UOH for stadium attendance and TV audiences in the same 
context and time period. They find against the OUH in Spanish Football Primera division 
from 2003 to 2007 for stadium attendance but for the hypothesis for TV audiences. 
Similarly, all of these studies find in favour of the UOH for television audiences. In 
summary, the existing evidence surrounding Premier League football shows stadium 
attending consumers prefer more certain match outcomes, while television audiences 
prefer more uncertain match outcomes.  
 
To estimate the marginal impact of a measure of uncertainty on demand ceteris paribus, 
control variables are modelled to account for other influences on demand. Table 2.2 shows 
the variables included in the modelling process for the literature focussed on estimating 
the impact of the UOH. The variables included in the modelling vary due to method of 
computation and league features. However, there are a number of key elements to 
modelling demand that the literature agrees upon. For example, a measure of current team 
performance is included in all studies, with the exception of Mills and Fort (2014), Forrest, 
Buraimo and Simmons (2005), Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002), Borland (1987) and Peel 
and Thomas (1997). The logic behind this is that a better performing team over the last few 
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matches (usually the previous six) will attract more spectators.  The general reputation of a 
team will also have a baseline of core supporters interested in consuming the live match on 
a regular basis. Forrest, Simmons, et al. (2005), Pawlowski and Anders (2012), Czarnitzki 
and Stadtmann (2002), and Benz et al. (2009) all included a measure of a team’s previous 
season success. Other measures of product quality include team quality and star talent, 
derby games, significance of the match to the team, age of stadia and temperature or 
weather. The price of the match can be included and, for stadium demand models, the cost 
of travel for away fans is part of the product price.  
 
In European football, Buraimo and Simmons (2009b), Buraimo and Simmons Buraimo and 
Simmons (2009a), Buraimo (2008), Falter et al. (2008), and Czarnitzki and Stadtmann 
(2002) acknowledged that a live television broadcast is a direct substitute for stadium 
attendance. Only Sacheti et al. (2014) and Jang and Lee (2015) included a measurement to 
account for a substitute sporting event held at a similar time to the match in question. 
Other substitutes such as leisure activities are not explicitly controlled for, although if the 
day of the match is used this will broadly equate to working (weekday) or leisure (weekend 
day). Potential market size is measured by local population density, average income and 
unemployment rates.  
 
In summary, across the existing literature there is a call for further clarity on the issue of 
outcome uncertainty and demand in the specific context of viewing at the stadium and on 
television in the Premier League. The argument that spectators do not dislike a team’s loss 
to the same degree as they like a victory is yet to be applied to the context of the Premier 
League. Chapter four estimates the impact of outcome uncertainty on both stadium 
attendance and television audiences during the same time period for the Premier League. 
This has only been completed previously by Buraimo (2008) (for English football) and 
Simmons Buraimo and Simmons (2009b) (for Spanish football). The research in chapter 
four also attempts to reconcile the differences in existing results by testing the uncertainty 
of outcome hypothesis with different measures of outcome uncertainty. 
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2.4 Live broadcasting and match day Revenue 
 
A summary of the empirical evidence surrounding the impact of live broadcasting on 
stadium attendance is given in Table 2.3. Variables used in the modelling process of 
existing research are summarised in Table 2.4.  
 
The empirical literature concerned with the economics of professional team sports focuses 
heavily on analysing the factors affecting the demand. Factors such as uncertainty of the 
match outcome are researched by Noll (1974), Dobson, Goddard, and Wilson (2001), 
Forrest, Simmons, and Szymanski (2004) and Buraimo (2008), amongst others. Early studies 
of demand for sports restricted attention to one specific determinant that may affect 
attendance.  For example: Davenport (1969) compared attendances in years where 
competition was close, to the years when competition was not close; Canes (1974) studies 
the correlation between attendance and a club’s league position; and Heilmann and 
Wendling (1976) looked at attendance with normal and discounted ticket prices. These 
papers shared the obvious weakness that they assume all other factors are being held 
constant, yet make no attempt to use controls to that effect.  
More rigorous studies by Noll (1974) and Hart et al. (1975) considered the functional form 
of the demand equation for sports, including the roles of market size, price and income. In 
a study on the Scottish football league, Jennett (1984) furthered the use of control 
variables by including the number of travelling supporters1. However, these studies use 
cross section or time series data with a short time span, for example, one season. To avoid 
this issue Bird (1982) used a time series data set that spans more than twenty seasons, in a 
study on the English football league. The focus is mainly on economic control variables, 
such as income and price with less consideration given to underlying econometric issues.   
 
As highlights of football matches were the only televised football, the impact of live 
television broadcasting of matches was largely ignored until the end of the last century, 
with the exception of a handful of papers. Hart et al. (1975) noted that little quantitative 
research had been undertaken in the sports economics field.  They model match day 
attendance for English First Division matches between 1969 and 1972. The model 
1 This is more applicable in the UK due to the shorter distances between stadiums than in 
the US. 
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incorporates the distance travelled by the away supporters, the population of the team’s 
catchment area and the team’s league position. Data from Leeds United, Newcastle United, 
Nottingham Forest and Southampton (only) are used with a view to diversify the 
geographical situation of each observation. Other factors that may influence attendance at 
the stadium such as weather, seasonality and televised Rugby Internationals are mentioned 
but treated as random disturbances. This treatment acknowledged that a televised sporting 
event is an alternative attraction to the original event. Bird (1982) estimated match 
attendance in the long run for English Football League matches from 1948 to 1980. The 
study finds a negative income elasticity of demand for football2. This finding suggests that 
football spectating is an inferior good with a low price elasticity. Bird (1982) noted that 
televised football highlights may be popular but chooses not to incorporate this in 
modelling demand. 
 
A frequently cited study on attendance at Premier League matches during the 1993-94 
season by Baimbridge, Cameron, and Dawson (1996) used a wide range of control variables 
such as outcome uncertainty, match quality and age of the team. The model identifies 
fifteen out of the twenty control variables that are used across the range of existing 
literature (Table 2.4). Variables that are included in other models of demand for English 
football include the previous season’s attendance, the month or part of the season, and 
participation in secondary competitions. Premier League matches that are broadcast live 
on Sky Sports in the UK on Mondays and Sundays are captured a by dummy variable. The 
study finds that matches televised on Mondays reduce attendances at the stadiums by 15 
per cent, but does not affect games broadcast on Sundays.  
 
However, this result is criticised by Forrest and Simmons (2006) for failing to use an 
econometric estimation method that accounts for when attendance reaches the stadium 
capacity, rendering the inference questionable. The studies noted in Table 2.4 consider the 
distance between the competing club’s stadia. This is used as a measure of the travel costs 
for away supporters and also to capture rivalry between closely located teams, described 
as derby matches. 
2 Demand theory refers to an individual's disposable income, Bird (1982) uses total real 
consumer expenditure.   The use of this measure assumes a stable relationship between 
consumption patterns and income during the time period 1948 to 1980. 
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Table 2.3 Empirical testing of the impact of live broadcasting 
Author(s)                                Sport Date Dependent variable TV measure Computation Impact of TV 
American Sports             
Welki and Zlatoper (1994) American National Football League 1986 - 1987 Attendance TV blackout dummy Tobit  5300 more attendance when TV 
Falls and Natke (2014) American Football Bowl Subdivision 2004 - 2009 
Attendance and per 
cent capacity TV dummy Tobit Increased stadium utilisation by 2.7% 
Lemke et al. (2010) American Major League Baseball 2007 Attendance and Log National TV and local blackout Censored  -6.7% 
Mirabile (2014) American College Football 2004 - 2012 Per cent capacity National TV Tobit Not significant 
             
European Sports            
Allan and Roy (2008) Scottish Premier League 2002 - 2003 Log attendance Terrestrial TV dummy Fixed effects -31.9% for Home Pay at Gate 
Czarnitski and Stadtmann (2002) German first division 1996 - 1998 Log attendance TV dummy Tobit Positive and dropped due to endogeneity 
Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) Spanish first division 1992 - 1996 Log attendance TV public, TV private Fixed effects -32.1% to -42.7% 
Carmichael et al. (1999)  English Rugby League 1994 - 1995 Log attendance Day, Sky OLS - 20.7% Friday Sky 
             
English Football            
Allan (2004) Aston Villa only 1995 - 2001 Log attendance Sky dummy Pooled OLS -7.75 per cent 
Baimbridge et al. (1996)  English Premier League 1993 - 1994 Log attendance Monday Sky, Sunday Sky Dummy OLS -15.2% Monday Sky 
Buraimo and Simmons (2006)  English Premier League 1997 - 2004 Log attendance Day TV dummy Tobit -2.8% to -10.3% 
Buraimo (2008) English League Football T1-3 1997 - 2004 Log attendance Sky, ITV Terrestrial, ITV digital Fixed effects -17.7% ITV terrestrial, -5.9% ITV digital, -4% Sky 
Buraimo, Forrest and Simmons (2009) English Football Championship 1997 - 2004 Log attendance Sky, ITV Terrestrial, ITV digital 
Hausman–Taylor 
random effects -21.2% ITV terrestrial, -8.3% ITV digital, -4.7% Sky 
Buraimo, Paramio and Campos (2010) Premier League, LaLiga 2003 - 2007 Log attendance Sky weekend/day (for PL) Tobit -2.9% weekend, -8.3% weekday 
Forrest and Simmons (2006)  English Football League 1999 - 2002 Log attendance TV, ITV Champions League Prais-Winsten regression -15.8 to -21.4% 
Forrest et al. (2004) English Premier League 1992 - 1998 Log attendance Day, Sky Tobit -9.1% to -12.9% 
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Table 2.4 Model variables included in existing attendance modelling literature 
Author(s)                                
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American Sports                                         
Welki and Zlatoper (1994) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Falls and Natke (2014) 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lemke et al. (2010) 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Mirabile (2014) 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
European Sports                     
Allan and Roy (2008) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czarnitski and Stadtmann (2002) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Carmichael, Millington and Simmons (1999)  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
English Football                     
Allan (2004) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Baimbridge, Cameron, and Dawson (1996)  1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Buraimo and Simmons (2006)  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Buraimo (2008) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Buraimo, Forrest and Simmons (2009) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Buraimo, Paramio and Campos (2010) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Forrest and Simmons (2006)  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Forrest, Simmons and Szymanski (2004) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Sum 6 4 5 8 2 4 8 11 6 11 4 1 15 13 6 4 7 5 5 5 
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The second most popular factor used in the modelling process is the day of the week the 
match is held on. Demand changes for matches that are not played on a Saturday as the 
amount of leisure time is likely less mid-week for most supporters. The majority of studies 
include a measure of current form for each team, showing that current performance can 
impact on the demand for the spectacle. 
 
Furthermore, the difference in performance (outcome uncertainty) can also have an impact 
on expectations of match quality and thus demand. All the studies in Table 2.4 include the 
live broadcast of a match as a direct substitute. However, few studies identify other sports 
events as a substitute to the live match (Baimbridge et al. (1996); Buraimo and Simmons 
(2008); Forrest, Simmons, et al. (2005). In addition, only Baimbridge et al. (1996) included a 
measure of economic activity, by unemployment, as an impact on stadium demand. 
 
Forrest and Simmons (2006) examined the impact of televising different, and possibly more 
attractive matches, on stadium attendance in different leagues in England 1999 to 2002. 
This study shows that broadcasting Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) 
Champions League matches involving Premier League clubs has a negative impact on 
attendance at lower league football matches. This effect is much stronger when games are 
broadcast on free to watch rather than subscription channels. The impact of televised 
matches on stadium attendance is estimated to be between 15.8 per cent and 21.4 per 
cent less people.  The study uses a Tobit estimation method to overcome the problems 
caused by sell-out crowds. This method is used by approximately one third of the existing 
studies in Table 2.3, notably by Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002), Mirabile (2015), Falls and 
Natke (2014), Welki and Zlatoper (1994), and Forrest et al. (2004).  
 
Allan and Roy (2008) argued that the focus on aggregate attendance at matches does not 
permit evaluation of the impact of broadcasting on different categories of spectators. Their 
model of stadium attendance in the Scottish Premier league between 2002 and 2003 
disaggregates match day attendance into three groups: season ticket holders, pay-at-the-
gate home team supporters, and pay-at-the-gate visiting team supporters. They find that 
the majority of variance in the attendance for football matches comes for consumers 
buying tickets at the gate, whereas season ticket holders are much less affected by match 
day specific characteristics. The results show that the number of home fans buying tickets 
at the gate drop by 31.9 per cent when the same match is broadcast live on terrestrial 
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television.  
 
In a study of the Spanish football league, Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) found evidence of a 
significant reduction in stadium attendance when a match is televised. The effect is 
increased for matches shown on free to view terrestrial television. Public and privately 
available television broadcasts of live matches are identified between 1992 and 1996. The 
attendance at the stadium is reduced by 32 per cent when the match is broadcast live on a 
subscription channel and reduced by 44 per cent when broadcast on a terrestrial channel. 
Buraimo, Paramio, and Campos (2010) found that whilst broadcasting live matches on free 
to air channels had a negative impact on attendance (3.8 per cent at a weekend and 18.6 
per cent during the week), the impact of broadcasting on subscription channels was not 
significant in La Lgia from 2003 to 2007. This study replicated the same estimation on 
Premier League data, finding that broadcasting live matches on Sky Sports reduced 
attendance by 2.9 per cent and 8.3 per cent for weekend and weekday matches 
respectively. Similarly, Forrest et al. (2004) found that the effect of broadcasting on match 
attendance in English football is mixed depending on the broadcaster and the platform on 
which the match is viewed.  They use Sky sports broadcasts on different days of the week 
to show there is a reduction in stadium attendance from 9 to 12 per cent for each live 
broadcast of Premier League matches between 1992 and 1998. The study suggests that this 
impact on stadium attendance is minimal and additional fees paid to the club for 
broadcasting rights would likely exceed the opportunity cost.  
 
Borland and MacDonald (2003) suggested the evidence on how live broadcasting affects 
attendance is weak due to a relatively small number of studies and a lack of consistent 
results. They attribute this inconsistency to econometric issues underlying the estimations 
as there is an endogeneity problem with the observations: on average, the attendance will 
be higher for televised matches. Simply, broadcasters wish to broadcast the most popular 
games in order to attract strong television advertising revenues. As indicated by Buraimo 
(2008), this endogeneity is likely to upwardly bias the effect of broadcasting. Buraimo 
(2008) used a number of control variables to isolate the impact of televised games on 
attendance. Table 2.4 shows that this analysis uses seven of the twenty control variables 
considered by the literature. These control variables are the characteristics that will attract 
or discourage supporters to attend the match at the stadium. He uses data from the top 
three leagues of English League football between 1997 and 2004 to model match-day 
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attendances and television audiences. Buraimo (2008) found the negative impact on 
stadium attendance is 17.7 per cent for ITV terrestrial, 5.9 per cent for ITV digital, and 4 per 
cent for Sky. 
 
Carmichael, Millington, and Simmons (1999) added to the literature on price elasticity of 
demand for attendance at English Rugby League matches. The study models attendance 
during the 1994 to 1995 season and identifies matches broadcast live on Sky Sports. For 
matches on Friday that are broadcast live on Sky Sports, stadium attendance at Rugby 
League matches is reduced by 20.7 per cent. Also outside of English football, Welki and 
Zlatoper (1994) presented evidence on factors affecting attendance at American National 
Football League matches. They use a censored regression technique allowing for sell out 
matches between 1986 and 1987. Matches are broadcast live nationally except for in a 
small area local to the stadium. The study estimates a reduction of 5,300 fans at the 
stadium when the game is not on television. This positive impact of live broadcasting on 
stadium attendance is also found by Falls and Natke (2014) and Czarnitzki and Stadtmann 
(2002).  Falls and Natke (2014) used a panel data set of American Football Bowl Subdivision 
matches and note that the broadcast matches are usually picked as they will be of higher 
demand. However, this model suffers from the common endogeneity issue seen with 
choice of broadcast matches in the Premier League.  
 
Within European football, Czarnitski and Stadtmann (2002) used a Tobit model to evaluate 
attendance in German First Division Football from 1996 to 1998.  In conclusion, the study 
shows that reputation and goodwill are more important for attendance than the thrill of 
outcome uncertainty. No inference can be taken regarding matches that are broadcast live 
as the variable is dropped from the model due to endogeneity. This highlights that matches 
that are most popular tend to be those chosen for broadcast.  
 
More recently, Buraimo and Simmons (2009a) constructed a model using a comprehensive 
set of control variables and use a method to capture market size by Geographical 
Information System (GIS) techniques. A Tobit estimation is used to account for sell-out 
crowds in the Premier League from 1997 to 2004.  The model identifies live broadcasts by 
channel and by day of the week. Estimates show the negative impact on attendance of live 
broadcasting to be between 2.8 and 10.3 per cent. In a similar manner, Buraimo, Forrest 
and Simmons (2009) also used GIS techniques to measure more accurately the potential 
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market size of the home and away clubs. They use data from the English Football 
Championship 1997 to 2004 to estimate attendance and an uncensored random effects 
model is used (due to the small number of Championship matches that are sold to 
capacity). Estimation shows that the negative impact on gate attendance is 21.2 per cent 
for broadcasts on ITV terrestrial, 8.3 per cent for broadcasts on ITV digital, and 4.7 per cent 
for matches on Sky Sports. From 1992 to 2006, there was just one sole broadcaster of 
Premier League matches. Since the 2007 season, following European Commission 
intervention, matches cannot be broadcast live by one sole broadcaster. After the 
intervention, aimed to reduce the monopoly of live matches by Sky Sports, a minimum of 
two broadcasters are now required to purchase the rights by auction.  
 
There is no consensus over the size of the marginal impact of broadcasting live matches, 
even when existing studies focus on the same sports league within the same time period. A 
number of the existing studies don’t acknowledge the endogeneity problem inherent with 
estimating the effect of live broadcasting on stadium attendance. As such, there is room to 
contribute to the debate around the size of the effect on stadium demand when 
compensating for the argument that broadcast matches are chosen for their popularity. 
The research in chapter five examines Premier League matches from 2004 to 2008, which 
includes the first year that the broadcaster Setanta acquired rights (due to the European 
Commission’s involvement). 
 
2.5 Investment and performance 
 
There exists a strong body of literature concerned with the prediction of match results. The 
majority of the existing studies focus on forecasting match results to test the efficiency of 
prices set by bookmakers in gambling markets. Other studies focus on the impact of 
specific factors (managerial change, referee bias etc.) on a match outcome. Table 2.5 shows 
a summary of the existing literature based on these categories, which are discussed in 
more depth below. 
 
Forecasting and efficiency  
 
A UK football gambling society was formed in 1923 (Football Pools) which gave gamblers 
the opportunity to bet on the outcomes of football matches, with the stipulation that 
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betting must be on a minimum of three matches and typically only on the outcome of a 
draw. In 1936 , the Football Association unsuccessfully tried to withhold fixtures from the 
pools companies fearful that rigged results in other sporting contests, such as, horse racing 
and cricket, would become commonplace in football too (Holt, 1989). More recently, the 
stance on betting on match outcomes in football has been more relaxed and a rapid 
increase in football betting turnover is evident as UK bookmakers allow individuals to place 
a bet on the outcome (and events within) of any single football match. Prices will react fully 
to all available information in an efficient market (Fama, 1970). However, the market for 
sports gambling is structured differently from a typical financial market. Bookmakers do 
not serve as an agent (matching buyer and seller) rather they take large positions with 
respect to the outcome of a match and announce a price (Levitt, 2004).  As such, the 
market for the forecasting of (and betting on) match results has seen a proliferation of 
studies examining efficiency and pricing errors of match odds.  
 
Hill (1974) studied English and Scottish League football during the 1971 -1972 season to 
test the correlation between predicted final league positions (as per bookmaker’s 
predictions) and the final league table. The study finds evidence that individual matches 
have a predictive element and that the outcome of a match is not pure chance. This result 
therefore showed that it was possible to predict the final league tables at the start of the 
season (with some accuracy), contrary to remarks by Reep and Benjamin (1968) that 
chance will dominate the match. From this idea (that a good team should beat a weaker 
team) Maher (1982) introduced team attacking and defending strength parameters to a 
statistical model (Poisson3) of goals scored. For the top four leagues of English League 
Football (1971 to 1974) Maher (1982) estimated the strength of each team when they play 
home and away matches. The results show that a bivariate Poisson statistical model fits the 
observed data more accurately than other models when a parameter is included for the 
correlation between the two team’s scores during a match. A more simple approach of 
independent Poisson models of the goals scored by both teams fails to account for the 
interaction between the two teams during a match.  
 
3 A discrete probability distribution for the probability of the number of goals scored (or 
other events) occurring in a fixed time (a match). The distribution assumes that goals 
scored in one match do not affect the number of goals scored in subsequent matches.  
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Table 2.5 (part 1) Empirical forecasting of football match results 
Author(s)                                Sport Date Dependent variable Computation 
Forecasting and efficiency     
Hill (1974) English and Scottish League Football (1 - 4) 1971 - 1972 League position Correlation between predicted and final position 
Maher (1982) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1971 - 1974 Goals scored / conceded Indp. Poisson, bivariate Poison 
Dixon and Coles (1997) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1992 - 1996 Goals scored / conceded Poisson / Mazimum liklihood 
Forrest and Simmons (2000) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1996 - 1998 Match result Ordered logit 
Koning (2000) Dutch football 1956 - 1996 Match result Ordered probit 
 Kuypers (2000) English  League Football 1993 - 1995 Match result Ordered logit 
Crowder et al. (2002) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1992 - 1997 Match result Markov Chain, Mote Carlo 
Dixon and Pope (2004) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1993 - 1996 Goals scored / conceded Poisson 
Levitt 2004 American National Football League 2001 - 2002 % of bettors placing bets OLS 
    on the team that is favoured 
Forrest and Simmons (2008) Spanish football 2001 - 1006 Match result Probit 
Span et al. (2009) German Football Bundesliga  1999 - 2003 Price of odds 
Franck et al. (2010) European Football Leagues 2004 - 2007 Win or Loss Probit 
Arkes and Martinez (2011) National Basketball Association 2007 - 2009 Home team win Logit 
Koning (2012) European Football Leagues 2002 - 2010 Match result Logit 
Direr (2013) European Football Leagues 2000 - 2011    
Bastos and da Rosa (2013) FIFA World Cup 2010 2010 Goals scored / conceded Poisson 
Koopman and Lit (2014) English Premier League Football 2003 - 2012 Goals scored / conceded Poisson 
       
Impact on performance     
Barnett and English  League Football (1 - 4) 1981 - 1989 League position OLS 
Hilditch (1993)     
Ridder et al. (1994) Dutch football 1989 - 1992 Goals scored / conceded Poisson / Conditional Maximum liklihood 
Clarke and Norman (1995) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1981 - 1991 Goals scored / conceded OLS 
Audas et al. (2002) English  League Football    
Dawson et al. (2007) English Premier League Football 1996 - 2003 Disciplinary points (cards) Poisson 
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Table 2.5 (part 2) Empirical forecasting of football match results 
Additional Competitions           
Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1989 - 1999 H win =1, draw =0.5, A win =0 Ordered Probit FA Cup For: Negative impact of Cup elimination 
Forrest,  Goddard and Simmons (2005) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1983 - 2000 H win =1, draw =0.5, A win =0 Ordered Probit FA Cup For: Negative impact of Cup elimination 
Goddard (2005) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1977 - 2002 Match result; Goals Ordered Probit (win); Bivariate Poisson (goals) FA Cup For: Negative impact of Cup elimination 
Dupont et al. (2010) Scottish Premier League 2007 - 2009 Player performance, player injuries Coefficient of Variation UEFA CL No impact: Performance. Against: Injuries 
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 Table 2.6 (part 1) Model variables included in existing performance modelling literature 
Author(s)                                
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Forecasting and efficiency                                   
Hill (1974) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maher (1982) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dixon and Coles (1997) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forrest and Simmons (2000) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Koning (2000) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Kuypers (2000) 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Crowder et al. (2002) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dixon and Pope (2004) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Levitt 2004 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Forrest and Simmons (2008) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Span et al. (2009) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Franck et al. (2010) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkes and Martinez (2011) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Koning (2012) 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Direr (2013) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bastos and da Rosa (2013) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Koopman and Lit (2014) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2.6 (part 2) Model variables included in existing performance modelling literature 
  
                                   
Impact on performance 
                                   
Barnett and Hilditch (1993) 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ridder et al. (1994) 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Clarke and Norman (1995) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Audas et al. (2002) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dawson et al. (2007) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                    
Additional Competitions 
                                   
Goddard and Asimakopoulos 
(2004) 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forrest,  Goddard and Simmons 
(2005) 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Goddard (2005) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cox, Gilmore and Graham (2013) 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dupont et al. (2010) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sum 3 1 19 10 8 4 3 5 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 
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The probability of one team scoring will change when the opposing team scores, as team 
behaviour and effort may change. However, this interaction between teams parameter is 
constant over time but team performance is likely to change during the season, later 
studies seek to estimate the same with a dynamic parameter. 
 
Dixon and Coles (1997) acknowledged the dynamic nature of team performance and 
estimate match outcomes between teams from different leagues. The method is based on 
a Poisson regression model (as used in Maher (1982)) but enhanced information of the past 
performance of each team up until the match result being estimated (as such the team 
performance parameter changes over time based on previous results). This model is 
compared to bookmaker’s estimated match outcomes and is shown to produce a positive 
(financial) return when used as the basis of a betting strategy. Crowder, Dixon, Ledford, 
and Robinson (2002) identified a weakness with this approach and refine a similar Poisson 
model for predicting match results by an approximation method based on a non-linear 
state space model4. Their approach estimated the team’s attack and defence strength, 
allowing the strength to change over time by an unobserved random process. The 
predictive capabilities of this approach are computationally simpler and reported as similar 
to the results of Dixon and Coles (1997).  
 
Examining the efficiency of prices offered by on line bookmakers for matches in Spanish 
football, Forrest and Simmons (2008)  developed an ordinal model for match wins, draws, 
or losses. This was used to compare the views of experts (setting odds) and a quantitative 
statistical model. An ordered Probit model estimated match results by lagged match results 
and the employment of additional explanatory variables (including the number of 
supporters for each team). Results showed that the bookmaker’s odds were influenced by 
the number of team supporters and that the odds were more favourable for popular teams 
in the Spanish Football League.  A number of other studies use a similar approach to model 
match outcomes to estimate the influence of specific factors (managerial change, artificial 
pitches, etc.) on the team performance, discussed below. 
 
 
4 A development of a simple dynamic system to analyse a function over a discrete series of 
time.  
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Impact on Performance 
 
Between 1981 and 1989 there were 362 matches in the English football League (top 4 
divisions) played on artificial pitches. Barnett and Hilditch (1993) tested the hypothesis that 
playing on this different surface impacts the match result. Modelling the league position of 
the team on recent and historical results using Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), the 
study found that there is an significant advantage to the home team by playing (and 
hosting matches) on an artificial pitch. However, the study only took into account points, 
goals and the match results of teams, acknowledging there are other factors that could 
contribute to the impact on team performance (such as legacy performance). Ridder, 
Cramer, and Hopstaken (1994) investigated the effect of player expulsion (by red card) on 
the match outcome. The study found that a red card early in the match significantly 
increases the probability of victory for the opposing team, although the probability of a 
draw remains similar. Furthermore, after 72 minutes of the match played (with no red 
cards) the defending team is willing to receive a red card to stop a clear goal scoring 
opportunity, even if the attacking team are of much better quality. The finding is based on 
balancing the difference in the probability of a goal being scored by the attacking side and 
the probability of the defending team winning the match with a player dismissed. 
 
Dawson, Dobson, Goddard, and Wilson (2007) and Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons (2010) 
were also concerned with team discipline, modelling the number of red and yellow cards in 
Premier League Football Matches. Like some of the above studies, a Poisson model is used, 
but used with a significantly larger number of control variables compared to other studies 
(Table 2.6). These controls included: if the match is of significance to end of season 
championship or European League qualification; playing personnel, styles of play and 
tactics; the referee; match attendance; and if the match was broadcast on television. The 
study found that there is a tendency for away teams to incur more red or yellow cards, and 
concluded that there was evidence of refereeing bias favouring the home team in the 
Premier League between 1996 and 2003. Whilst there are a lack of studies within this 
strand of literature that explicitly estimate the impact of wage expenditure, a number of 
studies focus on the impact on performance of competing in additional competitions.  
 
 
 
 39 
Impact of additional competition on performance 
 
Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) modelled match results of English League football from 
1989 to 1999 by an ordered Probit estimation. Like Dawson et al. (2007), the model used 
control variables for the significance of the match and also included the distance between 
the stadia of competing teams (usually seen in demand estimation). The study estimated 
the impact on league performance of competing in the FA Cup alongside the domestic 
league, finding that elimination from the FA Cup had a negative impact on team 
performance. Being eliminated from the cup allows a team to better concentrate efforts on 
league matches, improving performance. Also using an ordered Probit method, Forrest, 
Goddard, and Simmons (2005) compared the effectiveness of forecasts based on match 
odds to forecasts based on a statistical model. The model included similar variables to 
Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) as well as an attendance measure, outperforming the 
bookmaker odds early on in the data period, with the reverse being true towards the end 
of the period. Like Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004), the study found that elimination 
from the FA Cup has a negative impact on team performance. This negative impact on 
league performance is argued to be due to a loss of team confidence due to elimination 
from the Cup competition. Goddard (2005) found the same impact of elimination from the 
FA Cup but during a wider data period in English League football (1997 to 2002). This study 
showed that forecasting match results is best achieved using a hybrid model, in which goals 
are used to forecast win–draw–lose match results. 
 
There are a handful of studies that have approached the same question without using a 
statistical forecasting model. A negative impact of playing in an additional competition can 
arise from the short duration between matches (one in the league and one in an additional 
competition) causing a drop in physical performance and a rise in the injury rate. Dupont et 
al. (2010) analysed the effect of playing two matches in the same week (one match being in 
the UEFA Champions League) on physical performance between 2007 and 2009 in the 
Scottish Premier League, and found that playing in the UEFA Champions League did not 
significantly affect the physical performance of players. However, the injury rate of players 
was significantly higher. The study concluded that there is a need for player rotation during 
periods with congested match fixtures5.  
5 This would assume clubs have additional players of sufficient quality to rotate, requiring 
larger spend on wage bills. 
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 Additional competitions are often a lucrative source of revenue for clubs that succeed: The 
UEFA Champions League attracts large television audiences and, as such, provides 
competing teams with a share of media rights revenues. Pawlowski, Breuer, and Hovemann 
(2010) found evidence of a reduction in league domestic balance since 2000 due to an 
increase in the monies earned by teams competing in the Champions League. Successful 
clubs gain additional revenues and are better situated than other clubs to win re-entry to 
the Champions League, and to further dominate domestic league competition. The study 
concluded that the current revenue distribution benefits the top five leagues in Europe 
more than others, as they are the largest TV markets, allowing them to obtain relatively 
large payments even if the clubs do not progress well through the Champions League. 
Whilst the financial rewards for competing in the Champions League can be sufficient to 
compensate for a potential negative impact on domestic league performance, participation 
in the Europa League is less lucrative (although few studies focus on this issue). 
 
Cox et al. (2015) discussed the potential impacts from participating in the Europa League. 
The study shows that, for the three English Premier League clubs that qualify for the 
Europa League by the end of season league position, participation in this competition 
generates a series of tensions. The concern is the strains on playing squads that have 
limited strength in depth compared to some of their Premier and Europa League 
competitors. The study argues that balancing Premier League and Europa League 
commitments can be challenging as managers are frequently tasked with maintaining, if 
not exceeding, domestic performance. However, managers and players together with 
supporters often celebrate the achievement of European qualification. Playing in such 
competitions often attracts highly prized managerial and playing talent. Nevertheless, the 
study found that team success can lead to manager and player departures, where nine out 
of the ten clubs who won the trophy lost their manager immediately after their victory. 
Concluding that participation in the Europa League was finely balanced between cost and 
benefit. More successful clubs have taken advantage of the wider marketing opportunities 
available to increase commercial revenues. Furthermore, clubs that have seen notable 
diminishing league performances did not see a significant financial remuneration from the 
Europa League to compensate. However, as the study is based on a sample of four Premier 
League clubs, the method is unable to provide evidence of the marginal impact (holding 
other factors constant) of Europa League participation on domestic league performance.  
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 Despite the wide evidence base surrounding prediction of football match outcomes, there 
is little evidence surrounding the marginal impact of additional expenditure on wages or 
participating in domestic and European cups. Studies that test this hypothesis are either 
not robust enough to control for other factors influencing match performance (Cox et al., 
2015) or are robust but focus on FA Cup or League Cup participation (Forrest, Beaumont, et 
al., 2005; Goddard, 2005; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004). Thus, there appears a need 
to contribute to the debate around the size of the impact of Europa League participation 
using a robust forecasting method. The research in chapter six analyses the factors that 
affect a match win, using an ordered Probit model to forecast match results in line with the 
work of Forrest, Beaumont, et al. (2005), Goddard (2005) and  Goddard and Asimakopoulos 
(2004), but focussing on expenditure on team wages and participation in European League 
competitions.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
Existing evidence surrounding the economics of professional sport stem from three seminal 
works: Rottenberg (1956), Neale (1964), and Sloane (1971). Theoretical studies using the 
contest model (El-Houdiri and Quirk, 1971) have adapted the framework to replicate 
league specific features. Assuming a club seeks to maximise profit better fits the objectives 
of North American sports, as applying the same assumption to European sports has been 
shown to not hold empirically. The early literature analyses the impact of policy decisions 
under assumptions of profit maximising firms. More recently (Szymanski and Kesenne 
(2004) onwards), studies have adapted the theoretical model to account for this difference 
and found that the results change. The literature now also provides an analysis of policy 
implications, such as revenue sharing, under assumptions of profit maximising firms and 
win maximising firms (Vrooman, 2011) or a combination of the two (Dietl et al. 2011).  Hirai 
and Kawashima (2009) acknowledged that clubs are not controlled by owner-managers, 
rather the owner and manager are separate individuals with different objectives. Both 
(Dietl et al. 2011) and Hirai and Kawashima (2009) treated the decision to weight the club 
objective more towards winning or more towards profits as exogenous. There is a call to 
better understand this club level decision and how it will affect the investment decisions in 
playing talent as this would provide more clarity on the impact of revenue sharing. 
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The empirical literature has developed in a similar way, adapting methods to overcome 
unique league specific complications. Analysis of demand for live sports events focusses 
mainly on stadium attendance. With the recent prominence of live broadcasting, studies 
such as Buraimo and Simmons (2009b) have analysed the demand to watch a match live on 
TV. While the majority of the literature considers a live broadcast to be the major 
substitute for stadium attendance, few (Jang and Lee, 2015; Sacheti et al.,2014) have 
considered the idea from Neale (1964) that the competition for customers is with other 
sporting events scheduled simultaneously. A stadium has a constrained capacity, in some 
sports leagues the demand meets this constraint on a regular basis. As such, a number of 
studies use a censored regression method to account for not being able to observe the true 
demand at the stadium when the match is a sell-out. Live broadcasts may act as a 
substitute and take fans away from the stadium but broadcasters are also likely to air the 
matches with the strongest popularity. This endogeneity issue caused Czarnitski and 
Stadtmann (2002) to drop the estimated TV variable from their analysis. Studies that 
recognise the issue do so by looking at ticket prices (Garcia and Rodriguez, 2002) or the 
reverse relation, such that larger stadium attendances have positive impacts on the size of 
television  audience (Buraimo, 2008). The results in the literature estimating the impact of 
live broadcasts on stadium attendance are likely to be biased due to endogeneity unless 
this is specifically address however. Further developments in the literature attempt to 
account for complexities in consumer behaviour. Reference-dependent preferences are 
considered by Coates and Humphreys (2012), allowing a consumer to value a loss and a win 
with different magnitudes. Benz et al. (2009) argued that consumers behave differently; 
their choices may vary depending upon how many people are at the stadium. Their analysis 
estimates consumer behaviour at matches with varying stadium attendances.  
 
The results from the analysis of the existing literature suggest that there is still legitimate 
ambiguity amongst the evidence within the context of consumer behaviour in the Premier 
League. Furthermore, studies that test the marginal impact of wage expenditure or 
European Competition participation are either not robust enough to control for other 
factors influencing match performance (Cox et al., 2015), or are robust but focus on FA Cup 
or League Cup participation (Forrest, Beaumont, Goddard, and Simmons, 2005; Goddard, 
2005; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004). Thus, there appears a need to contribute to the 
debate around the size of the impact of Europa League participation using a robust 
forecasting method.
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Chapter 3 - Revenue sharing and competitive balance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The UK Restrictive Practices Court and the European Commission found in favour of the 
collective selling method so as to promote growth at all levels of football through 
redistribution of revenue (European Commission, 2002). The argument was that a 
collective selling method would better promote financial equality amongst member clubs 
and therefore promote competitive balance in the league (Szymanski, 2001). The Premier 
League provides each member club with an equal share of monies from the sales for 
broadcast rights. This equal share was £14.6 million, approximately 14.4 per cent of 
average club revenue and 25 per cent of domestic broadcast rights revenues during the 
2009-2010 season (Deloitte, 2011). These monies are further distributed (unequally) by a 
merit payment for final league position and a facility fee for hosting a live broadcast. The 
league has a small number of teams that dominate on the playing field and therefore 
monopolise the top positions in the league table. Being at the top of the Premier League 
table attracts larger merit bonuses, an opportunity to compete in the lucrative UEFA 
Champions League, and equally positive effects on the sales of merchandise and 
commercial sponsorships. In short, the rich clubs become richer, widening the dispersion of 
revenue between the richest and poorest.  
 
Existing research investigating the link between sharing revenue and competitive balance 
stems from the formalisation of a contest model of the professional sports league, as 
presented in El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971). Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) confirm 
the results of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) that sharing revenue has no impact on the 
allocation of players in a sports league and thus no impact on competitive balance. These 
works, however, assume that the firm objective of each member club is to maximise profit. 
This has been empirically shown to not hold in all cases, in particular in European football 
leagues, and particularly for the English Premier League (Deloitte, 2011).  Dietl et al. (2011) 
used an objective function that allows a sports club to choose a weighting between making 
profit or winning matches, beyond a point there is a trade-off. This weighting is set 
exogenously to the model. 
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To further understand the relationship between revenue sharing and competitive balance 
in the Premier League two methods of analysis are used: 
 
Firstly, the analysis builds on existing contest models by introducing an endogenous choice 
for strategic delegation into the club objective function. Clubs seek to maximise this 
objective (which is the weighted sum of profit and wins relative to competing clubs). The 
impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance is analysed using this contest model with 
managerial incentive contracts, which endogenises the weight given to profit or wins by 
each club, and solves by a two-stage game (Hirai and Kawashima, 2009; Dietl et al.,2011). 
Unlike Hirai and Kawashima (2009), the analysis in this chapter considers firms that differ in 
market size.  
 
Secondly, the two key factors (revenue sharing and competitive balance) are investigated 
empirically. The degree of revenue sharing in the Premier League over time and how this 
compares to other leagues in Europe is discussed.  A number of measures are used to 
identify how competitively balanced the Premier League is and how this compares to other 
leagues. An industry concentration measure is used alongside a measure of distributional 
dispersion and a unique competitive balance ratio (adapted from Humphreys (2002)). 
The chapter first discusses the mathematical model and the relative performance 
elements. Empirical analysis of revenue sharing and competitive balance in the Premier 
League follows. The final section of this chapter discusses the results in the context of the 
existing evidence and draws conclusions. 
 
 
3.2 Revenue sharing in a sports contest model 
This sports contest model builds on the frame work of Dietl et al. (2011), with one important 
departure: the firm is split into ownership and management when seeking to maximise an 
objective function as per Hirai and Kawashima (2009). The model is a league consisting of 
two clubs investing independently in an amount of playing talent 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 > 0, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. This is the 
stock of playing talent, described as the number of units of skills that a club acquires 
through the purchase of playing contracts.  The two clubs are asymmetric in terms of market 
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share6. For notational reasons and without loss of generality it is assumed that club 1 has a 
large-market share and that club 2 has a small-market share. 
 
As in the bulk of the sporting contest literature (see chapter two) the win percentage of 
firm 𝑖𝑖, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, is formulated as a contest success function (CSF) depending on both firms’ 
investment on talent represented by: 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 , with 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 (1) 
 
With,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 = 1. Such that, the probability of winning for club i is a function of its 
investment in talent compared to the investment in total for the league. Thus, win 
probability is increasing in own investment and decreasing in investment of competing 
clubs. Assuming that the two clubs differ in market size means the investments of the clubs 
are restricted such that they are not equal. Furthermore, following Szymanski (2003, 2004),  
Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) and Dietl et al. (2011) contest-Nash conjectures are used to 
formalise non-cooperative behaviour between clubs 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗⁄ = 0 and therefore the 
derivative of (1) with respect to 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗is given by:  
𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗
� = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2� . This implies that the 
talent investment for each club does not depend on the rivals’ respective investment. The 
CSF used is a logit function (following Dietl et al. (2011), giving a non-linear relationship 
between investment and talent. This describes the returns from investment in talent as 
diminishing after a certain amount of investment, relative to the league investment7.   
It is also assumed that the competitive balance measures the uncertainty of outcome 
connected to the teams participating in the league. This is formalised as the ratio of club 1’s 
win percentage over club 2’s corresponding value: 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) = 𝑤𝑤1(𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2)𝑤𝑤2(𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) (2) 
 
6 Hirai and Kawashima (2009) analysed a league that is homogenous in market size. 
7 Another strand of the literature considers the Walrasian conjectures dτi dτj⁄ = −1 for 
leagues with a fixed supply of talent under the assumption that a unitary increase of talent 
hired at one club leads to a unitary reduction of talent at the rival club (Eckard, 2006; Fort 
and Quirk, 2007; Szymanski, 2004). 
 
 46 
                                                          
with a win ratio (WR) equal to unity corresponding to a perfectly balanced league and any 
deviation from unity suggesting lower levels of competitive balance. Following Dietl et al. 
(2011) the revenue function for club 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 is formalised as: 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� − 𝛽𝛽2 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�2 (3) 
 
Where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  represents the market size of club 𝑖𝑖, and 𝛽𝛽 is the effect of the competitive balance 
on club revenues. The concavity of the revenue function with respect to wins explains the 
importance of parameter 𝛽𝛽. It can be observed that revenues increase with wins until a 
maximum 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽
 , after which wins will have a negative impact on club 𝑖𝑖’s revenue due to 
one team’s supremacy, reflecting the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (Dietl et al. 2011). 
According to this, the higher the 𝛽𝛽, the less wins required to achieve the maximum 
revenues, since competitive balance becomes more important. 
 
A linear cost function is formalised as 𝐶𝐶(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖) = 𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖. This implies that, for a given talent level 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 
club 𝑖𝑖’s marginal (and unitary) cost is constant and equal to 𝑐𝑐 for each team. This assumption 
is based on the grounds of a competitive labour market for talent8. Therefore club 𝑖𝑖’s profits 
can then be expressed as total revenue (3) minus total cost: 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� − 𝐶𝐶(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖) = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖[�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗](𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 −  𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 (4) 
 
This model departs from the model of Dietl et al. (2011) by assuming that each club 
𝑖𝑖 maximises a utility function given by a weighted combination of profit (4) and winning: 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� (5) 
 
Where 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 represents a relative performance function that indicates 
the win ratio of one club relative to their rivals. As in a number of managerial decision 
literature papers (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; and Sklivas, 
8 This assumption is in keeping with the literature such as Dietl et al. (2011). However, 
inelastic labour supply is analysed in a similar framework in Kesenne (2000) for example.  
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1987), it is not the performance of a firm that is most important but the performance in 
relation to the competing firm. The win probability as a measure of 𝑖𝑖’s talent investment 
compared to the total talent investment in the league is additive to the utility function 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  
and assumes that there is utility to be gained from losing against a competing firm. This 
relative performance function returns a negative or positive value depending on the firm 
being the largest investor in talent. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 is the “performance incentive” parameter. If 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 =0 then the club is strictly maximising profits, while the higher the 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 the higher is the 
incentive of club 𝑖𝑖 to achieve a higher win performance relative to its rival clubs. 
 
 
3.3 Results from modelling competitive balance 
 
This section reports the solutions using the model in section 3.2. The results based on the 
model are interpreted after benchmark cases and equilibrium are discussed. 
 
3.3.1 Benchmark cases 
 
Profit maximising clubs 
El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), amongst others, make an assumption that all firms in the model 
are profit maximising. This analysis begins by briefly discussing the case where both clubs 
maximise profits and therefore the problem of each firm can be expressed as: 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖≥0 �Π𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖[�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗](𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 − 𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖� (6) 
 
Solving the system of first order conditions to obtain club 𝑖𝑖’s equilibrium investment in 
talent,  win percentage and profits respectively: 
 
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖2𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − β)
𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)3  
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗  
Π𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖2[2𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� − β�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�]2(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)3  
(7) 
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 Win oriented clubs 
The analysis continues by assuming that each club maximises an objective function that is a 
linear combination of profits and own win percentage as in Dietl et al. (2011). The objective 
maximisation problem can then be expressed as: 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖≥0 �𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖[�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗](𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 − 𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 � 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�� (8) 
 
Solving the system of first order conditions, club 𝑖𝑖’s equilibrium investment in talent and win 
percentage can be expressed by the following: 
 
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝑊𝑊 = (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖)2(𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − β)
𝑐𝑐(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)3  
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
𝑊𝑊 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗  
Π𝑖𝑖
𝑊𝑊 = (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖)(−β(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖)�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 − 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� − 2�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�2(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)3  
(9) 
 
The following section provides a comparison between the results for win orientated clubs 
and the model equilibrium. 
 
3.3.2. Equilibrium analysis 
 
This section presents the solution concept of the model. Each club maximises their utility 
function given by (5) with respect to their investment in talent 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, given a level of investment 
in talent by the rival club 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗. Thus each club 𝑖𝑖 maximises the following problem: 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖≥0 �𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖[�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗](𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 − 𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 � 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�� (10) 
 
Solving the system of first order conditions, club 𝑖𝑖’s equilibrium investment in talent, win 
percentage and profit, respectively is: 
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 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 = (2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖)2(2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)(2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − β)
𝑐𝑐(2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)3  
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 = 2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 
 
Π𝑖𝑖
𝑊𝑊 = (2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖)(−β(2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖)�2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 − 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� − 2�2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗��2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖2�)2(2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)3  
 
Where 𝑏𝑏 ≤ 2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗  guarantees non-negative investments in talent by club 𝑖𝑖. As 
expected from (7), the win percentage of club 𝑖𝑖 increases with the relative performance 
parameter and market share (𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖⁄ > 0,  𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖⁄ > 0), and decreases with the 
corresponding values of firm 𝑗𝑗 (𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗� < 0,𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� < 0). If  2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 < 2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗  
then the small market club has a higher win percentage than the large market club. This 
indicates that if the small market club puts a greater weight on the relative performance 
element of its objectives, then it may obtain a higher winning percentage than the large 
club.  
 
The results of the model equilibrium differ from the bench mark cases. The equilibrium 
results are compared to results under the three alternative objective functions in order to 
evaluate their relative effects on talent investing and win percentages. Each constituent 
result is considered in turn.   
 
Win rate 
Result 1: Firms that opt for a relative performance utility objective function achieve a higher 
win rate than under all alternative objective function configurations if, and only if, the 
weight attached to relative performance is great enough to allow the firm to win: 
 
 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 > 𝜃𝜃𝚤𝚤� = 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 . 
 
Result 1 indicates that the relative performance weight should be over a threshold (𝜃𝜃𝚤𝚤� ) in 
order to ensure a higher win rate when pursuing a relative performance objective compared 
(11) 
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to all other objective configurations.  This can also be considered as the ratio of relative 
performance incentives being greater than the corresponding ratio of market shares:  
 
θi
θj
> µi
µj
 
 
Relative performance incentives will lead to higher win ratios, rather than profit maximising 
or win oriented objectives. 
 
 
Competitive balance: 
By substituting the win ratio equilibrium values from (7) into (2) we obtain the win ratio in 
equilibrium:  
 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝜏𝜏1, 𝜏𝜏2) = 2𝜃𝜃1 + 𝜇𝜇12𝜃𝜃2 + 𝜇𝜇2 (12) 
 
Result 2: If both clubs maximise relative performance utility objectives then: 
i. Competitive balance is decreasing in the relative performance weight for the large 
market club 𝑖𝑖 and increasing in the small market club’s choice of relative performance 
weight j until 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 < 𝜃𝜃𝚥𝚥� = 2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖+𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖−𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗2  
ii. The league is more balanced compared to a league with pure profit maximising 
clubs if the relative performance preference of the small market club  lies between: 
𝜃𝜃1𝜇𝜇2
𝜇𝜇1
≤ 𝜃𝜃2 ≤
(2𝜃𝜃1+𝜇𝜇1)𝜇𝜇1
2𝜇𝜇2
−
𝜇𝜇2
2
 
iii. The league is more balanced compared to a league with pure win maximising clubs if 
the win preference of the small market lies between: 𝜃𝜃1𝜇𝜇2
𝜇𝜇1
≤ 𝜃𝜃2 ≤
1
4
��8(𝜃𝜃1 + 𝜇𝜇1)(2𝜃𝜃1 + 𝜇𝜇1) + 𝜇𝜇22 − 3𝜇𝜇2� 
 
Total investment in talent: 
The total investment in talent is larger in a league containing clubs that maximise relative 
performance objectives compared to a league in which teams maximise win oriented 
objectives or maximise profits.  The following result summarises: 
 
Result 3: �𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃� > �𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑊𝑊� > �𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃� 
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In order to increase the win ratio under relative performance with respect to Result 1, the 
large market club has to increase the weight on relative performance over a threshold   𝜃𝜃𝚤𝚤� =
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗
.  Due to the pro-competitive character of relative performance incentives, increased 
competition between clubs will lead them to invest more in talent compared to a league 
based on any other pure objective function. 
 
Profits 
This section examines how relative performance incentives will affect the profitability of 
clubs in the league in three cases. In the first case, it is assumed that the large market club is 
maximising relative performance objectives, and the small-market club maximises profit (𝜽𝜽𝟏𝟏 > 0,𝜽𝜽𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎𝟎). The second case reverses this assumption, that is (𝜽𝜽𝟐𝟐 > 0,𝜽𝜽𝟏𝟏 = 𝟎𝟎), while 
the last case assumes both clubs are maximising relative performance utility. The findings 
are compared to the conditions of a utility maximising club that is orientated towards 
winning rather than relative performance.  
 
Result 4: 
i. If 𝜃𝜃1 > 0, 𝜃𝜃2 = 0, then league profitability increases if the large market club 
becomes relatively more performance oriented, but only if the market share of the large 
market club is relatively high. 
ii. If 𝜃𝜃2 > 0, 𝜃𝜃1 = 0, then the league profitability decreases if the small market club 
becomes relatively more performance oriented (i.e., as 𝜃𝜃2 increases). 
iii. If 𝜃𝜃1 > 0, 𝜃𝜃2 > 0, then the league profitability increases if the large market club 
becomes relatively more performance oriented, the market share of the large market club is 
relatively high and the relative performance objective of the small club is close to zero. The 
league profitability decreases if the small market club becomes relatively more performance 
oriented. 
 
Result 5: 
i. If 𝜃𝜃1 > 0,𝜃𝜃2 = 0, then league profitability under relative performance objectives is: 
a. higher than in a league with profit maximising firms, but only  if the market share of 
the large market club is relatively high. �Π𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 + Π𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃� > �Π𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + Π𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃� for 𝜇𝜇1 > ?̅?𝜇. The reverse 
relation holds for lower market shares. 
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b. always higher than in a league with win oriented firms only if the market share of 
the large market club is always relatively high �Π𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 + Π𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃� > �Π𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 + Π𝑗𝑗𝑊𝑊� for 𝜇𝜇1 > 𝜇𝜇�, 
with 𝜇𝜇� > ?̅?𝜇. The reverse relation holds for lower market shares 
ii. If 𝜃𝜃2 > 0,𝜃𝜃1 = 0, then league profitability under relative performance objectives is 
always lower than both the benchmark cases, and �Π𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 + Π𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃� < �Π𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊 + Π𝑗𝑗𝑊𝑊� <
�Π𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 + Π𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃� holds. 
iii. If 𝜃𝜃1 > 0,𝜃𝜃2 > 0, then league profitability under relative performance objectives is 
higher than in any other benchmark objective configuration only if the market share of the 
large market club is relatively high and the relative performance objective of the small club 
is close to zero. The league profitability always decreases if the small market club becomes 
relatively more performance oriented. 
 
Revenue sharing 
This section examines how revenue sharing between clubs in a league may affect their 
investment in talent, win ratio and profitability; given that the clubs are maximising relative 
performance utility. Following the bulk of the literature (see chapter two) it is assumed that 
revenue sharing is legal and its purpose is the redistribution of revenues from large market 
clubs with higher potential of generating revenues to the small market clubs with less 
commercial potential. Assuming that the revenue of club 𝑖𝑖 is 𝑊𝑊𝚤𝚤� = 𝛿𝛿(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)�𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗�,  the 
home club receives a fraction 𝛿𝛿 of it’s own revenues, whilst the visiting club receives 1- 𝛿𝛿 of 
the revenues of the home club, with 𝛿𝛿 ∈ [1
2
, 1].  
 
Note that the marginal revenue is 
𝜗𝜗𝑅𝑅𝚤𝚤��𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�
𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
=�δ(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽) − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖� 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖)2.  The 
effect of the revenue sharing weight to club 𝑖𝑖’s marginal revenue can be measured as:  
𝜗𝜗𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖
𝜗𝜗𝜗𝜗
= (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖)2. Therefore, revenue sharing will have a positive effect on the 
marginal revenue of club 𝑖𝑖 only if the total market is larger than 𝛽𝛽. Profits under revenue 
sharing can be expressed as : 
 
Π𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝛿𝛿 �𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖[�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗](𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 � − 𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)�𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗[�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖](𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 � (13) 
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Consequently the utility maximisation problem of club 𝑖𝑖 under revenue sharing can be given 
by: 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖≥0
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗� = 𝛿𝛿 �𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 ��𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 � − 𝑐𝑐𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)
�
𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗[�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽2� 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖](𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗)2 �+𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 � 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�
⎭
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎫
 (14) 
 
By solving with respect to talent investment we obtain the first order conditions: 
 
𝜗𝜗𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗�
𝜗𝜗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖
= [2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + δ(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽) − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖] 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖)2 − c = 0 
 
(15) 
The solution of the system of the first order conditions yield to the equilibrium investment 
in talent 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�𝛿𝛿,𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 , 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� and profits Π𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�𝛿𝛿,𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗,𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 , 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�  respectively. The win ratio is 
thus: 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝜏𝜏1𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝜏𝜏2𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽) − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽� − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽 (16) 
 
Taking the partial differential with respect to the revenue sharing parameter, the effect of 
revenue sharing on competitive balance can be obtained from: 
 
𝜗𝜗𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝜗𝜗𝛿𝛿
= �𝛽𝛽 − �𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗��[(2𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖) − �2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�][2𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽� − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽]2  (17) 
 
Result 6: All results from proposition 4 in Dietl et al. (2011) are confirmed in this model 
under the same conditions. Hence, the arguments regarding a sharpening effect, a dulling 
effect and the invariance principle are replicated. Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman 
(1995) confirm the results of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) find that under certain conditions, 
sharing revenue had no impact on the allocation of players in a sports league and thus no 
impact on competitive balance (the invariance principle). A dulling effect is seen when 
revenue sharing reduces the incentives for clubs to invest in playing talent (because each 
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club has to share some of the resulting marginal benefits of its talent investment with the 
other clubs in the league).  In contrast to this, Dietl et al. (2011) shows that revenue sharing 
does not necessarily reduce incentives to invest in playing talent. The sharpening effect 
sees revenue sharing enhance investment incentives and improves competitive balance in 
the league.  
 
3.3.3. Endogenous incentives for relative performance. 
 
This section presents the findings of the model in which there are profit maximising owners 
strategically delegating the talent decision to their manager in order to increase their 
profits. In order to examine the firm incentive to deviate from pure profit maximisation 
towards a more aggressive relative performance scheme some assumptions are added: Each 
club consists of one owner and one manager and both are risk neutral. This reflects a 
common practice in most clubs and therefore the strategic use of managerial incentive 
contracts has been introduced into the analysis, similar to Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), 
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) as discussed in chapter two. This literature 
shows each firm owner has the option to compensate the manager with an incentive 
contract combining own profits and sales or revenues in order to direct him to undertake a 
more aggressive behaviour in the market.  
 
The strategic delegation literature differs from the principal agent theory, by assuming full 
information and focussing on intra firm strategic interactions instead of agency issues within 
organisations. A principal agency issue may change how profits and revenues are reflected 
in the different incentives that influence the decision-making of the manager whose 
incentives might not be entirely aligned with those of the owner. Arguably, in many 
instances both the owner and manager are striving towards the maximisation of wins, 
however, there may be a need to balance win maximisation with other objectives when the 
perspective of the owner is taken into account. This potential misalignment in owner 
objective and manager objective is worthy of further research but assumed not to be of key 
consideration based on the strategic use of managerial incentive contracts. 
 
More specifically, following Fershtman and Judd (1987), the firm owner is viewed as a 
decision maker whose unique objective is to maximise the profits of the firm. This owner 
could be the actual owner, a board of directors, or a chief executive officer. The manager is 
an agent that the owner hires to make real-time operating decisions. Each firm’s owner has 
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the opportunity to compensate the manager by offering them a take it or leave it incentive 
contract9. The incentive contract proposed here is a linear combination of the clubs 𝑖𝑖’s 
profits and relative performance with respect to the rest of the clubs in the league, and 
therefore coincides with the utility function given by (5) in the simple case, or (13) in the 
revenue sharing case. 
 
A two-stage game is assumed, with observable actions. The sequence of moves unravels as 
follows: In the first stage, each club 𝑖𝑖’s owner can make an offer of a take-it-or-leave-it 
contract to their manager, specifying the incentive parameter for relative performance, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. 
In the second stage, after observing managerial objectives set in the previous stage 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, each 
manager 𝑖𝑖 selects an investment in talent by observing all other chosen incentive schemes. 
The game is solved by employing the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) solution 
concept. The solution concept of the second stage yields the results presented by 
Π𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�𝛿𝛿,𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖, 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�. Thus, in the first stage each owner makes an offer of a take-it-or-
leave-it contract to his manager specifying the incentive parameter 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖so as to maximise 
profits Π𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝛿𝛿,𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗,𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 , 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗). The solution of the system of first order conditions gives the 
optimal incentives for relative performance: 
 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)[(8𝛿𝛿 − 3)𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + (8𝛿𝛿 − 5)𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)] − 4𝛽𝛽[𝛽𝛽 − 2𝛿𝛿(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)]16(2𝛽𝛽 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗)  (18) 
 
(Assuming again that club 1 is the large market club and therefore club 2 corresponds to the 
small market club). Furthermore, simplifying 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 1 < 𝜇𝜇 < 3, 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1 
assures that the second order conditions hold and allows for comparisons. The equilibrium 
incentives for the large market club and the small market club are: 
 
𝜃𝜃1
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝜇𝜇[3𝜇𝜇 − 8𝛿𝛿(𝜇𝜇 − 1) + 2)] − 116(𝜇𝜇 − 3) ,𝜃𝜃2𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝜇𝜇(5𝜇𝜇 − 8𝛿𝛿(𝜇𝜇 − 1) − 2) − 716(1 + 𝜇𝜇)  (19) 
 
 
 
9 This assumes that firm owners have the bargaining power during negotiations with their 
managers, i.e. they offer to their managers ‘take-it or- leave-it’ incentive contracts (Vickers, 
1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; Miller and Pazgal, 2001, 2002, 2005; Jansen 
et al., 2007, 2009; Ritz, 2008, Manasakis et al. 2010). 
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The following result describes the findings: 
Result 7: a. The owner of the large market club will choose relative performance incentives 
to reward the manager only if the degree of revenue sharing is relatively low (𝛿𝛿 is relatively 
high). 
b. The owner of the small market club will choose relative performance incentives to reward 
the manager only if the degree of revenue sharing is relatively high (𝛿𝛿 is relatively low). 
c. Symmetric solutions in which both clubs’ owners choose relative performance incentives 
for their managers do not arise in equilibrium. 
 
More specifically, 𝜃𝜃1
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 > 0 if and only if 𝛿𝛿 > 𝛿𝛿  where  𝛿𝛿(𝜇𝜇) = 3𝜇𝜇2+2𝜇𝜇−1
8𝜇𝜇(𝜇𝜇−1) , with 𝑑𝑑𝜗𝜗�𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇 < 0 and 
𝛿𝛿(2) = 0.9375. Therefore, the owner of the large market club will only be willing to set 
positive managerial incentives for relative performance if the level of revenue sharing is 
low and therefore they will not have to share a relatively large amount of the extra 
revenues generated by more aggressive behaviour regarding talent expenditure.  
 
Furthermore, 𝜃𝜃2
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 > 0 if and only if 𝛿𝛿 < 𝛿𝛿 where 𝛿𝛿(𝜇𝜇) = (𝜇𝜇+1)(5𝜇𝜇−7)
8𝜇𝜇(𝜇𝜇−1) , with 𝑑𝑑𝜗𝜗�𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇 > 0 and 
𝛿𝛿(2) = 0.5625. Figure 3.1 shows this relationship between revenue sharing (𝛿𝛿) market size 
(𝜇𝜇) and relative performance incentives (𝜃𝜃). Intuitively, in contrast to the owner of the 
large market club, the owner of the small market club will set positive incentives for 
relative performance only if the level of revenue sharing is relatively high, and therefore 
the extra revenue generated will cover the cost of such an aggressive behaviour in talent 
investment.  
 
Finally, as 𝛿𝛿 < 𝛿𝛿  for any 1 < 𝜇𝜇 < 3, therefore there does not exist any symmetric 
equilibrium connected to the level of revenue sharing such that both owners would choose 
to set positive managerial incentives for relative performance.  
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Figure 3.1 Revenue sharing, market size and relative performance incentives. 
 
 
 
A higher weight given to relative performance leads to greater investment in talent. If there 
are low levels of revenue sharing than the large market club invests more in talent, the 
small market club does not and this worsens competitive balance. If there are high levels of 
revenue sharing then the small market club invests more in talent, the large market club 
does not and this improves competitive balance. The results show that revenue sharing will 
improve competitive balance under conditions of a relative performance contract, if and 
only if the amount of revenue shared is large. 
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3.4 Competitive balance and revenue sharing, empirical evidence 
 
Section 3.3 analysed the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance through the 
construction of a contest model. This section discusses the two key factors (revenue 
sharing and competitive balance), how these have changed over time in the Premier 
League, and how this compares to other football leagues in Europe.   
 
The Premier League acts collectively in selling broadcast rights, stopping individual clubs 
selling live games that are not in pre-set packages. It is reasonable to assume that the 
Premier League seeks to maximise the profit obtained from the sale of rights. It is able to 
do this by restricting access to the market, not allowing broadcasters to negotiate with 
individual clubs, instead forcing them to buy a complete package from the central 
negotiating body. The Premier League can limit overall output by restricting the number of 
games that can be televised. As this restrictive practices occur with the collusion of the 
member clubs, the risk is that the Premier League could be distorting the market for its 
product contrary to Article 81(1) of the European Commission Treaty or abusing its 
dominant position in the market as the sole seller of the rights contrary to Article 82 (now 
Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the European Union). 
 
Two broadcasters, BSkyB and Setanta, acquired the exclusive rights to broadcast live 
Premier League matches for a lump-sum fee (2007 to 2013), selling the programming to its 
own subscribers and to its competitors for a per-subscriber monthly fee. Table 3.1 shows 
the auction history of broadcast rights since 1983. From 1992 to 2007 BSkyB was the only 
broadcaster able to acquire rights to live matches from the Premier League, at a cost of 
£0.64 million to £3.64 million per match. The number of games broadcast per season has 
risen from 60 (1992) to 138 (2004-2013), and the cost has risen from £38.3 million (1992) 
to £594 million per season (2010-2013). 
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Table 3.1 Auction history of broadcast rights 
Year 
Length 
of 
contract 
(years) 
Broadcaster 
Live 
matches 
per 
season 
Total 
rights 
fee 
(£m) 
Annual 
rights 
fee 
(£m) 
£m per 
live 
match 
 Change 
in per 
match fee 
(%) 
1983 2 BBC / ITV 10 5.2 2.6 0.26   
1985 0.5 BBC 6 1.3 2.6 0.43 0.67 
1986 2 BBC / ITV 12 6.2 3.1 0.26 -0.40 
1988 4 ITV 18 44 11 0.61 1.37 
1992 5 BSkyB 60 191.5 38.3 0.64 0.04 
1997 4 BSkyB 60 670 167.5 2.79 3.37 
2001 3 BSkyB 66 1200 400 6.06 1.17 
2004 3 BSkyB 88 1024 341.3 3.88 -0.36 
2007 3 BSkyB/ Setanta3 138 1706 568.7 4.12 0.06 
2010 3 BSkyB/ Setanta3 138 1782 594 4.30 0.04 
2013 3 BSkyB/ BT 154 3018 1006 6.53 0.52 
2016 3 BSkyB/ BT 168 5136 1712 10.19 0.56 
1. 2001 - 2004  40 more matches were available on a pay per view basis (PremPlus) 
2. 2004 - 2007 50 more matches were available on a pay per view basis (PremPlus)  
3. Note: At the time there was no data on how much ESPN bought Setanta's rights for.  
Source: Adapted from OFCOM       
 
This dominance by one broadcaster meant BSkyB could prevent the dissipation of 
monopoly profits by increasing the marginal cost of the resale rights to its competitors. The 
high resale price weakens downstream price competition and extracts consumer surplus, 
depriving consumers of the benefits of competition. The power of BSkyB is reflected in the 
2004 auction: Despite the Premier League’s collective power, as no other broadcaster 
could compete, BSkyB negotiated a price decrease from £3.64 million to £2.47 million per 
game. The original contract was 110 games for £400 million, but was negotiated to 138 
games for £341.3 million per season. However, a ruling by the Government regulator 
Ofcom in March 2010 meant that BSkyB was forced to reduce the wholesale prices of Sky 
Sports channels to competing broadcasters to £17.14 per month. From August 2010 BT 
offered customers Sky Sports 1 and 2 for £11.99 per month. In response, BSkyB increased 
the price of these channels to its own customers by £3 per month. The knock on effect 
under the new regulations was to increasing the wholesale price to £19.07. This increased 
BT’s marginal loss to £7.08 per month for selling Sky Sports 1 and 2. 
 
Before BSkyB formed, Football League broadcast rights were sold to terrestrial 
broadcasters BBC and ITV from 1983. A bilateral monopoly (BBC and ITV) may well have 
suppressed the revenues generated by the sale of rights but escaped attention from 
competition authorities (Buraimo, Paramio, et al., 2010). Collective selling, when coupled 
with exclusivity, means that only the large broadcasters can afford the acquisition of rights. 
This leads to higher prices and the shutting out of competitors from key broadcasting 
content. Football fans are further harmed by less Premier League football coverage on 
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television (or none at all if they do not subscribe to the broadcasting channel). The Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) took the Premier League and broadcasters the BBC and BSkyB to the UK 
Restrictive Practices Court in 1999. The sale of television rights for live Premier League 
football was deemed collective and exclusive. Mr Justice Ferris ruled in favour of the 
Premier League, stating that collective arrangements generated wealth which could be 
distributed throughout football. To justify this argument the Football Foundation was 
formed to allocate redistributed revenues at all levels of the sport, including grassroots 
football (Mellor, 2008). 
 
The European Commission opened proceedings into the joint selling of media rights in 
2001, stating it is tantamount to price fixing. At the time, the Premier League sold 
approximately twenty five per cent of Premier League matches on behalf of the member 
clubs and did not allow member clubs to sell directly to a broadcaster. Two main issues 
were of concern to the European Commission: First, that joint selling and the exclusivity of 
rights reduced competition amongst broadcasters bidding for Premier League rights. This 
leads to restricted access to broadcast matches for fans, particularly for those not paying a 
subscription fee. Secondly, lack of competition may slow down uptake of rights available 
for new technology. The investigation under Article 81(3) assessed the potential benefits to 
collective selling arrangements, mainly redistribution of revenue to promote solidarity at all 
levels of football (European Commission, 2002). 
 
The European Commission invited third party observations. These observations suggested 
that the current measures to enhance solidarity (competitive balance between teams) 
needed improving if exemption was to be granted and that a collective selling arrangement 
may have negative consequences  given the importance of Premier League football to 
some broadcasters (European Commission, 2004). Settlement discussions between the 
European Commission and the FA Premier League ultimately led to changes in the tender 
procedure and commercial policy: Rights were to be auctioned, broadcasters were 
publically invited to bid; broadcast rights were offered in a number of packages and sold 
individually; rights for matches not auctioned would be available for near-live broadcast; 
terrestrial broadcasters would be offered one or more highlights packages; and unsold 
rights packages would revert to the clubs with a view to sell individually (European 
Commission, 2004). 
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Unlike other European leagues, not all Premier League games are televised. Furthermore, 
untelevised games do not revert back to individual clubs for resale within a private market. 
In Italy, there is a mixture of centralised sale and sales by individual clubs (Noll, 2007). A 
decentralised method of sale, one where clubs individually negotiate with broadcasters, 
will see different clubs receiving different rights fees depending on the likely number of 
viewers the match will attract (nationally) and the size of the local fan base.  Furthermore, 
the attraction of the match to the wider audience if a function of the team quality (or 
playing strength) and the longer term performance (or reputation) (Noll, 2007). The typical 
result from individual sales right are therefore historically well performing teams will 
receive the largest rights fees, these are the teams that already attract the largest 
attendance and revenues.  
 
In 2003, the Premier League changed the format of its auction by splitting the broadcast 
rights into four packages for the auction of 2004 to 2007 rights. This decision was to give 
consumers a choice of broadcaster. After further pressure, there were six packages of 23 
games announced for the auctions of 2007 and 2010, as shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2Packages for auction after European Commission involvement. 
Package Broadcaster Details  
A Sky 23 first-choice matches shown at 4.00 pm on Sundays.  
B Sky 23 second-choice matches shown at 1.30pm on Sundays.  
C Setanta 23 third-choice matches shown at 8.00 pm on Mondays.  
D Setanta 8 second-choice matches + 15 fourth-choice matches shown at 5.15pm on Saturdays.  
E Sky 5 first-choice matches + 9 third-choice matches + 9 fourth-choice matches shown at 12.45pm on Saturdays.  
F Sky 10 first-choice matches + 7 second-choice matches + 6 third- choice matches in midweek and bank holidays, Saturdays.  
 
The number of broadcast games rose from 106 (including PremPlus pay-per-view matches) 
to 138 for the 2004 to 2013 seasons. With a view to increase downstream competition, 
four packages of broadcast rights were auctioned (2004 – 2007). However, all four 
packages were acquired by one broadcaster, BSkyB. A further 242 matches were made 
available in one package as near live broadcast rights10. From the 2007 season onwards, 
live broadcast rights are sold to at least two broadcasting companies. These commitments 
became legally binding for the Premier League until June 2013, with a penalty of ten per 
cent of turnover for breaching the agreements.  Given the changes made by the Premier 
10 Near live sets the broadcaster constrained to broadcast after 20:30 or 22:00 of the same 
match day and only for weekend matches. 
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League, the European Commission concluded that there were no longer grounds for action 
(European Commission, 2006). 
 
For 2007 through to 2010 and 2010 through to 2013 seasons, BSkyB and Setanta purchased 
rights to the 138 live games on offer per season. Setanta lost the rights in 2009 after failing 
to meet payments and American broadcaster ESPN acquired the two packages of rights (42 
matches) Setanta had won at auction. From the 2010 through to 2013 seasons, BSkyB won 
115 of the 138 rights at auction, and ESPN won the remaining 23. The Premier League 
increased the number of rights available at auction for the 2013 to 2016 seasons. This 
decision was a reaction to market demand for more televised live Premier League matches 
and an increase in evidence of the average revenue outweighing the average cost of 
production (Cox, 2012). From this auction, BSkyB acquired rights to 116 Premier League 
matches and BT the remaining 39 of the 154 sold. 
 
The rights fees are shown below in Table 3.3. In 2007 BSkyB paid £4.76 million per match 
for 92 matches per season, Setanta paid £2.84 million per match for 46 matches a season. 
In 2010, Setanta only secured one package of 23 games, BSkyB acquired the remaining 115 
games for £4.70 million per match.   
 
Table 3.3 Details of the fees paid by broadcasters 
Year 
Length of 
contract 
(years) 
Broadcaster 
Live 
matches 
per season 
Total rights 
fee (£m) 
Annual 
rights fee 
(£m) 
£m per 
live 
match 
2007 3 BSkyB 92 1314 438 4.76 
  3 Setanta 46 392 130.7 2.84 
2010 3 BSkyB 115 1623 541 4.7 
  3 Setanta 23 159 53 2.3 
3013 3 BSkyB 116 2280 760 6.55 
  3 BT 38 738 246 6.47 
2016 3 BSkyB 126 1392 4176 11.05 
  3 BT 42 320 960 7.62 
 
 
Splitting the rights between multiple broadcasters should expose them to greater 
competition at the upstream level whilst allowing consumers to choose the product from 
different providers, in theory leading to lower prices. In practice, the second broadcaster 
Setanta subsequently lost the rights after failing to meet payments to the Premier League 
in 2009. Although the American broadcaster, ESPN, has taken over the rights previously 
owned by Setanta, there is still apprehension about the dominance BSkyB asserts in this 
market.  The protection against competition policy was originally granted for the auction of 
1992 when the European Commission offered leniency regarding the Premier League and 
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Sky contract in light of the pending merger between Sky and the British Satellite 
Broadcasting to form BSkyB. The leniency in subsequent auctions has remained and from 
2016 to 2019, BSkyB pay £11.05 million per Premier League match they acquired at 
auction. 
 
The Premier League provides each member club with an equal share of monies from the 
sales for broadcast rights. This equal share has changed little, £13.53 million during the 
2007-2008 season and £13.80 million during the 2012-2013 season. Revenues from 
broadcast rights are further distributed (unequally) by a merit payment for final league 
position, and a facility fee for hosting a live broadcast. The total payment from the Premier 
League to member clubs also includes a second (equal) payment for sales of international 
broadcast rights, a strong potential growth area for sales. Table 3.4 shows these payments 
for the Premier League in the 2007 - 2008 season and the proportion of each payment as a 
percentage of club total revenue (ordered by total club revenue). 
 
Table 3.4 Premier League revenue sharing by club (2007-2008) 
  Club total revenue 
Equal share 
 (as % of TR) 
Merit payment  
(as % of TR) Facility fee Overseas TV 
Total Payment from 
FAPL (as % of TR) 
Manchester 
United 257,116,000 13,534,463 5% 14,501,220 6% 12,236,636 9,578,954 49,851,273 19% 
Chelsea 213,648,000 13,534,463 6% 13,776,159 6% 9,168,914 9,578,954 46,058,490 22% 
Arsenal 209,294,000 13,534,463 6% 13,051,098 6% 11,360,144 9,578,954 47,524,659 23% 
Liverpool 164,222,000 13,534,463 8% 12,326,037 8% 10,483,652 9,578,954 45,923,106 28% 
Tottenham 114,788,000 13,534,463 12% 7,250,610 6% 6,101,192 9,578,954 36,465,219 32% 
Newcastle 100,866,000 13,534,463 13% 6,525,549 6% 10,045,406 9,578,954 39,684,372 39% 
Manchester City 82,295,000 13,534,463 16% 8,700,732 11% 8,292,422 9,578,954 40,106,571 49% 
West Ham United 81,726,000 13,534,463 17% 7,975,671 10% 6,101,192 9,578,954 23,655,817 29% 
Everton 75,650,000 13,534,463 18% 11,600,976 15% 7,854,176 9,578,954 42,568,569 56% 
Aston Villa 75,639,000 13,534,463 18% 10,875,915 14% 8,730,668 9,578,954 42,720,000 56% 
Portsmouth 71,556,000 13,534,463 19% 9,425,793 13% 8,292,422 9,578,954 40,831,632 57% 
Sunderland 63,597,000 13,534,463 21% 4,350,366 7% 6,539,438 9,578,954 34,003,221 53% 
Bolton 59,072,000 13,534,463 23% 3,625,305 6% 5,662,946 9,578,954 32,401,668 55% 
Reading 58,023,000 13,534,463 23% 2,175,183 4% 5,662,946 9,578,954 30,951,546 53% 
Blackburn 56,395,000 13,534,463 24% 10,150,854 18% 7,415,930 9,578,954 40,680,201 72% 
Fulham 53,670,000 13,534,463 25% 2,900,244 5% 5,662,946 9,578,954 31,676,607 59% 
Birmingham 49,836,000 13,534,463 27% 1,450,122 3% 5,662,946 9,578,954 30,226,485 61% 
Derby 48,558,000 13,534,463 28% 725,061 1% 5,662,946 9,578,954 29,501,424 61% 
Middlesbrough 47,952,000 13,534,463 28% 5,800,488 12% 5,662,946 9,578,954 34,576,851 72% 
Wigan 43,455,000 13,534,463 31% 5,075,427 12% 5,662,946 9,578,954 33,851,790 78% 
Source: Deloitte, 2009; Premier League, 2009.       
 
With the exception of the richest three clubs, the equal share payment is a larger 
proportion of club income than payments based on the merit end of season league 
position. Equal share payments were as much as 30 per cent (approximately) of total 
revenue for clubs such as Derby, Middlesbrough and Wigan. Each received a much lower 
payment (1 per cent to 18 per cent) for their league position. For the poorest clubs, total 
payments from the Premier League amount to 61 per cent to 78 per cent of the club’s total 
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revenue. Thus, there is a strong incentive to stay within the twenty member clubs of the 
Premier League, although the incentive to move up the table is much smaller. The weight 
given to sharing revenue equally is the chosen method with which to promote competitive 
balance in the Premier League. The expectation is that member clubs will strengthen their 
ability to compete on the football field based on the size of these shared revenues.  
 
 
There has been a growth in global demand for Premier League football since its inception in 
1992. The increase in demand has led to an increase in the revenues from the sale of 
broadcast rights, domestic and international. An index of disaggregated payments to clubs 
in the Premier League by the Football Association from 2003 to 2014 is shown in Figure 3.2.   
 
Figure 3.2 Index of payments to Premier League clubs, not adjusted for price inflation (2003 -2014) 
 
 
The equal share payment has risen from £205 million in 2003 to £432 million in 2013, a 210 
per cent increase. Similarly, facility fees and merit payments have increased by 224 per 
cent, from £115 million to £259 million11. This increase in payments represents an increase 
in revenue from the sale of domestic and international broadcast rights. The total 
payments to all clubs in the Premier League have increased from £437 million in 2003 to 
11 Facility fees and Merit payments follow precisely similar growth changes, hence Merit 
payments is visible whilst Facility fees is hidden in Figure 4.2. 
 -
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
2003 2004 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014
In
de
x
Equal Share
Facility Fees
Merit Payment
Overseas TV
Total Payment
 65 
                                                          
£1563 million in 2013. This is an increase of 357 per cent, and a 754 per cent increase in 
revenues from international broadcast rights. Rights to air live Premier League football in 
other countries are not restricted in the same manner as with domestic rights. Rights to all 
Premier League matches are available to purchase by an international broadcaster as this is 
not a close substitute to attending at the stadium for international consumers watching on 
television. Revenue from these international broadcast rights has grown from £81 million 
in 2003 to £611 million in 2013, when it contributed 39 per cent to total payments.  
In total, the payment from the Premier League was £766,793,964 in the 2007 2008 season. 
This is 40 per cent of the league’s total revenue of £1,927,358,000. The equal share 
payment and the overseas payment are shared equally amongst the teams and are defined 
here as Fixed Payments. The facility fee and the merit payment vary depending on a team’s 
performance, and are defined here as variable payments. The ratio of fixed payment to 
variable payments from the Premier League was 60:40 in the 2007 - 2008 season. This is 24 
per cent and 16 per cent (respectively) of the total revenue for the league. Table 3.5 shows 
total revenue and Premier League payments between 2003 and 2013.  
 
Table 3.5 Premier League revenue and payments (2003 - 2013) 
  
Total Revenue 
(TR) 
Premier 
League 
Payment (LP) 
% of 
TR 
Fixed 
Payments 
% of 
LP 
%of 
TR 
Variable 
Payments 
% of 
LP 
% 
of 
TR 
2003 2004 1,327,770,000  
         
436,995,370  33% 
       
205,644,980  47% 15% 
             
231,350,390  53% 17% 
2004 2005 
       
1,333,575,000  
         
467,682,048  35% 
       
262,953,160  56% 20% 
             
204,728,888  44% 15% 
2006 2007 1,530,430,000  
         
463,640,898  30% 
       
259,284,480  56% 17% 
             
204,356,418  44% 13% 
2007 2008 1,927,358,000  
         
766,793,964  40% 
       
462,268,340  60% 24% 
             
304,525,624  40% 16% 
2009 2010 
         
2,030,000,000  
         
830,958,732  41% 
       
494,780,860  60% 24% 
             
336,177,872  40% 17% 
2010 2011 
         
2,271,000,000  
         
952,749,977  42% 
      
634,912,513  67% 28% 
             
317,837,464  33% 14% 
2011 2012 
         
2,360,000,000  
         
968,180,900  41% 
       
651,054,740  67% 28% 
             
317,126,160  33% 13% 
2012 2013 
         
2,525,000,000  
         
972,165,620  39% 
       
654,695,280  67% 26% 
             
317,470,340  33% 13% 
 
Overtime, the ratio of fixed to variable payments has changed from 47:53 in 2003 to 67:33 
in 2012. This shows that the Premier League has increased revenue sharing over the period 
2003 to 2013(if the fixed payment is defined as shared revenue). However, as a percentage 
of total league revenue, the Premier League payment changes little over the time period 
from 33 per cent of total revenue in 2003 to 39 per cent in 2013. The revenue sharing 
policy is different in other European Leagues. 
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3.4.2 Revenue sharing in other European leagues 
 
Serie A is the highest division in Italian football and, since 2004, has twenty competing 
teams in the league. Unlike the Premier League, exclusive live rights to matches are sold 
directly by individual teams to the broadcasters. This changed to a collective method in the 
2009 - 2010 season with a view to improving the competitive balance among participating 
teams. Redistribution of broadcasting revenue took place during the 2010 - 2011 season for 
the first time. After deductions for youth development spending (4 per cent) and support 
for lower leagues (6 per cent), broadcast revenues as distributed as follows: 40 per cent 
equal share; 30 per cent merit payment based on league position; 30 per cent based on 
television audience commanded.  
 
The 30 per cent merit payment based on league position is a combination of: 10 per cent 
on the basis of the historical results since the 1946 - 1947 season; 15 per cent on the basis 
of the results achieved over the last five seasons; and 5 per cent on the basis of the result 
achieved in the last season. The 30 per cent based television audience commanded is a 
combination of: 25 per cent based on the number of supporters (calculated by three 
different independent polls); and 5 per cent on the basis of the population of the town of 
reference. The total payment from Serie A to the teams in the league is Euros 851,000,000 
during the 2011 - 2012 season and Euros 949,600,000 during the 2012 - 2013 season. The 
amount shared equally (40 per cent) is thus Euros 340,440,000 and Euros 379,840,000 in 
each of those seasons.  
 
The Bundesliga is the top flight division in Germany, hosting eighteen teams in the league. 
Redistribution of revenues from broadcast rights is based only on the league positions of 
teams in the current and previous seasons as follows: 40 per cent is based on the current 
season; 30 per cent based on the league position in the previous season; then 20 per cent 
and 10 per cent for each season before that. The total payment from the Bundesliga to the 
teams in the league is Euros 314,040,000 during the 2011 - 2012 season. Given the 
definition of shared revenue used for the Premier League, the Bundesliga does not share 
revenue. All payments are considered prizes, based on league placement.  
 
La Liga is the top flight division in Spain, hosting twenty teams in the league. The league 
shares no revenue. The total broadcasting revenue earned by all the teams in La Liga is 
Euros 655,000,000 during the 2011 - 2012 season. For the sake of comparison, this is 
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defined as a variable payment. Even though a central body is not redistributing this 
revenue, it is earned indirectly by merit of league standing. Of the Euros 655 million earned 
from the sale of broadcast rights, two teams earn 140 million Euros each. The next highest 
earning team by this revenue source earns Euros 48 million.  
 
Table 3.6 shows the total league revenue, the fixed and the variable payments for these 
four top flight leagues around Europe, for 2011 - 2012. The highest total revenue is 
received by the clubs in the Premier League, 2.9 million Euros, compared to between Euros 
1.6 and 1.9 million Euros in the leagues shown. The Premier League shares 67 per cent of 
the broadcast revenue as a fixed payment. This is far greater than 40 per cent shared by 
Serie A and none shared by Bundesliga and La Liga. This fixed payment made by the 
Premier League is also the largest as a percentage of total league revenue (28 per cent). 
This shows the large extent to which the Premier League is sharing revenue by fixed 
payments compared to other leagues in Europe.  
 
Table 3.6 Revenue sharing in top flight European Leagues (2011 – 2012) (Euros) 
 Total Revenue (TR) 
League 
Payment (LP) 
% of 
TR 
Fixed 
Payments 
% of 
LP 
%of 
TR 
Variable 
Payments 
% of 
LP 
% of 
TR 
Premier League 2,900,000,000 1,189,713,818 41% 800,024,892 67% 28% 389,688,925 33% 13% 
Serie A 1,600,000,000 851,000,000 53% 340,400,000 40% 21% 510,600,000 60% 32% 
Bundesliga 1,900,000,000 314,040,000 17% - 0% 0% 314,040,000 100% 17% 
La Liga 1,800,000,000 655,000,000 36% - 0% 0% 655,000,000 100% 36% 
 
 
3.4.3 Competitive balance in the Premier League 
 
Competitive balance is the degree of equality in team performance within a league. A 
competitively balanced league should be one that is not continuously dominated by a 
single team over an extended period (Foster et al., 2006). This section will discuss a range 
of league level measures of competitive balance (match level competitive balance is 
discussed in chapter four).  
 
The measures used to analyse league competitive balance are as follows:  
 
1) Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) 
The HHI is used to measure the concentration of league points obtained by each club. It 
calculates the number of points a team gains by the end of a season as a proportion of all 
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the points gained in the league by all teams. The HHI is the sum of the squared values, such 
that 𝐻𝐻 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖1  where i is the team, N is the total number of teams in the league, and s is 
the share of the league points gained. Values of the HHI measure will fall between 0 (the 
least concentrated) and 1 (the most concentrated). A league will be more evenly balanced 
when there is a more equal distribution of points, thus when HHI tends towards 0.  
 
2) HHI of Championship wins (HHIC) 
This measures the share of championships won by each team over the data period (ten 
years from 2003). Such that s (from the HHI equation) is replaced by the number of 
championship wins as a proportion of the total number of wins available. A more balanced 
league will have a larger number of teams winning the league and thus a smaller HHI value.  
 
3) The standard deviation (SD) of win percentage 
A SD usually measures the dispersion from a sample mean. Scully (1974) and Fort and Quirk 
(1995) use an exogenous value for the mean of 0.5. This value is the percentage of wins 
each team would gain in a perfectly balanced league where each team is of equal strength, 
such that 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = �∑𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 0.5)2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
 
 
where T is the season, WP is the win per cent of each team.  The SD here is a measure of 
deviation around a perfectly balanced league. The smaller the SD, the more balanced the 
league is.  
 
 
4) Competitive Balance Ratio (CBR) 
The CBR is a measure reflecting team-specific variation in winning percentages over time 
and league-specific variation within the single time period (Humphreys, 2002). This 
measure is particularly useful for comparing competitive balance in leagues that differ in 
the number of teams. A CBR value of 0 shows no variation in the standings of a league, a 
value of 1 shows 100 per cent variation in the standings of a league. By this measure a 
league is more competitively balanced as the CBR value tends towards 1. The CBR scales 
the average time variation in win-loss percentage for teams in the league (this is precisely 
 69 
equivalent to the SD equation) by the average variation in win-loss percentages across 
seasons. As such, it shows the relative size of each type of variation across a number of 
seasons. The CBR is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊 = 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇���
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁����
 
 
Where 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇��� is the average time variation in win-loss percentage for teams in the league and 
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁���� is the average variation in win-loss percentages across seasons. The within team 
variation is given by: 
𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖 = �∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝚤𝚤���������)2𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁  
 
Where 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is the win percentage of a team i in period t, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝚤𝚤��������� is the average league 
win percentage, and T is the number of seasons. The smaller the value of 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖   the less the 
variation in team 𝑖𝑖’s winning percentage during the seasons under observation. The 
average variation in win percentages can be found by averaging the 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖 across teams in 
the league: 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇��� = ∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁  
 
Where N is the number of teams in the league. The within-season variation in win 
percentages can be measured by the standard deviation of the win percentage in each 
season across all teams in the league (equal to the SD equation): 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 = �∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 − 0.5)2𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁  
 
Where 0.5 is used to represent the ideal win percentage of a team in a perfectly balanced 
league, all teams have a 50 per cent probability of winning a game. The smaller the value of 
𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖, the less the variation of win percentages across the league.  Thus the average 
variation in win percentages in each season can be found by averaging the 𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 across each 
season, T: 
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𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁���� = ∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁  
 
The two measures are opposites, such that, a larger 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖  and a smaller 𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 then the more 
competitively balanced the league will be.  
 
 
5) Change between seasons (Fluidity) 
The fluidity measure, used in Flores et al. (2010), captures the dynamics of league balance 
over seasons, rather than a static dominance of teams that is shown using the HHI. When 
the HHI measure is used on a season by season bases, it does not account for the identity 
of the teams in its application to measuring competitive balance. The fluidity measure is 
based on the correlation of league rankings from one season to the next. Haan et al. (2007) 
denoted this measure as a dynamic measure (DN) as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = � 2𝑛𝑛2��|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1|
𝑖𝑖
 
 
Where � 2
𝑛𝑛2
� is used to normalise the number of teams in the league, allowing for 
comparison between leagues with different numbers of teams. The league position of team 
i in the season t is given by 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, such that the champions are 1 and last place is 20 (or18). 
The mobility of teams to move up or down the league table is counted equally in both 
directions. If the correlation between one season and the next is high, then the league is 
not competitively balanced, DN is small. A small or zero correlation between the rankings 
of teams from one season to the next will indicate competitive balance, DN is large.  
 
There are difficulties in constructing a competitive balance measure where some teams 
appear infrequently in the data set due to promotion and relegation.  The HHI and CBR 
measures use information based on the teams in the league during the season in question. 
These types of measure are static and are not altered by promotion and relegation. 
However, when considering changes over time using the within team variation (CBR) and 
the fluidity (DN) teams that do not appear in more than one time period cannot be used in 
the analysis. Specifically, for the fluidity measure, teams that do not appear in both time 
periods t and t-1 are removed from analysis.  
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Table 3.7 shows the HHI (1), the Premier League champions and the HHIC (2), the SD of win 
percentage (3), the CBR (4), and the fluidity measure (5).  
 
Table 3.7 Competitive balance in the Premier League (2003 - 2013) 
 (1) HHI (2) Champions (3) SD (5) DN 
2003 2004 0.054 Arsenal 0.197   
2004 2005 0.055 Chelsea 0.215 0.345 
2005 2006 0.055 Chelsea 0.192 0.330 
2006 2007 0.054 Manchester United 0.193 0.285 
2007 2008 0.056 Manchester United 0.213 0.265 
2008 2009 0.055 Manchester United 0.204 0.260 
2009 2010 0.055 Chelsea 0.207 0.285 
2010 2011 0.052 Manchester United 0.186 0.195 
2011 2012 0.055 Manchester City 0.202 0.215 
2012 2013 0.055 Manchester United 0.216 0.200 
Average 0.055  0.203 0.264 
(2) HHIC  0.360   
(4) CBR   0.262  
 
The average HHI for the Premier League is 0.055 or 5.5 per cent, this changes little over the 
ten seasons. As a bench mark, an industry concentration ratio of above 25 per cent is used 
by competition authorities in the United States for investigation, although it is the changes 
in the concentration that are often most important. As such, a 5.5 per cent concentration 
shows the Premier League is a competitive league based on distribution of points achieved 
by the member teams. However, during the ten seasons since 2003, Manchester United 
have won the championship 5 times. The HHIC measure is 36 per cent, showing a high level 
of concentration of championship wins. Other teams in the league are not of sufficient 
quality to provide competition over the championship place against Arsenal, Chelsea, 
Manchester United and Manchester City. 
 
The Premier League shows a within season win percentage variation (SD) that is different 
from zero, i.e. it is not perfectly balanced. The 2010 - 2011 season has the lowest variation 
away from balanced competition, this is a value of 0.186. The 2012 - 2013 season is the 
least competitively balanced season, with a value of 0.221. In both these seasons, 
Manchester United won the league followed by Manchester City, Chelsea and Arsenal. 
However, Manchester United won with 80 points in the 2010 – 2011 season (the 20th 
placed team had 33 points) and then won with 89 points in the 2012 – 2013 season (the 
last placed team had 25 points). This dispersion of match wins is representative of the 
within season variation, the closer the distribution, the more competitively balanced the 
league.   
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 Figure 3.3: Premier League within season win percentage variation and revenue sharing 
 
 
Figure 3.3 compares the changes in the Premier League within season win percentage 
variation to changes in fixed payment revenue sharing (as a percentage of total league 
revenue). This are only a small number of observations and a small variation in both 
measures, however, a simple line of best fit visually shows a weak positive relationship. If 
this correlation is true, then revenue sharing is correlated to a less competitively balanced 
league. Thus, more shared revenue has worsened the league competitive balance. Table 
3.8 shows variation in within team win percentage in the Premier League between 2003 
and 2013. 
 
The larger the value of 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖, the larger the variation of win percentage across the 2003 to 
2013 seasons. This larger variation is representative of the notable importance of teams 
such as Manchester City, with a value of 0.15. Manchester City is placed 16th in the Premier 
League in 2003 and won the league in 2011. Similarly, Liverpool are placed in the top four 
places in the league 2003 to 2008 after which they are placed lower in the table on a 
regular basis. The smallest values, zero, correspond to those teams present in the Premier 
League for a very short period of time. 
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Table 3.8 Premier League within team variation in win percentage (2003 – 2013) 
Team σT,i 
Arsenal 0.06 
Aston Villa 0.08 
Birmingham City 0.05 
Blackburn Rovers 0.09 
Blackpool 0.00 
Bolton Wanderers 0.07 
Burnley 0.00 
Charlton Athletic 0.06 
Chelsea 0.09 
Crystal Palace 0.00 
Derby County 0.00 
Everton 0.07 
Fulham 0.06 
Hull City 0.03 
Leeds United 0.00 
Leicester City 0.00 
Liverpool 0.09 
Manchester City 0.15 
Manchester United 0.06 
Middlesbrough 0.06 
Newcastle United 0.09 
Norwich City 0.05 
Portsmouth 0.07 
QPR 0.08 
Stoke City 0.03 
Reading 0.11 
Sheffield United 0.00 
Southampton 0.06 
Sunderland 0.07 
Swansea City  0.01 
Stoke City 0.00 
Tottenham Hotspur 0.09 
Watford 0.00 
West Bromwich Albion 0.08 
West Ham United 0.08 
Wigan Athletic 0.05 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 0.06 
Average 0.05 
 
The CBR is found by the division of average time variation in win-loss percentage for teams 
in the league, 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇���  by the average variation in win-loss percentages across seasons,  𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁����. The 
CBR for the Premier League between 2003 and 2013 is 0.262. A CBR value of 0 shows no 
variation in the standings of a league, a value of 1 shows 100 per cent variation in the 
standings of a league. As such, the CBR measure shows that the Premier League is not 
perfectly balanced. This measure is more appropriate for comparing different leagues 
(Humphreys, 2001), the following section compares the Premier League to three other top 
European leagues (the Bundesliga, La Liga and Serie A).  
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 The fluidity (DN) measure shows the how dynamic teams are at moving up or down the 
league table. A larger value of DN shows a great amount of movement in final league 
position between the year shown in Table 3.7 (t) and the previous season (t-1). Between 
the 2003 – 2004 and the 2004 – 2005 season the fluidity measure is 0.345, this is the 
highest level of this measure in the Premier League, dropping to 0.200 in 2012. This 
indicates that the movement of teams between league positions has become smaller, 
showing that competitive balance in the league has decreased over the data period. 
 
 
3.4.4 Competitive balance in other European leagues 
 
The five measures of competitive balance (HHI, HHIC, SD, CBR, and DN) are calculated for 
the top four European Leagues (Premier League, Serie A, Bundesliga and La Liga) from 2003 
to 2013 and are shown in Table 3.9. The HHI measure of competitive balance is highest for 
the Bundesliga (0.06) and lowest for La Liga (0.054). The concentration of points won in a 
season is higher in the German league. During the 2012 – 2013 season, Bayern Munich won 
the league with 91 points. The runner up, Borussia Dortmund had 66 points and the last 
placed team SpVgg Greuther Furth won 21 points. The Spanish league is the more evenly 
balanced. During the same season Barcelona won the league with 100 points, the runner 
up (Real Madrid) gained 85 points and the last placed team (Zaragoza) won 34. The Premier 
League sits between La Liga and Serie A with a HHI of 0.055 on average, indicating that it is 
the second most competitively balanced league.  
 
Manchester United won five Premier League championships from the ten seasons 
analysed. The HHIC (for championship wins) is 0.36. La Liga shows the highest 
concentration of championship wins, with Barcelona (winning six) and Real Madrid 
(winning three) dominating the top of the table.  By this measure, the Bundesliga is more 
competitive, with five different teams claiming the title over ten years. 
 
All leagues show a within season win percentage variation (SD) that is different from zero, 
showing that all leagues are not perfectly balanced. The 2009 - 2010 season has the closest 
to perfect balance for Serie A and the 2003 - 2004 season is the least competitively 
balanced season. In the 2009 – 2010 season, Internazionale won the league with 82 points 
and Livorno was the losing team with 29 points. In the 2003 – 2004 season the points 
difference was larger and hence less competitively balanced: Milan won the league with 82 
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points and Ancona came last place with 13 points.  Figure 3.4 shows the variation in within 
season variation in European leagues, between 2003 and 2013. 
 
Figure 3.4 European leagues within season variation (SD) (2003 - 2013) 
 
0.150
0.160
0.170
0.180
0.190
0.200
0.210
0.220
0.230
0.240
20
03
20
04
20
04
20
05
20
05
20
06
20
06
20
07
20
07
20
08
20
08
20
09
20
09
20
10
20
10
20
11
20
11
20
12
20
12
20
13
Premier League
Serie A
Bundesliga
La Liga
 76 
 Table 3.9 Measures of competitive balance in European leagues (2003 – 2013) 
 Premier League     Serie A       Bundesliga     La Liga       
 (1) HHI (2) Champions (3) SD (5) DN (1) HHI (2) Champions (3) SD (5) DN (1) HHI (2) Champion (3) SD (5) DN (1) HHI (2) Champion (3) SD (5) DN 
2003 2004 0.054 Arsenal 0.197   0.062 Milan 0.230   0.060 Werder Bremen 0.185   0.052 Valencia 0.170   
2004 2005 0.055 Chelsea 0.215 0.345 0.053 Juventus 0.206 0.327 0.060 Bayern Munich 0.185 0.352 0.053 Barcelona 0.183 0.30 
2005 2006 0.055 Chelsea 0.192 0.330 0.056 Internazionale 0.226 0.500 0.061 Bayern Munich 0.222 0.190 0.052 Barcelona 0.195 0.33 
2006 2007 0.054 Manchester United 0.193 0.285 0.055 Internazionale 0.217 0.310 0.059 VfB Stuttgart 0.194 0.205 0.052 Real Madrid 0.178 0.32 
2007 2008 0.056 Manchester United 0.213 0.265 0.054 Internazionale 0.205 0.320 0.060 Bayern Munich 0.190 0.275 0.054 Real Madrid 0.174 0.34 
2008 2009 0.055 Manchester United 0.204 0.260 0.054 Internazionale 0.190 0.220 0.061 VfL Wolfsburg 0.198 0.285 0.054 Barcelona 0.172 0.21 
2009 2010 0.055 Chelsea 0.207 0.285 0.053 Internazionale 0.185 0.355 0.060 Bayern Munich 0.198 0.320 0.056 Barcelona 0.219 0.28 
2010 2011 0.052 Manchester United 0.186 0.195 0.053 Milan 0.188 0.340 0.059 Borussia Dortmund 0.173 0.440 0.056 Barcelona 0.186 0.34 
2011 2012 0.055 Manchester City 0.202 0.215 0.053 Juventus 0.194 0.280 0.061 Borussia Dortmund 0.210 0.435 0.054 Real Madrid 0.199 0.43 
2012 2013 0.055 Manchester United 0.216 0.200 0.055 Juventus 0.197 0.235 0.062 Bayern Munich 0.210 0.230 0.056 Barcelona 0.194 0.32 
Average 0.055 Manchester United 0.203 0.264 0.055 Internazionale 0.204 0.321 0.060 Bayern Munich 0.197 0.304 0.054 Barcelona 0.187 0.317 
(2) HHIC   0.360     0.380     0.320     0.460    
(4) CBR     0.262       0.296       0.301       0.306   
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The Premier League and the Bundesliga follow a similar path from the 2008 – 2009 season 
onwards. During the 2004 to 2005 season, teams placed third to ninth in the Bundesliga all 
won between 17 to 18 matches each. This created a more even distribution of wins and 
thus a lower SD. However, in 2005 to 2006 the matches won were less evenly spread 
amongst the same teams and so there was a notable decrease in competitive balance. The 
Premier League, the Bundesliga and La Liga saw an increase in competitive balance in the 
2010 – 2011 season, after which the balance deteriorated. There were 269 matches won 
during this season in the Premier League, after which the number of games won rose to 
287 (190 matches won or 380 draws is most balanced). This was partly due to the 
ascendency of Manchester City to challenge Manchester United for the title. The top four 
teams won 97 matches in 2011 – 2012 compared to 84 in the (more balanced) previous 
season.  
 
Serie A shows a gradual increase in competitive balance since 2005, partly initiated by the 
relegation of 2005 -2006 winners, Juventus due to league sanctions. Juventus did return to 
Serie A in 2007 – 2008 season but did not return to their previous strength until winning 
the title in 2011 – 2012 and again in 2012 – 2013. La Liga was the most balanced league 
amongst the four using the SD measure on average, but particularly during the 2003 – 2004 
season. During this season, only 10 points separated the 5th and 15th in league positions. 
The sharp decrease in competitive balance seen in the 2009 – 2010 season was due to the 
dominance of Barcelona and Real Madrid, winning 62 matches with 195 points between 
them. Scoring 26 goals for Real Madrid that season was Cristiano Ronaldo, newly signed 
from Manchester United. 
 
The CBR for the Premier League between 2003 and 2013 is 0.262, lower than Serie A 
(0.296), the Bundesliga (0.301) and La Liga (0.306). Over this ten year time period, the 
Premier League is the least balanced (CBR tends towards zero when there is less variation 
in league standings). Taking into account the within team and within league variation, the 
most balanced is La Liga.  
 
Using the dynamic competitive balance measure (DN), Serie A is the most balanced league. 
The change in team league positions between 2004 – 2005 and 2005 – 2006 is the largest 
change seen across the data period (DN=0.500). This is mainly due to the change in position 
of Juventus from 1st in the 2004 – 2005 season to 20th in the 2005 – 2006 season, as 
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mentioned before this is due to the league sanctions imposed on the team. Removing the 
DN measure, as an outlier, Serie A is reported as the third most competitive balance league 
of the four analysed. The Spanish league sees a greater fluidity compared to the other 
leagues (DB=0.317 on average over the data period). The least balanced league by the 
fluidity measure is the English Premier League (DN=0.264 on average).  
 
Table 3.10 shows a summary of the league performance by each of the balance measures 
used, a value of 1 represents the most competitively balanced relative to the other leagues. 
Considering the four measures of competitive balance, Serie A is the least balanced league, 
followed by the Premier League as the second least balanced league. Against a priori 
expectations, the Spanish league is the most balanced. The HHI (1), SD (3), CBR (4), and DN 
(5) measures account for balance across the member clubs in each league, whereas the 
HHIC (2) measure focusses just on the winning clubs. This shows that outside of the two 
dominant teams in La Liga (Barcelona and Real Madrid) the remaining part of the league is 
the most competitive. However, few teams will ever have an opportunity to win the La Liga 
title. In the Bundesliga, the championship title race has been the most open. This shows 
that competitive balance may be important in different ways: it could be more important 
to consider the closeness of all teams in the league, or it could be more important to 
consider a greater opportunity for more teams to win the title. 
 
Table 3.10 Summary of competitive balance measures 
 Premier League Serie A Bundesliga La Liga 
(1) HHI 2 3 4 1 
(2) Champions 2 3 1 4 
(3) SD 3 4 2 1 
(4) CBR 4 3 2 1 
(5) DN 4 3 2 1 
Sum 15 16 11 8 
     
 
3.4.5 A correlation between competitive balance and revenue sharing? 
 
The analysis from Table 3.6 (revenue sharing) and Table 3.9 (competitive balance) show 
that the Premier League has the highest amount of revenue shared equally (28 per cent of 
league revenue) and the second to worst competitive balance (by the combination of 
different measures). Serie A has the most unevenly balanced league and the second 
highest level of revenue sharing (21 per cent of league revenue). The two leagues that do 
not share revenues by equal payments (the Bundesliga and La Liga) are the most 
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competitively balanced. As there are only four observations available (one per league), no 
statistical tests can be performed. However, the results show a negative correlation 
between revenue sharing and competitive balance, a correlation coefficient of -0.8339. The 
Premier League spend a significant amount more money than other leagues, but do not 
achieve the most competitively balanced league.   
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
There are varying ways to identify the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance in 
a league (as per the review in chapter two). For clubs assuming a utility maximising 
objective, revenue sharing is shown to have three main effects on competitive balance. The 
sharpening effect (more revenue sharing increases the amount of talent investment at 
each club so enhancing the competitive balance in the league), the dulling effect (more 
revenue sharing reduces the amount of talent invested by each club and so worsens the 
competitive balance), and the invariance proposition (revenue sharing has no effect on 
talent investments and competitive balance). 
 
The model constructed in section 3.2 introduces relative performance managerial incentive 
contracts to the contest model. The expansion of the contest model incorporates a 
separation of ownership and control which is often seen in a large number of firms, 
particularly in Premier League clubs. This endogenises the weighting placed on winning or 
profits within the objective function, often held as exogenous in the existing literature. The 
model is solved by optimising the weighting placed on investing in talent based on a 
relative performance incentive. The results show that revenue sharing will improve 
competitive balance under conditions of a relative performance contract if, and only if, the 
amount of revenue shared is large. A low level of revenue sharing, however, reduces the 
league competitive balance. This differs from existing evidence that find a dulling effect of 
revenue sharing (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004). The result also differs from the 
sharpening proposition indicated in Dietl et al. (2011). Although the dulling and sharpening 
effect is evidenced by the model, the impact on competitive balance depends on the size of 
revenue that is shared. If revenue sharing is to be used as a policy measure to improve the 
competitive balance of a league, then this result shows that the amount of revenue sharing 
needs to be large. A small amount of revenue sharing worsens the competitive balance as 
the large market club would invest more aggressively in talent. The way to encourage a 
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small market club to invest more heavily in playing talent is to raise the degree of revenue 
sharing. 
 
However, the conditions proof for the dulling effect to hold are based on a single domestic 
competition. As such, additional competitions such as the European Champions League (for 
those placed highest in the league) and the lower domestic division (for those placed 
lowest in the league) are largely ignored. If revenue sharing from TV is shared equally, 
given the incentive of clubs to qualify for European competition, large market clubs may 
still invest heavily even in the presence of equal sharing. The main reason is the high 
revenues associated with participation in Champions League football. Green, Lozano and 
Simmons (2015) empirically examines the effects of Champions League qualification on 
teams’ investments in playing squads (changes in payroll), and show that clubs on the 
fringe of Champions League qualification will invest more heavily. Similarly, a small amount 
of revenue sharing may still cause small clubs to invest heavily in talent given that 
relegation is costly, due to a large gap in the available revenues between the domestic 
leagues in English football. The empirical evidence from Green et al. (2015) lays way for 
further adaptation of the contest model to include revenue streams from outside of the 
domestic league in focus. 
 
In line with the existing literature the model defines revenue sharing as the redistribution of 
revenues from large market clubs with higher potential of generating revenues to the small 
market clubs with less such potential. This has classically been true for the sharing of gate 
revenue in North American sports but is also true when considering the broadcast rights 
revenue in the Premier League. Large market clubs would raise greater revenues than small 
market clubs if broadcast rights are sold competitively, in the same way a large club would 
have greater gate receipts. The home club receives a fraction (𝛿𝛿) of revenues whilst the 
visiting club receives (1- 𝛿𝛿) of the revenues of the home club. The degree of revenue sharing 
required to force a result that improves competitive balance is above 43.5 per cent of league 
total revenue (𝛿𝛿<0.565 when market size is equal to 2, seen in Figure 3.1). Around 25 per 
cent of broadcast revenue was shared in the Premier League during the 2011 – 2012 season 
(Table 3.6). According to these results, the current degree of revenue sharing will worsen 
the competitive balance.  
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Empirically estimating the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance in the Premier 
League is less rigorous due to the lack of variation in either element over time. League level 
competitive balance is measured in four top flight European leagues over ten seasons, 
using four different measures of competitive balance. The results show that the Premier 
League is amongst the least balanced leagues, only Serie A is less balanced. The 
championship title winners of La Liga are dominated by Barcelona and Real Madrid, 
however, taking account of all the teams in this league shows that this league is the most 
equally balanced. Removing the top two teams in each league (akin to removing outliers) 
also confirms that the remaining part of La Liga is more balanced than the other leagues12. 
This finding goes against a priori expectations and raises the question, is competitive 
balance between all teams in the league more important than all teams having an equal 
shot at winning the title?  
 
The amount of revenue shared equally between teams in the Premier League increases 
over the ten year period but remains approximately 28 per cent of league total revenue 
(2013). Compared to other leagues in Europe, the Premier League shares the most revenue 
amongst the member clubs. The cross section of the four European leagues shows the 
change in competitive balance and the corresponding differences in revenue sharing. Albeit 
a small sample, there appears a negative correlation between revenue sharing and 
competitive balance.   
 
This correlation sits with the dulling effect found by Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) and 
Dietl et al. (2011) and with the finding that balance will be reduced with small amounts of 
revenue sharing. The combination of the two key results from the analysis in this chapter 
suggests that if the Premier League wishes to improve this balance then a far greater 
amount of sharing is needed. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In the 2012 – 2013 season the governing body of the Premier League paid £972 million to 
the 20 member clubs, raised from the collective sale of broadcast rights, around two thirds 
of which was distributed equally to each club. The remaining amount was paid in reward 
for final league position. The £654 million equal payment was a policy measure aimed to 
12 Results not shown for HHI-5 and HHI-15. 
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enhance competitive balance in the league. The Premier League has a small number of 
clubs that dominate the champion’s spot. Over ten seasons (2003 to 2013) only four teams 
have claimed the title (Arsenal, Chelsea, Manchester City, and Manchester United). These 
clubs are amongst the richest in the league, their continued success creates a dispersion of 
revenue between the richest and poorest (through gaining access to European League 
competitions, discussed in chapter six). 
 
This chapter investigated the relationship between revenue sharing and competitive 
balance. Results from empirical investigation show that there is a negative correlation 
between sharing revenue and competitive balance. Results from mathematical modelling 
confirm this relationship is true if the amount of revenue sharing is small (below 43.5 per 
cent of total revenue). Furthermore, to enhance the competitive balance of the league a 
greater amount of revenue must be shared (above 43.5 per cent of revenue). Between 
2003 and 2013, no European football league offered the degree of revenue sharing 
necessary to promote an increase in competitive balance.  
 
These results show a strong policy implication, they suggest that the £654 million spent to 
enhance equality of teams in the Premier League is not just a futile gesture but detrimental 
to the cause. Given that the Premier League is a successful league, by revenues, empirically 
has a poor competitive balance compared to other European leagues, and theoretically 
shares an amount of revenue that weakens competitive balance, this raises a question of 
how important is competitive balance really? Throughout this chapter, it has been assumed 
that competitive balance is of importance. In the contest model, the importance of 
competitive balance directly affects clubs revenues. This follows the principle that balanced 
competition is a greater spectacle than a small proportion of teams seeing great success in 
a league, known as the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis coined by Rottenberg (1956). 
Buraimo and Simmons (2015) show that balance in competition is not as important for 
spectators as watching star footballers play. The importance of competitive balance on 
spectator demand is analysed in chapter four.  
 
 Empirically, competitive balance and the degree of revenue sharing is measured and a 
correlation is estimated. Ideally, more variation in both measures needs to be observed to 
allow for more rigorous statistical testing of the relationship between revenue sharing and 
balance. Existing studies that attempt analysis of the same similar research questions do so 
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by observing a natural experiment (where a governing body introduces a significant change 
in the revenue sharing policy) such as, Robinson and Simmons (2014). In the contest model, 
the weight placed on winning or profit objectives is endogenised. This is exogenous in the 
previous literature. However, there are a number of other factors held exogenous (club 
market size, the impact of competitive balance on revenues, and the marginal cost of 
playing talent). The most important factor to include in the model for further research is 
the cost of playing talent. This can be achieved by adding a supply side (of playing talent) to 
match the demand (investment in playing talent) in the market. This turns the analysis into 
a general equilibrium model, and should provide further clarity to the analysis. A key 
assumption to the contest model is that competitive balance has a positive effect on 
revenues, thus the more balanced the two competing teams are in playing talent, the 
higher the revenue for each team. As competitive balance becomes more important, less 
wins are required to achieve the maximum revenues. The analysis in chapter four tests the 
hypothesis that greater competitive balance leads to greater demand to spectate the 
match.  
 84 
Chapter 4 - Outcome uncertainty and demand  
 
 
A version of Chapter 4 was revised and resubmitted to the Journal of Sports Economics in 
March 2015. Cox, A. (Under review). Spectator demand, uncertainty of results and public 
interest Evidence from the English Premier League. Journal of Sports Economics.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Premier League stadium attendance was over 13 million in the 2011 - 2012 season (Rollin, 
2012), producing £547 million in match day revenue (Deloitte, 2013). Live Premier League 
matches were broadcast in 212 territories, reaching approximately 4.7 billion viewers and 
raising £1.2 billion in revenue per year (Premier League, 2015).  The league restricts access 
to the television market by not allowing broadcasters to negotiate with individual clubs and 
instead forcing them to buy a package from the central negotiating body. The UK 
Restrictive Practices Court and the European Commission found in favour of this collective 
selling method so as to promote solidarity at all levels of football by redistribution of 
revenue (European Commission, 2002). The argument is that a collective selling method 
would better promote financial equality amongst member clubs and therefore promote 
competitive balance13 in the league (Szymanski, 2001). The decision is deemed to be in the 
public interest due to the underlying assumption that competitive imbalance reduces 
spectator demand for matches. This argument has been known as the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis (UOH) and stems from the work of Rottenberg (1956).  
 
Evidence of the UOH, however, is mixed. In European football, Forrest, Buraimo and 
Simmons (2005) found evidence for the UOH whilst results from Pawlowski and Anders 
(2012), Forrest, Beaumont, Goddard and Simmons (2005) and Buraimo and Simmons 
(2008) are against. These studies focus on stadium attendance as the measure of demand 
but, given large television audiences of football matches, this does not accurately reflect 
demand for the event. Considering both stadium and TV demand, Buraimo and Simmons 
(2009) find that a more balanced match would reduce stadium attendance but increase 
television audiences in Spanish football. However, Buraimo (2008) is the only study (to the 
13 Chapter three examined the influence of sharing revenue on the competitive balance of 
the Premier League. 
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author’s knowledge) to test the UOH for Premier League television audiences, finding no 
relationship between competitive balance and demand.  
 
A number of existing studies use a quadratic function (of the home win probability) to 
estimate the marginal effect of the UOH on demand for a football match. Coates and 
Humphreys (2012) argue that spectator preferences are not symmetric, given that they do 
not dislike a team’s loss to the same degree as they like a victory. Home win probability is 
split into bands or steps and allowed to vary more flexibly across values of stadium 
attendance (to account for reference-dependent preferences) and the marginal impact of 
competitive balance upon attendance is allowed to vary at different levels of competitive 
balance. Other studies use a linear relationship, such as the probability of the match ending 
in a draw and Sacheti et al. (2014) argue that the existing results are sensitive to the 
uncertainty measure used. Despite a lack of general consensus in existing studies, the 
Premier League spends millions on enhancing the competitive balance, around £730 million 
in 2007 - 2008 season (Deloitte, 2009).  
 
This section contributes towards building a consensus view on the UOH in the English 
Premier League in two ways: Firstly, the impact of outcome uncertainty is estimated for 
both stadium attendance and television audiences. Testing the UOH on both types of 
demand during the same time period and for the same sporting competition has only been 
shown by Buraimo (2008) (for English football) and Simmons Buraimo and Simmons 
(2009b) (for Spanish football) with differing results. Secondly, this study tests the UOH with 
different measures of outcome uncertainty that are commonly used in the existing 
evidence. The approach from Coates et al. (2014) is used to test the UOH with the 
probability of the home team winning. The probability of a draw and the absolute 
difference of win probability, used by Buraimo and Simmons (2009) and Forrest et al. 
(2005), are tested and compared. The chapter first discusses each element of the model to 
be estimated before discussing the method, then analysis and discussion of the results. 
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4.2 Stadium attendance and television audiences 
 
The demand for a football match can be approximated by the number of people attending 
the stadium and watching the event live on television. Stadium attendance figures for each 
Premier League match are taken from respective editions of the Sky Sport Football 
Yearbook 2004 – 2012 (Rollin and Rollin, Various Years) released annually. The information 
is total attendance at each Premier League match. This includes a mixture of ticketing 
types: Season ticket holder; one off home supporter tickets; and one off away supporter 
tickets. However, stadium attendance may fail to reflect the true demand due to stadium 
capacity constraints. When a supply constraint is placed on a market, some consumers are 
denied access to the product. Demand exceeding the supply constraint is therefore not 
observed in the recorded stadium attendance information. Unobserved excess demand will 
exist if the capacity constraint is binding. The distribution of stadium attendance numbers 
is shown in Figure 4.1. This shows data from 3,040 matches from 2004 to 2012. The right 
hand tail of the distribution appears censored in several places: around 55,000, 60,000 and 
75,000 attendance. Distribution of stadium capacity over the same period is shown in 
Figure 4.2. The distribution of attendance numbers closely follows the distribution of 
stadium capacities, suggesting attendance is being constrained. 
 
Stadium capacity figures are taken from the respective club reports. The true capacity of 
the stadium varies with the level of fan separation and policing needed at each match. 
However, the maximum seated capacity serves as a close approximate to the true supply of 
tickets on offer. Combining capacity and attendance data at match level show varying 
attendance at discrete capacity sizes (for each stadium). The average attendance, capacity 
and utilisation for all Premier League clubs during their participation in the league between 
2004 – 2012 seasons is shown in Table 4.1. Sixteen of the thirty four clubs had an average 
match attendance of 95 per cent or more of the stadium capacity. Given seating 
arrangements that may differ from match to match due to security and policing of 
supporters, a capacity utilisation of 95 per cent or greater is considered a binding 
constraint (Buraimo and Simmons, 2006).  
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Figure 4.1 Premier League stadium attendance (2004 – 2012) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Premier League stadium capacity (2004 – 2012) 
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Table 4.1 Premier League average attendance, capacity and utilisation (2004-2012) 
Club Average  Attendance 
Min 
Attendance 
Max 
Attendance 
SD 
Attendance 
Average 
Capacity 
Average 
Capacity 
utilised 
Average TV 
Audience 
(millions) 
Man Utd 73,604 67,684 76,098 3,152 75,160 0.98 0.68 
Arsenal 54,450 37,010 60,161 9,539 54,904 0.99 0.51 
Newcastle 50,327 41,053 52,389 2,580 52,393 0.96 0.33 
Man City 43,928 35,776 47,479 3,100 47,190 0.93 0.4 
Liverpool 43,434 35,064 45,071 1,628 45,330 0.96 0.52 
Chelsea 41,562 38,000 42,321 571 42,351 0.98 0.55 
Sunderland 39,235 28,226 47,936 4,553 49,000 0.8 0.21 
Aston Villa 37,186 26,422 42,953 3,920 42,687 0.87 0.23 
Everton 36,125 29,561 40,552 2,595 40,363 0.89 0.22 
Tottenham 34,714 25,641 36,274 3,004 36,246 0.96 0.39 
West Ham 33,976 29,582 35,000 1,197 35,474 0.96 0.26 
Derby 32,432 30,048 33,087 882 42,449 0.76 0.06 
Southampton 30,610 27,343 32,066 1,695 32,689 0.94 0.19 
Sheffield Utd 30,512 25,011 32,604 2,289 32,500 0.94 0.1 
Middlesbrough 28,669 22,920 34,836 3,145 35,090 0.82 0.11 
Wolves 27,244 22,657 29,086 1,624 28,775 0.95 0.27 
Birmingham 26,606 19,922 29,382 2,296 29,913 0.89 0.14 
Stoke 26,561 24,274 27,739 810 27,966 0.95 0.3 
Charlton 26,265 23,423 27,111 915 27,111 0.97 0.13 
WBA 25,340 22,474 27,751 1,277 27,492 0.92 0.18 
Norwich 24,910 16,002 26,819 2,322 26,096 0.96 0.17 
Hull 24,602 22,822 25,030 535 25,404 0.97 0.16 
Crystal Palace 24,108 20,705 26,193 1,614 26,257 0.92 0.11 
Reading 23,681 21,379 24,135 722 24,268 0.98 0.15 
Bolton 23,345 17,014 27,880 2,561 28,229 0.83 0.19 
Blackburn 23,149 16,035 30,316 3,253 31,340 0.74 0.19 
Fulham 23,138 16,180 25,700 2,499 24,888 0.93 0.2 
Burnley 20,643 18,397 21,761 862 22,546 0.92 0.09 
Swansea 19,946 18,985 20,605 546 20,520 0.97 0.25 
Portsmouth 19,628 16,207 20,821 1,007 20,461 0.96 0.16 
Watford 18,750 13,760 19,830 1,358 22,000 0.85 0.12 
Wigan 18,517 14,007 25,133 2,562 29,448 0.64 0.16 
QPR 17,342 15,195 18,076 850 18,439 0.94 0.33 
Blackpool 15,780 14,550 16,116 425 16,220 0.97 0.21 
 
 
The average capacity utilised over at each match over the time period shows attendance, 
on average, is constrained at a number of venues. Clubs with a high average attendance, 
such as Arsenal, Chelsea and Manchester United, have the highest average capacity 
utilisation indicating excess demand for attendance at their home matches. Clubs with 
lower average attendances, such as Reading, Blackpool and Swansea also have high 
average capacity utilisation. This shows that demand for matches exceeds the supply 
constraint at a variety of clubs, not just those that are considered largest by fan base, 
stadium size or revenue.  
 
Attendance at 1,543 of the 3,040 matches met or exceeded 95 per cent of the stadium 
capacity. Average capacity utilisation was 90 per cent (with a standard deviation of 11). The 
lowest capacity filled match was, an early season fixture at Wigan in 2007 against 
Middlesbrough (40 per cent capacity). This fixture is the second lowest attended match in 
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the data period. The distribution is heavily skewed towards the assumed maximum 
capacity of 95 per cent.   
 
Consumers wishing to watch live Premier League football matches can attend the stadium 
or watch a subset of these matches live on television. There are costs for attending the 
match at the stadium above the ticket price such as travel and time costs. For a consumer 
that considers the cost to be greater than the benefit, a substitute to stadium attendance is 
watching the match live on television. 138 of the 380 Premier League matches per season 
are broadcast live between 2004 and 2012.  Sky Sports was the sole broadcaster between 
the 2004 and 2007 seasons, showing 88 matches by subscription and a further 50 matches 
on a pay-per-view channel, Prem Plus. Chapter three discussed the TV rights deal in more 
detail. 
 
The number of viewers for each broadcast match is taken from the Broadcasting Audience 
Research Board (BARB) database. BARB viewing data are results from a sample survey of 
5100 households. The panel of private households in the sample are selected to closely 
match the UK wider population by completion of an Establishment Survey which identifies 
the household’s characteristics, geography, technology platform used and other control 
variables. Each household is monitored by TV meter and software meter (for computers) to 
identify what is being watched. Members of the household self-report who is watching 
(and when they stop watching) the program by interaction with the TV meter, this is 
monitored on a minute by minute basis. BARB is able to track directly the use of Sky 
subscribers by accessing service information codes from the Sky provided set-top box. This 
is where the data used in this study will be taken from. The data that BARB produce are the 
consolidated ratings that include catch-up, or time-shifted, viewing that happened up to 
seven days after the original broadcast. The consolidated ratings are considered by BARB as 
the standard on which the UK broadcasting and advertising industries rely for all reporting 
and trading. 
 
Alongside the average attendance data, Table 4.1, shows the average television audiences, 
estimated by the BARB survey, by team over the data period. There is a strong correlation 
(correlation index 0.76) between average television audiences and average attendances. 
The clubs that have the greatest historical reputation for success and thus the largest local 
following also have the largest television audiences, an argument also discussed in Noll 
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(2007). Manchester United, Chelsea, Liverpool, and Arsenal exceed all other clubs in the 
league with respect to demand for spectating their matches both at the stadium and on 
television. Audience numbers have grown over time and differ depending on the 
broadcaster. 
 
Average audiences for each broadcaster by year are shown in Table 4.2. This shows the 
average demand for watching matches on television has grown between 2004 and 2012. 
Sky Sports dominated the subscription channel market for Premier League matches. 
Average viewers for matches shown on Sky Sports rose from 0.96 million in 2004-2005, to 
1.3 million in 2011-2012. Average viewers for matches shown on Setanta or ESPN are 
between 0.28 and 0.43 million. The audience numbers for Sentanta during the 2009 -2010 
season is incomplete (due to financial issues). The average viewership for the remaining 
matches that season shown by ESPN is 0.36 million, this is higher than Setanta audiences 
and rose to 0.43 million in 2011-2012.  
 
Table 4.2 Average television audience of live Premier League matches by broadcaster 
Season Sky Sports Setanta ESPN 
2004-2005 0.96   
2005-2006 1.01   
2006-2007 1.00   
2007-2008 1.05 0.31  
2008-2009 1.05 0.28  
2009-2010 1.07 incomplete  0.36 
2010-2011 1.20  0.41 
2011-2012 1.30  0.43 
 
As the number of matches broadcast live on, and the number of viewers subscribed to, Sky 
Sports account for the majority of those available, the following analysis discusses Sky 
Sports audiences only. The audience viewing figures for Sky Sports from BARB are complete 
for this time period. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of Premier League audiences 
broadcast on Sky Sports (2004-2012). This histogram shows Sky Sports’ television audience 
in millions, the majority of which are approximately 1 million viewers. The highest audience 
of 2.9 million was for Chelsea against Liverpool in February of 2011.  
 
Sky Sports wishes to attract advertising revenue and this is driven by audience numbers. To 
analyse the effect of competitive balance on spectator demand, other factors influencing 
the attendance and television audience must be accounted for. These determinants are 
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grouped into three categories: match outcome uncertainty, the current performance of 
teams, and the characteristics of the match. These are considered in turn. 
 
Figure 4.3 Sky Sports television audiences (2004 – 2012) 
 
 
4.2.1 Uncertainty of Outcome  
 
The UOH, first identified by Rottenberg (1956), postulates that the demand for a match will 
be affected by the uncertainty of the outcome of that match. Attendance demand 
increases with tighter competition (based on the percentage of games each team has won 
in the league). A team winning 50 per cent of matches would have a greater attraction than 
a team winning 70 per cent of its matches. Table 4.3 shows the win percentage of each 
team and the corresponding average stadium attendance and Sky Sports television 
audience for the 2004 to 2012 seasons. 
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Table 4.3 Win per cent and demand for Premier League teams (2004 -2012) 
 
 
Over the eight seasons in this time period, Chelsea and Manchester United won 67per cent 
of all matches. Both these clubs have been successful in winning trophies. Less successful 
clubs such as Sheffield United, Norwich, Reading and Derby have an average win 
percentage of 57 to 54 per cent. These less successful clubs, have a corresponding lower 
than average stadium attendance and television audience. The nine clubs with an average 
win percentage between 45 and 55 per cent are Norwich, Reading, Derby, Liverpool, 
Average Win% Average Attendance
Average Sky Sports 
Audience (Millions)
Chelsea 67% 41,562 1.38
Man Utd 67% 73,604 1.57
Arsenal 58% 54,450 1.33
Sheff Utd 57% 30,512 0.93
Norwich 55% 24,910 0.76
Reading 55% 23,681 0.79
Derby 54% 32,432 0.81
Liverpool 52% 43,434 1.35
Swansea 52% 19,946 1.05
QPR 52% 17,342 1.14
Crystal Palace 48% 24,108 0.71
Watford 48% 18,750 0.59
Burnley 46% 20,643 0.55
WBA 42% 25,340 0.86
Blackpool 41% 15,780 1.02
Tottenham 41% 34,714 1.19
Birmingham 40% 26,606 0.81
Everton 40% 36,125 0.93
Sunderland 39% 39,235 0.94
Man City 38% 43,928 1.13
Wolves 37% 27,244 0.93
Newcastle 37% 50,327 1.17
Aston Villa 36% 37,186 0.95
West Ham 35% 33,976 1.07
Stoke 35% 26,561 0.91
Charlton 34% 26,265 0.65
Blackburn 34% 23,149 0.90
Bolton 34% 23,345 0.87
Hull 33% 24,602 0.97
Wigan 32% 18,517 0.88
Middlesbrough 32% 28,669 0.76
Portsmouth 32% 19,628 0.74
Southampton 32% 30,610 0.73
Fulham 31% 23,138 0.91
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Swansea, QPR, Crystal Palace, Watford, and Burnley. Of these nine clubs that have the 
most competitively balanced win percentages, only Derby and Liverpool had an average 
stadium attendance above the league average of 30,598.  
 
The other seven clubs ranked in the last fourteen in terms of average stadium attendance. 
Liverpool, QPR and Swansea attract an average television audiences of 1.35, 1.14 and 1.05 
million, respectively (all above the league average of 0.95 million). The remaining seven 
clubs ranked in the lowest ten in terms of television audiences.  As such, there is no 
consistent correlation with a rise in either stadium attendance or television audience for 
clubs with an average win percentage of approximately 50 per cent. This is likely due to a 
number of other factors influencing the demand for each match. Furthermore, as these are 
average observations over a number of seasons, the demand for each match can be 
observed with the corresponding match level measure showing the uncertainty of the 
match outcome.  
 
A measure increasingly used in the existing literature is a match level measure of the pre 
match probability of the home team winning (Benz et al., 2009; Beckman et al., 2011; 
Coates and Humphreys, 2012). The home win probability is taken from the average pre-
match betting odds offered by between 30 and 40 bookmakers. Pre-match betting odds for 
weekend games are collected on Friday afternoons, and on Tuesday afternoons for 
midweek games. These are fixed betting odds and, as such, do not vary based on the 
quantities of bets placed. These odds, and the corresponding average, are made available 
at http://www.football-data.co.uk. The bookmaker’s odds are converted into 
percentages14. Bookmakers provide odds for the home team winning, a draw between 
both teams, and the odds for an away team win.  
 
Theoretically, these odds, once converted to probability percentages, should sum to equal 
one (100 per cent). However, the betting odds include a profit margin for the bookmakers. 
To account for this profit margin, known as the over-round, the margin needs to be 
removed by deflating the probabilities. A Theil index is calculated to allow for a truer 
reflection of probability after accounting for the bookmaker's margin (Theil, 1967). The 
home, away and draw probabilities are scaled by the sum of the probabilities, as used in 
14 by the following formula: Probability  =  100/decimal odd. For example, if the decimal 
betting odd is 1.3, then the corresponding probability is 76.92 per cent ( = 100 /1.3). 
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Peel and Thomas (1992) and Forrest and Simmons (2002). The adjusted home win 
probability more accurately reflects the perceived chance of the home team winning. The 
information that the bookmaker takes into account for this probability calculation by is not 
revealed, however it is influenced by a variety of information beyond that of the team’s 
win percentage.  
 
A number of existing studies use the home win probability such that the closer the home 
win probability is to 50 per cent the more evenly balanced the match is expected to be. If 
the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis holds, then it is matches with a home win 
probability close to 50 per cent that will attract the greatest attendance. Figure 4.4 shows 
the frequency histogram of the home win probability for the 2004 to 2012 seasons. The 
average home win probability is 45 per cent and is one of the most frequently observed 
probabilities. The lowest probability of the home team winning is 6 per cent for Sunderland 
against Chelsea in 2006 and Derby against Manchester United in 2008. The highest 
probability of the home team winning is 86 per cent for Chelsea against Wigan, and also 
against Blackpool in 2010.  
 
Figure 4.4 Histogram of match level home win probability (2004-2012) 
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Although a number of studies use the probability of the home team winning as a measure 
of competitive balance, it is possible that a match outcome could vary in certainty with the 
same home win probability. For example, consider two matches (A and B). Match A has the 
following probabilities: p(home win) = 0.4, p(draw)= 0.1, p (away win) = 0.5. Match B has 
the following probabilities: p(home win) = 0.4, p(draw)= 0.2, p (away win) = 0.4.  The 
outcome is arguably more certain in match A (in the sense that one team is perceived to be 
superior to the other) than in match B. However, the probability of the home team winning 
is the same in both cases. Buraimo and Simmons (2009) and Forrest et al. (2005) use the 
probability of a draw or the absolute difference in win probability as the measure of 
uncertainty (Buraimo and Simmons, 2015).  
 
To better understand the correlation between match outcome uncertainty and demand 
(before statistical analysis), data are split into match pairs. A pair is both the home and 
away team for each match such that one match pair is observed per season, for example, 
Liverpool versus Everton which differs from the reverse fixture Everton versus Liverpool. 
There are 916 match pairs in the Premier League from 2004 to 2012.  
 
Table 4.4 shows the stadium capacity utilisation and television audiences for the top and 
bottom 20 match pairs, ordered by draw probability. These are averages for the match 
pairs over the data period (a number of match pairs are only observed once due to 
promotion to and relegation from the Premier League).   
 
The top twenty matches that have the highest probability of ending in a draw have an 
average capacity utilisation of 92 per cent and an average television audience of 0.949 
million. These matches are between teams that are very close in terms of league position 
and have a small absolute difference between home win and away win probability.  
 
The twenty matches with the lowest probability of a draw are matches between teams that 
are high and teams that are low in the league table (for example, Arsenal vs Derby). These 
matches have a higher average stadium utilisation (97.5 per cent) and television audience 
(1.398 million) than the matches that are deemed more uncertain. This observed 
correlation would reject the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis and suggests that watching 
teams placed high in the table is an important demand factor. For example, Chelsea vs 
Manchester United and Wolverhampton versus Birmingham had the same draw probability 
(29.3 per cent) yet have different stadium demand (98.6 and 88.6 per cent capacity 
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utilised). Furthermore, Chelsea versus Wolverhampton had the same capacity utilisation as 
the Chelsea versus Manchester United match. 
 
Table 4.4 Demand and outcome uncertainty, Premier League match pairs (2004 -2012) 
Match pairs  
(top 20 by Draw prob) Capacity Utilisation 
TV 
audience Home win Prob 
Draw 
Prob 
Difference in  
Prob 
Norwich Southampton 0.948  0.391 0.299 0.082 
Charlton Norwich 0.998  0.515 0.299 0.330 
Aston Villa Southampton 0.862  0.487 0.299 0.274 
Birmingham Southampton 0.980  0.487 0.299 0.274 
Liverpool Man Utd 0.982 1.555 0.340 0.296 0.030 
Birmingham WBA 0.938 0.189 0.461 0.295 0.218 
Swansea WBA 0.991  0.357 0.295 0.009 
Birmingham Aston Villa 0.888 0.439 0.365 0.295 0.081 
Birmingham Stoke 0.755  0.401 0.294 0.095 
Swansea Stoke 0.951  0.364 0.294 0.022 
Charlton Birmingham 0.967  0.439 0.294 0.172 
Swansea Fulham 0.940  0.364 0.294 0.021 
Watford Middlesbrough 0.861  0.370 0.294 0.034 
Wolves Blackburn 0.974  0.420 0.294 0.134 
Birmingham Charlton 0.913  0.441 0.293 0.176 
Birmingham Everton 0.860  0.357 0.293 0.067 
Chelsea Man Utd 0.986 1.615 0.425 0.293 0.143 
Wolves Birmingham 0.886  0.394 0.293 0.081 
WBA Charlton 0.859  0.352 0.293 0.042 
WBA Charlton 0.859  0.352 0.293 0.042 
  0.920 0.949 0.404 0.295 0.116 
 (bottom 20 by Draw prob)      
Arsenal Derby 0.996  0.794 0.150 0.738 
Liverpool Burnley 0.968  0.790 0.149 0.728 
Derby Man Utd 0.779  0.059 0.148 0.733 
Chelsea Norwich 0.987  0.790 0.147 0.727 
Chelsea Swansea 0.985  0.786 0.145 0.718 
Man Utd Sheff Utd 0.990  0.798 0.144 0.741 
Arsenal Southampton 0.991  0.796 0.142 0.735 
Chelsea Watford 0.988  0.807 0.140 0.755 
Man Utd Watford 0.996  0.806 0.140 0.752 
Chelsea Wolves 0.986  0.804 0.140 0.747 
Man Utd Hull 0.979  0.806 0.139 0.752 
Man Utd Swansea 0.996 1.905 0.801 0.137 0.739 
Arsenal Blackpool 0.995  0.808 0.137 0.753 
Man Utd Burnley 0.986  0.808 0.136 0.751 
Man Utd QPR 0.996 1.647 0.806 0.134 0.746 
Chelsea Burnley 0.973  0.819 0.128 0.767 
Arsenal Burnley 0.995  0.823 0.128 0.773 
Man Utd Derby 0.992  0.832 0.124 0.788 
Chelsea Derby 0.929 0.680 0.838 0.120 0.796 
Chelsea Blackpool 0.984 1.361 0.859 0.103 0.820 
  0.975 1.398 0.771 0.137 0.753 
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4.2.2 Team performance 
 
The demand for each football match is influenced by the competing team’s quality and the 
current run of form (Forrest and Simmons, 2002). The legacy performance of a team is 
measured by the average win percentage from the previous season. This is the number of 
games a team won divided by the total number of games played in that season. The 
average win percentage is 42 per cent and most frequently teams won 30 per cent of the 
38 games per season. West Bromwich Albion won just 16 per cent of matches in the 2004 
to 2005 season, while Chelsea won 76 per cent of matches in the 2005 to 2006 season.  
 
Greater performance in the previous season should increase demand to watch the team 
play. Similar to Table 4.4, the average match outcome uncertainty is similar in both groups, 
extreme values of previous performance are matches with competing teams that are close 
in league position. Although the bottom group of matches are more uncertain (by draw 
probability) the demand is lower. Matches featuring the highest performing teams are able 
to fill their stadium to 96.7 per cent and pull a television audience of 1.205 million on 
average. The corresponding values for the lowest performing teams are 87 per cent and 
0.054 million, (with only three television appearances compared to nineteen for high 
performers). This correlation shows that team performances from the previous seasons has 
a strong role to play in determining demand. A match including teams that have scored a 
higher number of goals and conceded fewer goals should increase the stadium and 
television demand.  The number of goals scored and conceded for both teams are recorded 
for the previous six matches. The average number of goals scored by the home team in the 
previous six matches is 8.8, the highest is 33 scored by Chelsea during the 2010-2011 
season. The correlation between goals scored by the home team and stadium capacity 
utilisation is shown in Figure 4.5, a correlations coefficient of 0.11. 
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Table 4.5 Demand and previous performance (2004 -2012) 
Match pairs Capacity Utilisation 
TV 
audience 
Home win 
Prob 
Draw 
Prob 
Difference in 
win Prob 
Combined league 
position t-1 
Chelsea Man Utd 0.986 1.615 0.425 0.293 0.143 3.750 
Man Utd Chelsea 0.980 2.112 0.407 0.291 0.132 3.750 
Arsenal Chelsea 0.995 1.622 0.372 0.292 0.063 4.250 
Chelsea Arsenal 0.988 1.769 0.510 0.275 0.294 4.250 
Arsenal Man Utd 0.969 1.974 0.385 0.291 0.086 5.000 
Man Utd Arsenal 0.984 2.021 0.491 0.277 0.260 5.000 
Chelsea Liverpool 0.989 1.891 0.507 0.283 0.297 5.250 
Liverpool Chelsea 0.965 1.669 0.325 0.290 0.130 5.250 
Liverpool Man Utd 0.982 1.555 0.340 0.296 0.030 6.000 
Man Utd Liverpool 0.979 1.841 0.495 0.281 0.270 6.000 
Arsenal Liverpool 0.994 1.469 0.454 0.285 0.192 6.500 
Liverpool Arsenal 0.976 1.622 0.419 0.285 0.165 6.500 
Bolton Chelsea 0.845 0.367 0.171 0.257 0.400 8.750 
Chelsea Bolton 0.975 0.220 0.747 0.173 0.667 8.750 
Bolton Man Utd 0.926 0.188 0.164 0.247 0.425 9.500 
Man Utd Bolton 0.979 0.101 0.729 0.184 0.642 9.500 
Chelsea Tottenham 0.989 0.827 0.610 0.244 0.464 9.750 
Tottenham Chelsea 0.961 0.854 0.254 0.281 0.217 9.750 
Arsenal Bolton 0.986 0.000 0.690 0.205 0.586 10.000 
Bolton Arsenal 0.887 0.392 0.229 0.267 0.352 10.000 
  0.967 1.205 0.436 0.265 0.291 6.875 
        
Portsmouth Watford 0.968 - 0.575 0.260 0.409 37.000 
Reading Sheff Utd 0.992 - 0.506 0.279 0.292 37.000 
Sheff Utd Reading 0.770 - 0.387 0.287 0.061 37.000 
Watford Portsmouth 0.824 0.519 0.329 0.285 0.058 37.000 
WBA Norwich 0.867 - 0.525 0.266 0.315 37.000 
WBA West Ham 0.919 0.161 0.425 0.280 0.129 37.000 
West Ham WBA 0.927 - 0.489 0.277 0.256 37.000 
Wigan Derby 0.572 - 0.578 0.260 0.416 37.000 
Crystal Palace Norwich 0.981 - 0.463 0.290 0.216 38.000 
Derby Sunderland 0.779 - 0.300 0.286 0.113 38.000 
Norwich Crystal Palace 0.948 - 0.442 0.285 0.169 38.000 
Reading Watford 0.964 - 0.648 0.227 0.523 38.000 
Sunderland Derby 0.865 - 0.556 0.266 0.377 38.000 
Watford Reading 0.874 - 0.349 0.290 0.012 38.000 
Birmingham Derby 0.862 - 0.583 0.260 0.427 39.000 
Crystal Palace WBA 0.873 - 0.404 0.286 0.094 39.000 
Derby Birmingham 0.733 - 0.388 0.290 0.065 39.000 
Sheff Utd Watford 0.944 - 0.590 0.254 0.434 39.000 
Watford Sheff Utd 0.859 0.400 0.422 0.291 0.136 39.000 
WBA Crystal Palace 0.887 - 0.423 0.291 0.137 39.000 
  0.870 0.054 0.469 0.275 0.232 37.900 
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Figure 4.5 Goals scored by the home team and stadium capacity utilisation (2004-2012) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Goals scored by the home team and Sky Sport viewers (2004-2012) 
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Table 4.5 shows the top and bottom match pairs, demand and uncertainty measures. These 
matches are ordered by the previous performance of the competing teams. The average 
final league position from the previous season (t-1) from each team is summed, the smaller 
the result the higher up the league table the two teams finished. The average match 
outcome uncertainty is similar in both groups, extreme values of previous performance are 
matches with competing teams close to each other in league position. Although the 
bottom group of matches are more uncertain (by draw probability) the demand is lower. 
Matches featuring the highest performing teams are able to fill their stadium to 96.7 per 
cent and pull a television audience of 1.205 million on average. The corresponding values 
for the lowest performing teams are 87 per cent and 0.054 million, with only three 
television appearances compared to nineteen. This correlation shows that team 
performance from the previous seasons has a strong role to play in determining the 
demand.  
 
The variance in capacity utilisation decreases and the average utilisation increases as the 
number of goals scored by the home team in the previous six matches increases. This 
suggests that a match including a home team with a high number of goals scored should 
increase stadium demand. Similarly, Figure 4.6 shows the correlation between the number 
of goals scored by the home team and Sky Sports viewers for all matches broadcast on Sky 
Sports between the 2004 and 2012 seasons. This shows a positive correlation between the 
number of goals scored by the home team and Sky Sports viewers, suggesting that 
television viewers wish to see more goals being scored, a correlation coefficient of 0.01. 
 
Teams’ wage bills also capture match attractiveness. Wages are likely to reflect players’ 
marginal revenue products. Given a competitive market for players, the wage bill is likely to 
be a strong predictor of team strength (Buraimo, 2008; Forrest et al., 2004). This study uses 
team wage bills, taken from various issues of the Deloitte Annual Review of Football 
Finance, divided by the Premier League average for the respective season. This is a 
measure of relative wages and shows the quality of a team relative to the average. 
 
Stadium attendance for matches in the current season are correlated to the legacy 
attendance and capacity of the club.  The average attendance from last season is used to 
capture the habit persistence nature of fans in purchasing season tickets. As season tickets 
are pre-paid, holders are more likely to attend a match regardless of other factors such as 
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the team’s performance (Buraimo and Simmons, 2009b). As an example, Table 4.6 shows 
the match attendance and capacity utilisation for just one match pair, Arsenal against 
Aston Villa for each year of the data period, alongside the previous season’s average 
attendance for the home team. 
 
Table 4.6 Match attendance and previous season attendance for Arsenal (2004 -2012) 
Arsenal - Aston Villa Average match Capacity Utilisation Match Attendance 
Average Season 
attendance t-1 
2004-2005 0.991 38,137 38,079 
2005-2006 0.992 38,183 37,979 
2006-2007 0.994 60,023 38,184 
2007-2008 0.996 60,097 60,045 
2008-2009 0.994 60,047 60,066 
2009-2010 0.995 60,056 60,040 
2010-2011 0.994 60,023 59,927 
2011-2012 0.996 60,108 60,025 
 
There is a high degree of correlation between match attendance for Arsenal vs Aston Villa 
and the Arsenal’s average attendance in the previous season. For the 2006 – 2007 season, 
Arsenal moved to a larger stadium, with a larger capacity. This allowed for match 
attendance to increase from 38,184 to 60,045 on average, an anomaly that is not seen in 
attendance data of most matches.  
 
 
4.2.3 Match characteristics 
 
Supporters may place a higher importance on matches between neighbouring teams 
reflecting often long standing passionate rivalry, for example, Liverpool and Everton or 
Newcastle and Sunderland.  Allan and Roy (2008) include a variable for derby matches that 
involve two local teams based on distance.  Demand may also depend on the travel cost for 
away supporters to travel between the home and visiting team’s stadiums (Forrest, 
Simmons and Szymanski, 2004). An increase in travel costs would likely increase television 
demand and reduce stadium attendance (for the away supporters). 
Liverpool and Everton have the shortest distance between each stadium, 0.9 miles. The 
largest distance between two teams is the 361 miles between Newcastle and Swansea. The 
average distance travelled for each of the 3,040 matches is 141 miles but the most 
frequent distance travelled by teams is 213 miles between Merseyside and London based 
teams: Bolton and Reading; Chelsea and Everton or Liverpool; and Fulham and Manchester 
City. Figure 4.7 shows the correlation between distance and the number of Sky Sports 
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viewers for all Sky Sports live matches 2004 to 2012. Given the costs, the substitute of 
watching the match live on television may become more appealing as distance increases. 
The highest number of Sky viewers (above 2 million) correspond to matches between clubs 
that are close together and those around 213 miles apart (the Merseyside – London 
matches). It is expected that distance has a non-linear relationship with demand, such that 
the effect of travelling an extra mile differs depending on the distance already travelled.  
 
The correlation of the distance between the two competing teams and stadium capacity 
utilisation of the home team for matches between 2004 and 2012 is shown in Figure 4.8. 
Attendance information is based on total, not disaggregated numbers, as travelling 
supporters are likely to be the most affected by the distance required to travel to the 
match. Visually, there is little evidence of such a negative relationship, however, as ticket 
sales for the away team are only a small proportion of total stadium attendance. 
 
Figure 4.7 Distance between teams and Sky Sports viewers (2004-2012) 
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Figure 4.8 Distance between teams and stadium capacity utilisation (2004-2012) 
 
 
Approximately 57 per cent of matches between 2004 and 2012 are played on a Saturday. 
Games are often moved from Saturdays for the reason that they are to be broadcast live or 
fall on a Bank holiday. The choice of attending a match at the stadium may be affected by 
the day the match is played on. Matches that are played during the week should see 
reduced stadium attendance compared to matches played on Saturdays (Allan, 2004).The 
allocation of matches by day and the corresponding average stadium attendance, capacity 
utilisation, and average Sky Sports viewers are shown in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7 Allocation of matches by day (2004 – 2012) 
 Number of matches 
Live 
broadcast 
matches 
Average 
stadium 
attendance 
Average 
Capacity 
utilisation 
Average Sky 
Sports viewers 
(millions) 
Monday 187 133 34,428 90% 0.89 
Tuesday 156 59 33,480 90% 1.04 
Wednesday 239 73 34,076 89% 0.98 
Thursday 6 6 36,907 88% 0.93 
Friday 15 6 37,572 94% 1.01 
Saturday 1740 367 33,926 90% 0.93 
Sunday 697 460 36,849 92% 1.22 
 
Matches on a Saturday attract 33,926 to a stadium, on average. This is lower than all other 
days, except for Tuesday. Matches that attract a higher demand are more likely chosen for 
broadcast and are often not played on a Saturday. Demand for watching the match live on 
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Sky Sports is highest on Sunday and lowest on Monday. The average stadium attendance 
for a Bank holiday is 38,005, higher than the average attendance on non-Bank holidays 
(34,605).  However, matches on a Bank holiday received an average Sky Sports audience of 
0.87 million, which is lower than the average (0.9 million) for the remaining days although 
not statistically significant.  
 
Matches that are played towards the end of the season may also attract higher 
attendances (Allan and Roy, 2008). Table 4.8 shows the allocation of Premier League 
matches 2004 to 2012 by month. Typically, the Premier League season ends mid-May, 
when approximately 10 per cent of matches are played. The highest average stadium 
attendance and capacity utilisation is during May (36,039 and 95 per cent respectively). 
This shows that the demand for watching a match live at the stadium is highest at the end 
of the season when final league positions are most likely determined. The month hosting 
the largest number of matches is December when 22 per cent of matches are scheduled. 
Matches scheduled during December receive the second highest number of average 
attendances at the stadium (35,091), as many are scheduled on national holidays (days 
when leisure time is increased). The start of the Premier League season (August) sees the 
lowest average stadium attendance and one of the lowest capacity utilisation rates, 33,855 
and 89 per cent respectively.  
 
Table 4.8 Allocation of matches by month (2004 – 2012) 
 Number of matches 
Live 
broadcast 
Average 
stadium 
attendance 
Average 
Capacity 
utilisation 
Average Sky 
Sports 
viewers 
(millions) 
August 264 91 33,855 89% 1.01 
September 255 92 34,256 90% 0.93 
October 303 113 34,778 91% 1.05 
November 311 114 34,399 90% 1.13 
December 439 150 35,091 91% 1.08 
January 305 104 34,482 89% 1.21 
February 282 107 34,210 90% 1.21 
March 295 111 34,503 90% 1.12 
April 379 142 34,797 92% 1.08 
May 207 80 36,039 93% 1.07 
 
The highest average Sky Sports audience is during January and February, when 1.21 million 
viewers watch each match on television. With the exception of December, stadium 
attendance appears in line with the average attendance in the surrounding months. This 
suggests an increase in demand for broadcast live football during these two months, rather 
than a substitution away from stadium attendance.  
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4.3 Methodology  
 
The aim of this chapter is to test the relationship between the uncertainty of outcome and 
the demand for Premier League matches. There are two hypotheses to be tested: 
 
1. Outcome uncertainty has a positive impact on match day attendance. Greater 
uncertainty of the match result increases demand for stadium attendance. 
2. Outcome uncertainty has a positive impact on TV audience demand. Greater 
uncertainty of the match result increases demand for live television broadcasts. 
 
To test these hypotheses an econometric model is formulated from existing studies. 
Further discussion of the existing literature is in chapter two. There are two empirical 
techniques commonly used in the existing literature for modelling the impact of outcome 
uncertainty on the demand for stadium attendance. The simplest form of which is OLS15.  
 
The demand for sporting events such as live Premier League matches often observes a 
censored attendance value based on the number of tickets sold being equal to a team’s 
stadium capacity rather than the true demand (Verbeek, 2008). It may be argued that the 
observed demand equals true demand given the presence of unofficial, secondary markets 
for admission tickets. In this case, each consumer willing to attend a match could bid a 
sufficiently high price to gain attendance and no censored observations exist (Benz et.al., 
2009). If the secondary market for ticket sales is not perfect however, perhaps due to 
supply frictions, then methods to adjust for censoring in observations is preferred, such as 
a censored normal (or Tobit) regression. The censored regression model is given by  
 yi∗ = xi′β + ui 
 yi = �yi∗: yi∗ < yi0yi0: yi∗ ≥ yi0 
 
15 OLS is known to be the best linear unbiased estimator under the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions. The OLS regression line, 𝑚𝑚′𝛽𝛽, describes the conditional mean of the 
dependent variable given a set of regressors: 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖|𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖] = 𝑚𝑚′𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 where 𝑚𝑚′𝑖𝑖 = (1    𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖2 . . . 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
and 𝛽𝛽′ = (𝛽𝛽1    . . . 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖). 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the estimate of a change in the conditional mean of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  if   𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
changes in value, ceteris paribus. In other words, the marginal impact of  𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖on 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, holding 
all other things constant (Wooldridge, 2010). 
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where yi0 represents the censored value of an observation i. The conditional mean of the 
censored dependent variable ( yi∗) given a set of regressors (xi) is similar to that given by 
OLS 
 E[yi∗|xi] = x′iβ 
 
where β  is estimated by maximum likelihood. For the censored normal regression to 
return consistent estimations the errors from the estimation are assumed to be normally 
distributed (Wooldridge, 2010).  
 
Stadium attendance and television audiences are modelled separately as the following 
functions: 
 
(1) Stadium Attendancejt = f(OUTCOME UNCERTAINTYjkt, TEAM PERFORMANCEjkt, MATCH
   CHARACTERISTICSjkt) 
 
(2) TV Audiencejt = f(OUTCOME UNCERTAINTYjkt, TEAM PERFORMANCEjkt, MATCH 
  CHARACTERISTICSjkt) 
 
This is a cross-sectional time-series (panel) regression model. Where j and k denote the 
home and away teams, and t denotes the season. Each observation is a Premier League 
match. A match is a competition between two teams at the home team’s stadium such that 
Liverpool against Arsenal is a different observation to Arsenal against Liverpool. Each 
match is played once per year over the eight years in the data set. The panel is unbalanced 
as not all matches are repeated in each time period due to the relegation and promotion of 
teams. The descriptive information for all included variables is shown in Table 4.9. This 
table shows the 3,040 Premier League football matches played between the 2004-2005 
and the 2011-2012 seasons (used to estimate stadium attendance). The second part of the 
table shows a subset of the data for the 770 matches that were broadcast live on Sky 
Sports. Financial information was not available for Portsmouth FC for the 2008 – 2009 and 
the 2009 – 2010 seasons, removing these observations reduce the useable data set to 
2,964 matches played across the data period, 756 of these were televised on Sky Sports.  
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The UOH postulates a positive relationship between demand and uncertainty of outcome. 
This estimation uses a Tobit method accounting for the capacity constraint of stadiums in 
the Premier League for equation (1) on 2,964 observations. As the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of stadium attendance, this method allows for a censor point (at 95 
per cent capacity) to vary between observations.  
 
Table 4.9 Descriptive statistics for model variables 
 Stadium Attendance Television Audience 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable            
Stadium Attendance  3040 34640 13823 13760 76098      
Television Audience      770 1092005 470210 166000 2900000 
            
Outcome uncertainty           
Probability of Home win 3040 0.45 0.18 0.06 0.86 770 0.43 0.18 0.06 0.86 
0.059<P<0.176 3040 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 770 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
0.176<P<0.268 3040 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 770 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
0.268<P<0.359 3040 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 770 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
0.359<P<0.450 3040 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 770 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
0.450<P<0.542 3040 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 770 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
0.542<P<0.633 3040 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 770 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
0.633<P<0.724 3040 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 770 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
0.724<P<0.860 3040 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 770 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Probability of Draw 3040 0.26 0.04 0.10 0.31 770 0.26 0.04 0.10 0.31 
Pr(Home win) - Pr(Away win) 3040 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.82 770 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.82 
            
Team Performance           
Win% Last Season 3040 0.42 0.14 0.16 0.76 770 0.45 0.15 0.16 0.76 
Promoted 3040 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 770 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Home Goals Scored 3040 8.79 4.07 0.00 33.00 770 9.52 4.42 0.00 31.00 
Home Goals Conceded 3040 6.17 3.21 0.00 21.00 770 5.78 3.15 0.00 21.00 
Away Goals Scored 3040 6.23 3.27 0.00 23.00 770 7.16 3.51 0.00 23.00 
Away Goals Conceded 3040 8.68 3.84 0.00 23.00 770 8.16 3.85 0.00 23.00 
Attendance Last Season 3040 33852 13993 8611 75826 770 37309 15055 8611 75826 
Home wage bill (million) 3002 60.8 40 16.9 202 761 72.4 45.5 16.9 202 
Away wage bill (million) 3002 60.8 40 16.9 202 765 78.3 47.6 16.9 202 
            
Match Characteristics           
Broadcast on TV 3040 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 770 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Distance 3040 141 86 0.90 361 770 133 91 0.90 361 
Monday 3040 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 770 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Tuesday 3040 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 770 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Wednesday 3040 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 770 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Thursday 3040 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 770 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Friday 3040 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 770 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Saturday 3040 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 770 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Sunday 3040 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 770 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
August 3040 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 770 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
September 3040 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 770 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
October 3040 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 770 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
November 3040 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 770 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
December 3040 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 770 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
January 3040 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 770 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 
February 3040 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 770 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
March 3040 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 770 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
April or May 3040 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 770 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 
The estimation for equation (2) is a panel estimation with fixed effects on 756 observations 
(subset of the 2,964 that include only the matches that are broadcast live by Sky Sports). In 
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both estimations month, season and team specific fixed effects are added, capturing 
specific unobserved information between these elements. 
 
 Stadium attendance is modelled based on all four approaches (A to D). Television audience 
demand differs to stadium demand with regards to how audiences treat home and away 
fixtures. TV audiences do not differentiate between a home fixture and an away fixture for 
either team. Unlike stadium attendees, the cost of consumption on television for home, 
away and neutral fans is constant across these groups. As such, equation 2 is estimated on 
approaches C and D, discussed in turn below: 
 
Estimation A: The model includes a measure of the level of home team win probability and 
a squared term. An inverted U shaped relationship is present if the level term is positive 
and the squared term is negative. This would confirm the UOH. 
 
Estimation B: The quadratic approach assumes symmetry either side of the turning point. 
Coates and Humphreys (2012) note that the effect of expected losses may differ from the 
effect of expected wins, as captured by the probability of a home win. This flexibility is not 
captured by the quadratic function, a series of dummy variables are included representing 
levels of home win probability. Levels of home win probability are split into eight equal 
probabilities (from 0.059<P<0.176 to 0.724<P<0.860) and are represented by a dummy 
variable, shown in Table 4.916. The highest proportion of matches have a home win 
probability of between 35 and 45 per cent or 45 and 54 per cent (one quarter and one fifth 
of the observations respectively).  The inverted – U shaped relationship between home win 
probability and demand will be tested by the significance of each dummy variable 
compared to matches that have a home win probability between 5.9 and 17.6 per cent. If 
an inverted U shaped relationship exists then dummy variables representing mid-values of 
home win probability should show a positive coefficient and be statistically significant from 
zero. 
 
16 Other banding distributions were set for the dummy variables but are not reported as 
they made little difference to the results. The distribution of bands closely follows the 
directions of Coates and Humphreys (2012) in a study of American Ice Hockey, thus 
providing a direct comparison. 
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Estimation C: Using the probability of the match ending as a draw removes the need to 
model outcome uncertainty in a complex form. A statistically significant positive 
relationship between the probability of a draw and demand will confirm the UOH.  
 
Estimation D: The absolute difference in the probability of the home team and the away 
team winning is used as the measure of outcome uncertainty. This uncertainty measure17 
provides a comparison to the draw probability. A statistically significant negative 
relationship between the absolute difference in win probability and demand will confirm 
the UOH. 
 
 
4.4 Results from modelling the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis 
 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are shown in Table 4.10. Joint significance of the 
included variables is confirmed by a likelihood ratio or Wald test. Coefficient estimates that 
are statistically significant at five or ten per cent are indicated by two asterisks and one 
asterisk, respectively.  34 and 67 per cent of the variance is due to differences across 
panels, shown by the intraclass correlation value, Rho (or R Squared value). It is assumed 
that the differences across observations are uncorrelated with the regressors. The day, 
month, season and team fixed effects are significant. Full regression output including all 
fixed effects and diagnostic tests are reported in Appendix B.  
 
Estimation 1-C, models stadium attendance, a constrained dependent variable, with the 
measure of draw probability. Appendix B shows the output for diagnostic tests for this 
estimation. Given the estimation type, constrained dependent variable, a number of 
diagnostic tests usually performed for a linear regression are not available. However, a 
kernel density plot with the normal density overlaid shows that the residuals from this 
estimation do not conform to a perfect normal distribution. Further investigation by a 
standardized normal probability plot and a plot showing the quantiles of a variable against 
the quantiles of a normal distribution, shows that there is non-normality in the middle 
range of data and near the tails. The Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality returns a p-value 
that rejects the assumption that the distribution is normal. This non-normality is likely a 
feature of including fixed effects in a random effects estimation, however, fixed effects are 
important to include in estimation from an economic standpoint. Although normality of 
17 Used by Buraimo and Simmons (2009b), Buraimo and Simmons (2015) and others. 
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residuals is required for valid hypothesis testing, assuring validity of the p-values, it is not 
essential for unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. 
 
Estimation 2-C, models television with the measure of draw probability. Robust variance 
covariance estimators for the standard errors are used to account for any unknown order 
of heteroskedasticity for the television audience estimations. However, plotting the 
residuals against the fitted values shows not no obvious pattern. Multicollinearity between 
explanatory variables can inflate the standard errors for the coefficients. Using a variance 
inflation factor shows that distance and distance squared are a linear combination of each 
other, this is expected. However, the home team wage bill to be potentially correlated with 
the legacy attendance at the stadium. This makes economic sense, as higher attendance 
would lead to greater revenue from ticket sales which is available to spend on players.  
 
Outcome uncertainty 
Modelling the log of stadium attendance by Tobit estimation18 (1-A), the coefficient 
estimates for the probability of a home win and its squared value are statistically significant 
and follow a U-shaped relationship. High and low values of the probability of the home 
team winning correspond to the highest gate attendance. The turning point of the U-
shaped relationship, the lowest demand, is at 44.7 per cent home win probability, where 
the match is likely to be most balanced. Coefficient estimates using the dummy functional 
form (1-B) show that home win probabilities from 35.9 per cent through to 54.2 per cent 
are negative, compared to probabilities between 5.9 per cent and 17.6 per cent (used as a 
base dummy variable for comparison). Similar to the quadratic equation (1-A), this shows 
that stadium demand is less for Premier League matches with values of the probability of 
the home team winning that indicate a more balanced match. Coates and Humphreys 
(2012) show a significant impact on stadium demand only with high values of home win 
probability (71.6 per cent and greater). They argue this result is due to the presence of 
asymmetry in demand behaviour. Stadium attendance is greater when the home team is 
more likely to win rather than when the match outcome is less certain (as found in the 
quadratic estimation). This shows that watching a team win is more important to a football 
fan than seeing a team lose, supporting the argument of Coates and Humphreys (2012).  
18 Tobit regression coefficients are interpreted in similar manner to OLS regression 
coefficients. However, the linear effect is on the uncensored latent variable, not the 
observed outcome (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980).  
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 Estimates for the probability of the match ending as a draw (1-C) are significant and 
negative. The measure is a linear representation of outcome uncertainty and removes the 
need for postulating a more complex relationship. This shows that stadium demand will fall 
when the probability of a draw increases. Measuring uncertainty by the absolute difference 
in win probabilities (1-D) finds a statistically significant and positive coefficient estimate. 
The larger the difference between the probability of the home and the away team winning 
(reduced outcome uncertainty), the larger the stadium demand. These results all refute the 
UOH for stadium attendance in the English Premier league and confirm the results found 
using a quadratic function (similar to 1-B) by Peel and Thomas (1992), Forrest and Simmons 
(2002), Buraimo and Simmons (2008), and Forrest et. al.(2005). 
 
Modelling Sky Sports television audiences using the probability of a draw (2-C) show that 
this measure of competitive balance has a positive impact on television audiences. 
Furthermore, using the absolute difference in win probability as the measure of 
uncertainty (2-D) uncovers a statistically significant negative relationship. An increase in 
the absolute difference (reduction in outcome uncertainty) would decrease the television 
demand, contradicting the result found for stadium attendance (1-C and 1-D). Buraimo 
(2008) finds no evidence of an impact on television audience whereas the work of Forrest 
et al. (2005) supports the UOH. Results here show that the relationship between outcome 
uncertainty and television audience demand for Premier League matches is significant and 
opposes that of stadium demand. This highlights a trade-off between viewing at the 
stadium and on television.  
 
Team Performance 
An increase in the average attendance during the previous season increases stadium 
attendance. Teams that are newly promoted to the Premier League also see a significant 
increase in stadium attendance. This shows that historical team success is important in 
attracting fans to the stadium.  
 
More goals scored by the home and away teams over the previous six matches increases 
demand at the stadium. The impact is reversed if the home team and away team have 
conceded more goals, showing that fans like to see goals being scored by the team that 
they support (and do not like to see their team concede goals). A greater number of goals 
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scored by the away team increases the television audience, suggesting television audiences 
prefer to see more goals from the travelling team. The relative wage bill of both teams 
have an elevating effect on both stadium and television audiences. Wages area a factor 
that crowds out outcome uncertainty in results from Buraimo and Simmons (2015), 
showing that team (or star) quality is more important that closeness of competition. This 
shows that television audiences encompass a greater mixture of fans, and specifically more 
neutral19 consumers of football matches. 
 
Match Characteristics 
Stadium demand decreases when the match is broadcast live on television, confirming that 
televised matches are a substitute to stadium attendance. However, broadcasters will 
choose (via negotiation) the matches that will attract a higher audience. Thus, estimating 
the impact of live broadcasting on stadium attendance requires further consideration 
which is discussed in detail in chapter five. No further investigation is carried out in this 
chapter as the television identifier is used as a control variable rather than the main 
concern.  
 
For each mile increase between the stadiums of the competing teams, stadium attendance 
decreases at a decreasing rate, as expected. This is a factor that television audiences should 
not consider important, as an insignificant result shows. From the day and month fixed 
effects (reported in Appendix B), weekday matches are attended less compared to matches 
played on a Saturday. April and May matches attract a higher crowd at the stadium and on 
television compared to matches played in August, reflecting the interest in the followed 
team’s final league position.  Matches played from October onwards see an increase in 
television audiences compared with the start of the season (August).  
19 Those that do not support either team. 
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Table 4.10 Stadium attendance and television audience estimation 
 Stadium Attendance (Ln) Tobit estimation Television Audience (Ln)  Fixed Effects 
 1A - Home win 1B - Step 1C - Draw 1D - Home win diff 2C - Draw 2D - Home win diff 
 Coeff se  Coeff se  Coeff se  Coeff se  Coeff se  Coeff se  
Probability of Home win -0.298 0.100 ** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Probability of Home win ^2 0.332 0.105 ** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.176<P<0.268 - - - -0.004 0.013  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.268<P<0.359 - - - -0.007 0.014  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.359<P<0.450 - - - -0.033 0.015 ** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.450<P<0.542 - - - -0.032 0.017 * - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.542<P<0.633 - - - -0.016 0.020  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.633<P<0.724 - - - -0.023 0.024  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.724<P<0.860 - - - 0.029 0.029  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Probability of Draw - - - - - - -0.208 0.109 * - - - 0.830 0.326 ** - - - 
Absolute Probability difference - - - - - - - - - 0.046 0.017 ** - - - -0.140 0.057 ** 
Win% Last Season 0.003 0.042  0.000 0.042  0.002 0.042  0.003 0.040  0.201 0.163  0.202 0.163  
Promoted 0.119 0.018 ** 0.118 0.018 ** 0.120 0.018 ** 0.118 0.018 ** -0.027 0.064  -0.029 0.064  
Home Goals Scored 0.005 0.001 ** 0.005 0.001 ** 0.005 0.001 ** 0.005 0.001 ** 0.004 0.003  0.004 0.003  
Home Goals Conceded -0.003 0.001 ** -0.003 0.001 ** -0.003 0.001 ** -0.003 0.001 ** 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.004  
Away Goals Scored 0.002 0.001 ** 0.002 0.001 ** 0.003 0.001 ** 0.003 0.001 ** 0.006 0.003 * 0.006 0.003 * 
Away Goals Conceded 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.001  -0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.001  -0.008 0.003 ** -0.009 0.003 ** 
Home Wages/PL average 0.089 0.017 ** 0.091 0.017 ** 0.090 0.017 ** 0.090 0.016 ** 0.142 0.048 ** 0.137 0.048 ** 
Away Wages/PL average 0.053 0.009 ** 0.051 0.008 ** 0.061 0.006 ** 0.056 0.006 ** 0.246 0.017 ** 0.248 0.017 ** 
Attendance Last Season 0.385 0.037 ** 0.383 0.036 ** 0.384 0.037 ** 0.375 0.035 ** -0.160 0.119  -0.159 0.120  
Broadcast on TV -0.013 0.006 ** -0.014 0.006 ** -0.013 0.006 ** -0.017 0.006 **       
Distance -0.001 1.1E-04 ** -0.001 1.1E-04 ** -0.001 1.1E-04 ** -0.001 1.3E-04 ** 0.000 3.9E-04  0.000 3.9E-04  
Distance (squared) 8.4E-07 3.9E-07 ** 8.5E-07 3.9E-07 ** 8.5E-07 3.9E-07 ** 8.6E-07 4.4E-07 * -1.2E-07 1.4E-06  -1.1E-07 1.4E-06  
Constant 6.959 0.394 ** 6.940 0.394 ** 6.958 0.395 ** 6.994 0.382 ** 0.663 1.302  0.914 1.313  
Log likelihood 642.345   1542.272   1389.474   581.034         
Rho | Rsquared 3.5E-13 9.3E-14  5.3E-14 4.9E-15  5.6E-14 5.5E-15  0.104 0.023  0.651   0.669   
Uncensored observations 1455   1455   1455   1455   756   756   
Right-censored observations 1509   1509   1509   1509   0   0   
Wald chi2 18854.22   18909.52   18799.14   15166.02         
** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level. Team, Day, Month, and Season fixed effects are significant. 
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4.5 Discussion 
 
Model 1- A and 1-B indicate a U shaped relationship between stadium attendance and 
outcome uncertainty implying that demand increases when the home team is more likely 
to win (or lose) and reduces with more evenly balanced matches. The turning point, the 
probability of the home team winning that corresponds to the lowest gate attendance, is 
approximately 45 per cent (from 1-A). Studies of the Premier League using home win 
probability as a measure of outcome uncertainty all show evidence against the UOH  
(Buraimo and Simmons, 2008; Forrest, Beaumont, et al., 2005; Forrest and Simmons, 2002; 
Peel and Thomas, 1992). However, there is currently less agreement over the turning point 
at which the lowest stadium attendance is observed. Table 4.11 shows the estimated 
turning points from the existing evidence. Results presented in section 4.4 largely concur 
with estimates of the turning point by Buraimo and Simmons (2008). Model 1-C and 1-D 
indicate a negative relationship between outcome uncertainty and stadium attendance. 
This rejects the UOH for Premier League matches, and is in line with results from Forrest, 
Beaumont, et al. (2005).  Buraimo (2008) finds no significant relationship when using the 
points difference between teams as the measure of uncertainty.  
 
Table 4.11 Turning point and impact of UOH and stadium demand relationship 
Author(s) Data Turning point / Impact 
Quadratic estimation 
Buraimo and Simmons (2008) English Premier League Football 2000 -2006 35% 
Forrest and Simmons (2002) English Football PL - Division 4 1997 - 1998 88% 
Forrest, Beaumont, Goddard and Simmons 
(2005) English Premier League Football 1997 - 1998 88% 
Peel and Thomas (1992) English Football Division 1-4 1986 - 1987 60-67% 
Linear Estimation 
Buraimo (2008) English League Football 1997 - 2004 No impact 
Forrest, Buraimo and Simmons (2005) English Premier League Football 1997 - 1998 Against UOH 
 
Efforts made by the Premier League to increase stadium demand by increasing the 
competitive balance of the league appear ill considered based on the evidence presented 
in this chapter. Increasing the balance (i.e. increasing the match uncertainty) will reduce 
stadium demand. Combining these results with those from chapter three indicates that the 
Premier League is currently following a policy that should help promote stadium demand. 
The amount of revenue shared causes a reduction in competitive balance, and this 
increases the match certainty. If matches become more certain then stadium demand 
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increases. However, stadium demand is positively affected by team performance and as 
stadium attendance is constrained at approximately half of Premier League matches. Thus, 
an increase in stadium demand would require an increase in stadia capacity. Policies to 
increase the team quality of clubs and the capacity of stadia are therefore better placed to 
promote demand. For example, attracting star playing talent or encouraging investment in 
stadia, similar to findings from by Bryson, Rossi, and Simmons (2014), stadium attendance 
increases with an increase in predicted wages of team players in Italian Serie A football. 
 
Model 2-C and 2-D indicate a positive relationship between outcome uncertainty and Sky 
Sports audiences. Television audiences are higher when the draw probability is higher or 
when difference between home and away win probability is small. These results provide 
support for the UOH in the Premier League for television demand, agreeing with Forrest, 
Simmons, et al. (2005).  Table 4.12 shows the existing support for the UOH and television 
demand in a wider context. Buraimo (2008) and Buraimo and Simmons (2015) find no 
evidence to support the UOH for television audiences in the Premier League. The latter 
study concludes that uncertainty has no impact on audience ratings when accounting for 
the quality of talent employed. Research by Buraimo and Simmons (2009) supports the 
UOH in Spanish top flight football, Paul et al. (2007), and Tainsky et al. (2014) find support 
for the UOH in American NFL, Taisnky (2004) supports the UOH for non-local markets only.  
 
Table 4.12 Existing support for the UOH and TV demand relationship 
Author(s) Data Impact 
Buraimo (2008) English League Football 1997 - 2004 No impact 
Buraimo and Simmons (2009) Spanish Primera Division Football 2003 - 2007 Supports UOH 
Buraimo and Simmons (2015) English Premier League Football 2001 - 2008 No impact 
Forrest, Buraimo and Simmons (2005) English Premier League Football 1993 - 2002 Supports UOH 
Paul et al. (2007) American National Football League 1991 - 2002 Supports UOH 
Tainsky et al. (2014) American National Football League 2005 - 2009 Supports UOH 
 
These results provide an indication that policies focussing on enhancing match uncertainty 
are worthwhile for promoting television demand, and as such may be deemed in the public 
interest.  However, this type of policy will have contradicting effects on stadium and 
television demand. More certain outcomes lower stadium attendance and increase 
television audiences. Facing such a trade-off, policy makers have to consider which 
audience is most important: the stadium goers or the television viewers. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
The UK Restrictive Practices Court and the European Commission found in favour of a 
collective selling method for broadcast rights by the Premier League (European 
Commission, 2002). This issue was deemed to be in the public interest due to the 
underlying assumption that competitive imbalance reduces spectator demand for matches.  
 
The results in this chapter contribute towards building a consensus view on the uncertainty 
of outcome hypothesis in the Premier League. The impact of outcome uncertainty on 
stadium attendance and television audiences are estimated whilst accounting for the 
variety of uncertainty measures used in existing studies. Results refute the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis for stadium attendance, which concurs with the work of Peel and 
Thomas (1992), Forrest and Simmons (2002), Forrest et al. (2005), and Buraimo and 
Simmons (2008). Thus, matches that are more certain are favoured by consumers when 
viewing the match at the stadium. Results from modelling television demand show that the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis does hold (a less certain outcome is preferred). The 
findings here concur with Sacheti et al. (2014) and Forrest, Buraimo and Simmons (2005) 
insofar as the impact of outcome uncertainty is sensitive to the measure used.   
 
Similar to Buraimo and Simmons (2009) this chapter analyses demand for viewing matches 
at the stadium and on television in the same data period. This is rarely considered in the 
literature and provides an important insight in to the implications of policies aimed at 
enhancing competitive balance. The impact of match uncertainty means that a change in 
revenue sharing polices aimed at promoting a more uncertain match will affect both 
television and stadium demand in opposing directions.  
 
To further understand the impact of outcome uncertainty on demand, obtaining 
disaggregated attendance data would allow for distinguishing between season ticket 
holders and the purchasers of individual tickets, and between home and away supporters. 
The majority of stadium attendance numbers are supporters of the home team, and 
variance in attendance across matches may not distinguish the preferences for home 
success and outcome uncertainty (Forrest, Buraimo and Simmons, 2005). Also, Sky Sports 
viewing figures do not distinguish between viewers of a private television or viewers in 
larger crowds (such as in public houses). Broadcasters select (by negotiation with the 
Premier League) which matches to air. Furthermore, the success of the broadcaster is 
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correlated to the viewing figures, such that matches are selected because they are likely to 
see greater demand. This endogeneity issue is inherent in modelling the UOH and can bias 
the estimate of the impact of broadcasting on stadium attendance. The Premier League has 
argued that restricting the quantity of matches to be broadcast minimises the home 
stadium gate revenue loss, thus inferring that televised matches have a strongly negative 
impact on attendance (a hypothesis that is tested in chapter five whilst taking into 
consideration the endogeneity issue). 
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Chapter 5 - Live broadcasting and match day revenue 
 
 
A version of chapter five was published in the International Journal of the Economics of 
Business. Cox, A. (2012). Live Broadcasting, Gate Revenue, and Football Club Performance: 
Some Evidence. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 19:1, 75-98. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Before 1992, terrestrial broadcasters (BBC and ITV) televised up to 18 live matches per 
season, since then (the start of the Premier League) the number of matches broadcast and 
the revenues collected for sale of rights have risen. From 2010 to 2013 the Premier League 
sold rights to 138 (of the 380) matches per season to BskyB and Setanta for an average of 
£4.3 million per match, rising to £10.2 million per match from 2016 to 2019. A collective 
selling method allows the governing body to control the number of matches available for 
purchase. The Premier League argued it was desirable to restrict the number of matches 
broadcast live to protect gate attendance (Forrest et al., 2004). The argument is that a 
broadcast match is a substitute to the live event at the stadium and so, if the number of 
matches broadcast are not controlled, this would reduce stadium attendance and thus 
league revenue.   
 
Despite the Premier League restricting access to the live broadcast market in this manner, 
the existing evidence does not reach a general consensus view regarding the impact of live 
broadcasting on stadium demand. Falls and Natke (2014) and Welki and Zlatoper (1994) 
show that stadium attendance of American Football matches increases when a match is 
broadcast live. Similarly, Czarnitski and Stadtmann (2002) also find a positive impact of live 
broadcasting but discard the result as attendance is likely greater at (German First Division) 
matches that are chosen by the broadcaster to be televised. Baimbridge et al. (1996) and 
Buraimo and Simmons (2005) show that broadcasting live Premier League matches has a 
negative impact on stadium attendance, although these results show a large difference in 
the magnitude that live broadcasting has. Borland and Macdonald (2003) suggest the lack 
of consistency between the existing studies is due to econometric issues underlying the 
estimation. An endogeneity problem is inherent, such that stadium attendance will be 
higher for televised matches as broadcasters wish to air the most popular games in order 
to attract strong television advertising revenues.  
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 This chapter seeks to further the debate around the impact of live broadcasting on gate 
attendance by estimating the effect of live broadcasting on match day gate revenue using a 
fixed effects panel method on a four season long data set from 2004 to 2008. This more 
recent data include the first year Setanta acquired broadcasting rights due to the European 
Commission’s involvement. Match day revenue is used as the dependent variable to 
account for match day ticket prices changing for better quality matches or opposition.  
Furthermore, the model is estimated for the Premier League as a whole and two further 
estimations for the top four clubs (Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United) and 
the worst performing clubs. The results from the estimations of the top and bottom teams 
in the league table show the differences in the marginal impact of broadcasting as the 
desirability of the matches (to be broadcast) differ. This method attempts to account for 
the underlying endogeneity problem that the most popular matches are the matches 
televised. For robustness and comparison with existing evidence, the model is also 
estimated using a Tobit random effects method with stadium attendance as the dependent 
variable. The chapter first discusses each element of the model to be estimated before 
discussing the method. The analysis and discussion of the results follows. 
 
 
5.2 Match day revenue 
 
Stadium attendance figures for each match are taken from respective editions of the Sky 
Sport Football Yearbook (Rollin, 2004 - 2009) released annually. The average ticket price 
and average match day revenue for each club, ordered by match day revenue between 
2004 and 2008 is shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Ticket prices are taken from the club website and annual reports. The club pricing policy 
can vary between teams, for example: Portsmouth FC charged different ticket prices 
depending on seat location, £41 for the best seats and £34 for the worst view, regardless of 
the visiting team (Portsmouth FC website, 2009). Whereas, Arsenal FC change the ticket 
prices depending on the status of the visiting team and the seat location, £46 to £94 for tier 
A games and £32 to £66 for tier B games during the 2007 -2008 season (Arsenal FC 
website). Here, tier A matches are usually those versus the top four teams, local derbies or 
teams of particular interest. Tier B matches are typically against teams positioned lower in 
the Premier League table. 
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Table 5.1 Ticket price and match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
Club 
Average 
ticket 
price 
Min 
ticket 
price 
Max 
ticket 
price 
StdDev of 
ticket 
price 
Average 
of Gate 
revenue 
Min of 
Gate 
revenue 
Max of 
Gate 
revenue 
StdDev of 
Gate 
revenue 
Arsenal £56.84 £49.00 £70.00 £10.23 2,784,535 1,813,490 4,211,270 812,019 
Man Utd £31.94 £31.75 £32.00 £0.11 2,300,490 2,165,888 2,435,136 118,828 
Chelsea £50.88 £50.50 £51.00 £0.22 2,120,330 1,938,000 2,158,371 37,312 
Newcastle £32.82 £31.50 £36.00 £1.72 1,690,086 1,540,640 1,883,772 107,701 
Tottenham £46.62 £42.00 £55.00 £6.26 1,674,560 1,434,468 1,989,790 228,310 
West Ham £45.57 £41.50 £52.00 £4.96 1,566,704 1,242,444 1,820,000 188,602 
Liverpool £33.45 £33.00 £35.00 £0.84 1,454,631 1,157,112 1,572,305 67,679 
Man City £30.61 £27.50 £36.00 £3.83 1,305,748 1,001,728 1,700,784 215,378 
Derby £36.92 £36.50 £38.50 £0.84 1,197,667 1,096,752 1,273,272 48,775 
Birmingham £41.83 £41.50 £42.00 £0.24 1,148,164 916,694 1,234,044 75,724 
Everton £31.00 £31.00 £31.00 £0.00 1,141,861 988,435 1,257,112 68,731 
Aston Villa £26.47 £26.00 £28.00 £0.82 981,311 686,972 1,202,684 132,654 
Sunderland £24.20 £22.50 £28.00 £2.30 938,900 649,198 1,314,555 197,344 
Reading £36.18 £33.00 £40.00 £2.58 857,631 705,507 965,400 75,269 
Fulham £38.77 £36.50 £43.00 £2.82 840,751 598,660 1,077,673 129,104 
Middlesbrough £28.00 £28.00 £28.00 £0.00 804,402 641,760 975,408 86,890 
Sheff Utd £26.00 £26.00 £26.00 £0.00 793,312 650,286 847,704 59,519 
Portsmouth £37.88 £37.50 £38.00 £0.22 754,545 641,550 770,850 20,875 
Southampton £24.00 £24.00 £24.00 £0.00 734,631 656,232 769,584 40,672 
WBA £28.16 £25.00 £40.00 £6.20 728,578 578,600 1,108,360 192,436 
Bolton £30.00 £28.00 £35.00 £2.92 720,514 476,392 975,800 124,468 
Crystal Palace £29.50 £29.50 £29.50 £0.00 711,186 610,798 772,694 47,625 
Norwich £23.00 £23.00 £23.00 £0.00 560,054 541,627 587,006 15,652 
Charlton £21.00 £21.00 £21.00 £0.00 551,558 491,883 569,331 19,223 
Wigan £26.18 £15.00 £29.00 £3.34 506,759 254,595 725,667 113,419 
Blackburn £21.69 £17.50 £30.00 £5.69 487,015 288,630 909,480 176,255 
Watford £25.00 £25.00 £25.00 £0.00 468,761 344,000 495,750 33,954 
 
After recording all club pricing policies, this study assumes that the policy for identifying 
different price categories remains the same at the club over the data period. This is with 
the notable exception of Wigan FC in the 2007 – 2008 seasons: In an attempt to attract 
fans to support the struggling Wigan FC, ticket prices were reduced to £15 or £20 for 
selected games (ESPN, 2007). It is also assumes that football fans are unlikely to switch 
allegiance between teams because one team offers lower ticket prices than another. 
Instead, they may be less inclined to attend matches when prices are perceived as too high 
(Buraimo and Simmons, 2005). Average prices, as per Table 5.1 are the average of the 
ticket prices available at each match. This average is unweighted, meaning that there is no 
assumption made on the distribution of type of seats sold (the number of Tier A or B etc. if 
prices differ by seat location). 
 
The collective selling of broadcast rights by the Premier League is restricting supply of 
matches on television to allow clubs to raise more gate revenue. As this could be achieved 
from higher ticket prices or higher attendance, or both, then the effect might not be shown 
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through attendance numbers.  Thus gate revenue is used20. Match day gate revenue is 
calculated by multiplying the stadium attendance with the average ticket price at that 
match, this is an approximate measure of match day revenue. Other revenues from 
stadium advertising and sales of merchandise and food and beverages are hard to measure 
precisely for every match, so an approximate measure is appropriate21. The average match 
day attendance and match day revenue ordered by the number of live broadcasts hosted 
between 2004 and 2008 is shown by average attendance in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Match attendance and match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
Stadium 
Match 
Attendance 
(average) 
Attendance 
when 
broadcast 
Change 
(%) 
Match day 
Revenue 
(average) 
Revenue 
when 
broadcast 
Change 
(%) 
Number of 
broadcasts 
Man Utd 72,038 72,136 0% 2,300,490 2,302,458 0% 45 
Arsenal 49,070 48,426 -1% 2,784,535 2,905,747 4% 34 
Liverpool 43,480 43,182 -1% 1,454,631 1,463,975 1% 34 
Chelsea 41,677 41,559 0% 2,120,330 2,113,288 0% 33 
Man City 42,532 41,886 -2% 1,305,748 1,272,185 -3% 33 
Aston Villa 37,019 37,685 2% 981,311 1,017,468 4% 30 
Newcastle 51,471 51,196 -1% 1,690,086 1,721,988 2% 29 
Bolton 23,944 23,951 0% 720,514 722,619 0% 26 
Blackburn 22,137 22,260 1% 487,015 572,087 17% 25 
Everton 36,834 36,067 -2% 1,141,861 1,118,082 -2% 25 
Tottenham 35,913 35,956 0% 1,651,699 1,641,239 -1% 25 
Middlesbrough 28,729 29,673 3% 804,402 830,830 3% 24 
Portsmouth 19,922 19,818 -1% 754,545 750,232 -1% 24 
Birmingham 27,441 27,714 1% 1,148,164 1,161,447 1% 21 
Fulham 21,635 21,813 1% 840,751 850,995 1% 20 
WBA 25,695 25,531 -1% 728,578 724,363 -1% 19 
Wigan 19,272 20,405 6% 506,759 562,336 11% 19 
West Ham 34,356 33,885 -1% 1,566,704 1,591,925 2% 18 
Charlton 26,265 26,127 -1% 551,558 548,672 -1% 16 
Reading 23,681 23,795 0% 857,631 888,793 4% 12 
Sunderland 38,624 38,292 -1% 938,900 954,976 2% 10 
Watford 18,750 18,957 1% 468,761 473,931 1% 8 
Norwich 24,255 24,667 2% 560,054 571,946 2% 5 
Southampton 30,610 29,839 -3% 734,631 716,136 -3% 5 
Crystal Palace 24,108 22,972 -5% 711,186 677,659 -5% 4 
Derby 32,432 32,214 -1% 1,197,667 1,208,707 1% 4 
Sheffield Utd 30,512 30,904 1% 793,312 803,504 1% 4 
 
The highest average attendance is 72,038 at Manchester United, the stadium with the 
largest capacity in the Premier League. The highest average match day revenue is £2.78 
million at Arsenal. Despite attracting an average attendance of 49,070 (lower than at 
Manchester United) ticket prices at Arsenal are higher. Manchester United has been host 
to 45 live broadcasts during the data period, the lowest live broadcasts fall to clubs who 
20 Beyond stadium attendance and revenue, clubs maybe concerned with stadium 
atmosphere. Where, a greater support is arguably linked to greater team performance. The 
issue of stadium attendance affecting team performance is discussed in more detail in 
chapter Six. 
21 The attendance data are not disaggregated into season ticket holder, away fans, and 
home one off tickets. The revenue information is an average of one off ticket prices, as 
such excludes the discounted prices for season ticket holders.  
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occupied the lower league positions and did not participated in the league every season 
(due to promotion and relegation).  On average, when a match is broadcast the stadium 
attendance or match day revenue does not vary at Manchester United. This is not true for 
other clubs for example, the attendance grows by approximately 6 per cent at Wigan when 
a match is broadcast live, increasing the match day revenue by 11 per cent. Across all clubs 
in the league, there is little evidence of a negative correlation between match day revenue 
when a match is broadcast live. This highlights two possible effects of live broadcasting: 
Watching the match live on television can act as a substitute and reduce attendance; and 
matches most likely chosen to be broadcast are ones that would attract the largest 
audiences and highest ticket prices.  
 
The distribution of match day revenue is show in Figure 5.1. This is data of 1,520 matches 
from 2004 to 2008. The average match day revenue during this period is £1,212,338. The 
right hand tail of the distribution shows the maximum match day revenue of £4,211,270 
from Arsenal against Manchester United. This match was broadcast live on Sky Sports in 
each season and appears to be an outlier22. The lowest match day revenue is £254,595 at 
Wigan against Fulham in 2007 (Wigan dropped the ticket price for matches during this time 
to £15 with a view to increase attendance numbers). This particular match attracted 16,973 
people, less than half the stadium capacity. The next highest group of outlying data are 
approximately £2.6 and £2.9 million revenue per match. These matches are also at the 
home ground of Arsenal but against opposition usually lower in the league table (Bolton, 
Charlton, Fulham). The average ticket prices at these matches were £49 (Bolton) to £70 
(close rivals Charlton and Fulham) with approximately 60,000 attending. Lower than this, 
match day revenue at Manchester United ranged from £2.1 to £2.4 million over the data 
period.  
 
To analyse the effect of broadcasting matches live on match day revenue, other factors 
must be accounted for. These factors are grouped into: Live broadcasting; geographic and 
demographic variables; attractiveness of the match; and exogenous variables. These are 
discussed in turn.  
 
22 Removing the outlying data for Arsenal vs Manchester United (or all of Arsenal’s home 
matches) makes little difference to the estimated results that are resented in section 5.4. 
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Figure 5.1 Frequency histogram of match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
 
 
5.2.1 Live broadcasting 
 
Of the 1,520 matches played from 2004 to 2008, 552 were broadcast live. The Premier 
League arranged the fixtures such that the 552 live broadcasts were timed not to clash with 
the league standard 15:00 Saturday kick off (there were some exceptions to this to account 
for public holidays and other cup competitions). 216 matches were broadcast on Sunday, 
185 were early (12:45) or late (17:15) afternoon on Saturday, the remaining were weekday 
evenings or bank holiday afternoons. This timing policy was aimed at reducing the 
potentially negative impact of fans watching a match on television rather than attending a 
broadcast match at the stadium23. There were 638 match pairs across the data period of 
four seasons. The top twenty and bottom twenty match pairs (ordered by the number of 
times broadcast and gate revenue) is shown in Table 5.3. Matches such as Arsenal versus 
Manchester United and Manchester United versus Arsenal are broadcast four times (once 
23 Estimates of the impact on match day revenue could be enhanced by considering the 
market definition of the substitute good. A substitute product to watching a Premier 
League match live at the stadium may fall outside of the defined television broadcast: there 
may be many other leisure activities that form a substitute for ninety minutes of spectating 
at a football match. 
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in each season). Matches shown on Sky Sports received the largest TV audiences, those 
shown on Prem Plus and Setanta channels attracted lower TV audiences.  
 
Table 5.3 Match Pairs by broadcast appearances and gate revenue (2004 – 2008) 
Match Pairs Times broadcast 
Average 
gate 
revenue 
Average 
ticket 
price 
(£) 
Average TV 
audience 
Average 
Attendance 
Sky 
Sports 
Prem 
Plus Setanta 
Top 20 by times broadcast         
Arsenal Man Utd 4 3,443,405 70 1,856,500 49,192 4 0 0 
Arsenal Chelsea 4 3,442,968 70 1,701,750 49,185 4 0 0 
Arsenal Liverpool 4 3,439,818 70 1,486,000 49,140 4 0 0 
Man Utd Arsenal 4 2,318,051 32 2,314,250 72,588 4 0 0 
Man Utd Liverpool 4 2,295,722 32 1,843,750 71,890 4 0 0 
Man Utd Chelsea 4 2,293,727 32 1,947,750 71,827 4 0 0 
Chelsea Liverpool 4 2,136,955 51 1,652,000 42,004 4 0 0 
Chelsea Man Utd 4 2,132,360 51 1,064,750 41,914 3 1 0 
Chelsea Arsenal 4 2,130,372 51 1,877,750 41,875 4 0 0 
Newcastle Man Utd 4 1,876,624 36 1,257,000 52,310 3 0 1 
Man City Man Utd 4 1,672,899 36 1,278,250 46,626 4 0 0 
Liverpool Man Utd 4 1,557,168 35 1,345,250 44,491 4 0 0 
Liverpool Chelsea 4 1,542,538 35 1,607,000 44,073 4 0 0 
Liverpool Arsenal 4 1,538,906 35 1,527,500 43,969 4 0 0 
Aston Villa Arsenal 4 1,129,119 28 391,500 40,513 2 1 1 
Aston Villa Chelsea 4 1,073,097 28 786,500 38,493 3 1 0 
Middlesbrough Man Utd 4 909,776 28 641,750 32,492 2 2 0 
Portsmouth Arsenal 4 768,299 38 525,750 20,286 2 2 0 
Blackburn Chelsea 4 652,658 30 792,250 21,755 3 1 0 
         
Bottom 20 by times broadcast       
Watford Wigan 0 458,450 25 - 18,338 0 0 0 
Blackburn Derby 0 456,925 18 - 26,110 0 0 0 
Wigan Middlesbrough 0 454,053 26 - 17,284 0 0 0 
Wigan Reading 0 447,349 27 - 16,840 0 0 0 
Wigan Charlton 0 437,398 26 - 16,823 0 0 0 
Blackburn Everton 0 433,979 18 - 24,304 0 0 0 
Wigan Watford 0 425,334 26 - 16,359 0 0 0 
Wigan Sheff Utd 0 424,372 26 - 16,322 0 0 0 
Wigan Portsmouth 0 402,373 22 - 17,971 0 0 0 
Blackburn WBA 0 397,764 18 - 22,098 0 0 0 
Blackburn Norwich 0 376,614 18 - 20,923 0 0 0 
Blackburn Sheff Utd 0 376,506 18 - 20,917 0 0 0 
Blackburn Charlton 0 374,586 18 - 20,810 0 0 0 
Blackburn Reading 0 374,008 18 - 21,048 0 0 0 
Blackburn Southampton 0 373,068 18 - 20,726 0 0 0 
Blackburn Middlesbrough 0 372,616 18 - 20,852 0 0 0 
Blackburn Sunderland 0 367,085 18 - 20,716 0 0 0 
Watford Blackburn 0 344,000 25 - 13,760 0 0 0 
Blackburn Fulham 0 326,427 18 - 18,276 0 0 0 
Blackburn Watford 0 288,630 18 - 16,035 0 0 0 
 
 
The average match day revenue here is the average for the match pair across all four 
seasons. The matches that attract revenues above one million per match are those 
between teams in the top four league positions (usually Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, 
Manchester United). These matches attract the highest ticket prices, stadium attendance 
and television audience. On average for the top twenty match pairs (broadcast four times), 
gate revenue is £1.9 million, this is greater than £392 thousand for the bottom twenty 
match pairs (not broadcast). The lowest gate revenues were seen at matches charging the 
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lowest ticket prices, such as £18 at Blackburn.  These matches are amongst teams that are 
lowest in the league table and are not broadcast live over the data period, they have lower 
stadium attendance on average (19,326). This further indicates that matches chosen for 
broadcasting are already the most attractive matches to watch.  
 
5.2.2 Geographic and demographic variables  
 
Gate revenue is a function of market size (Baimbridge et al., 1996). Each clubs unitary area 
is likely to be different when measured by its physical size and consequently, the 
population of the Unitary Authority local to the team’s stadium is expressed in terms of the 
land area of the Unitary Authority. This measure is the population density (people per 
square kilometre), expressed as relative to land area, it is comparable across each team. 
The 2004 and 2006 based sub national population projections are taken from the UK 
National Statistics online. The largest population density is in central London located clubs 
from 11 to 12 thousand people per square kilometre (Arsenal, Chelsea and Fulham). 
Outside of central London clubs, the average population density is 3,046 people per square 
kilometre. Figure 5.2 shows the correlation between the population density in the Unitary 
Authority surrounding the home team stadium and match day revenue for all Premier 
League matches from 2004 to 2008. This shows a positive correlation between local market 
size and match day revenue, with an increasing variance in revenue as population density 
increases. A greater number of people in the local area will represent a larger potential 
market for match day ticket sales.  
In London, there is likely to be a number of clubs represented in the Premier League and 
English football broadly compared with other cities or areas. The presence of multiple clubs 
occurs in a number of authority regions as follows: Liverpool (Liverpool and Everton); 
Manchester (United and City); Hammersmith and Fulham (Fulham and Chelsea); 
Birmingham (Birmingham and Aston Villa). In these cases, the market size measured by 
population density is shared between both clubs. Buraimo and Simmons (2009) use a 
sophisticated GIS mechanism to overcome issues of market size, however, this study 
assumes that clubs equally share the market when there is more than one club in the same 
define area The clubs affected are as mentioned above.  
 
Attendance may also depend on the distance between the home and visiting team’s 
stadiums. This is an approximation for travel cost, such that higher travel costs may reduce 
the travelling supporter’s attendance at a match, and thus reduce the home team’s gate 
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revenue (Forrest et al., 2004). The measured road distance between grounds of home and 
away teams is taken from the Automobile Association. Match day revenue is highest for 
stadia approximately 200 miles apart (Merseyside teams playing London teams) and for 
less than 20 miles apart (local rivalries), as such measures to account for a non-linear 
relationship are included in the estimation. Local derby matches are accounted for and 
discussed later. 
 
Figure 5.2 Population density and match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
 
 
The nature of supporting a football team can often mean a lifelong following regardless of 
income (Baimbridge et al., 1996). However, the average male24 weekly earnings of 
residents surrounding the football club may affect gate revenue on match days. Data are 
taken from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, Office for National Statistics midyear 
estimates for respective years. Figure 5.3 shows the average weekly male earnings against 
match day revenue. This shows a positive correlation between weekly earnings and match 
day revenue, with an increasing variance in revenue as earnings increase, suggesting that 
stadium attendance is a normal good. 
 
24 Male earnings are used as an approximation of average earnings in the local area. 
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Figure 5.3 Average weekly earnings and match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
 
 
Differences in economic activity can be approximated by local unemployment rates. Lower 
levels of economic activity (higher unemployment) may cause a reduction in gate revenue. 
Claimant count rates are the number of unemployment benefit claimants as a proportion 
of resident working age population taken from Nomis (ONS) for the respective years. Figure 
5.4 shows the relationship between unemployment rates and match day revenue. The 
highest levels of unemployment are seen in Birmingham and Aston Villa (7.9 per cent), 
Wigan (6.4 per cent), Middlesbrough (6.1 per cent), and Liverpool and Everton (6 per cent). 
The Birmingham area suffered a high unemployment rate during the 2007 to 2008 season, 
a likely result from the financial crisis. Removing these outliers, there is a positive 
correlation, demonstrating that areas with a higher proportion of claimants see higher 
match day takings. This may be due to the increased leisure time a claimant may have 
compared to a worker or may be a feature of more densely populated areas. However, 
spectating football is traditionally a working class leisure pursuit in industrial cities (such as 
the areas mentioned above). 
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Figure 5.4 Unemployment and match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
 
 
5.2.3 Popularity or attractiveness of the football match 
 
There is evidence that supporters place importance on the matches between neighbouring 
teams, reflecting often long standing rivalry, for example, Liverpool and Everton (0.9 miles 
apart) or Newcastle and Sunderland (12.7 miles apart).  Allan and Roy (2008) included a 
variable for a derby match that is equal to 1 for matches that involve two local teams and 0 
for all other matches.  The distance is restricted to 34.7 miles, covering the North East 
derby between Middlesbrough and Sunderland (34.7 miles apart) and the North West 
derby between Manchester United and Liverpool (33 miles apart). Table 5.4 shows the 
change in average match day revenue by club when the match includes a local rival. With 
the exception of Crystal Palace, derby matches attract higher average revenue at all 
stadiums.  
 
Teams’ wage bills also capture match attractiveness. The competitive and mobile labour 
market in English football means that players can frequently move between teams in order 
to maximise their wages. Therefore, wages are likely to reflect players’ marginal revenue 
products. Given a competitive market for players, the wage bill is likely to be a strong 
predictor of team strength (Buraimo, 2008; Forrest et al., 2004). This study uses team wage 
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bills, taken from various issues of the Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance, divided 
by the Premier League average for the respective season. 
 
Table 5.4 Average match day revenue of derby matches by club (2004 – 2008) 
Stadium Match day Revenue (average) Derby matches 
Arsenal 2,788,499 3,397,715 
Aston Villa 993,219 1,065,703 
Birmingham 1,148,373 1,176,504 
Blackburn 493,180 590,064 
Bolton 723,072 793,725 
Charlton 552,038 558,223 
Chelsea 2,120,529 2,132,893 
Crystal Palace 710,914 692,654 
Derby 1,198,423  
Everton 1,144,058 1,215,405 
Fulham 839,266 923,891 
Liverpool 1,455,772 1,530,820 
Manchester City 1,313,492 1,515,390 
Manchester United 2,299,846 2,308,502 
Middlesbrough 763,292 858,900 
Newcastle 1,693,815 1,869,850 
Norwich City 559,802  
Portsmouth 754,178 767,980 
Reading 858,913  
Sheff Utd 792,669  
Southampton 736,753 742,104 
Sunderland 942,268 1,223,932 
Tottenham 1,677,680 1,954,695 
Watford 468,942 480,463 
West Brom 735,673 661,858 
West Ham 1,580,832 1,789,452 
Wigan 507,752 572,130 
 
This is a measure of relative wages and shows the quality of a team relative to the average. 
Figure 5.5 shows relative wage bills against match day revenue. The majority of 
observations have a relative wage bill below 1, less than the league average. There is a 
positive correlation, as a club spends more proportionally to the league average, the match 
day revenue increases.  
 
With ever more Premier League clubs attracting foreign ownership and consequently large 
investments, willingness to spend on playing talent has risen sharply. Spending on star 
players will likely attract fans to the terraces (Baimbridge et al., 1996; Bryson et al., 2014). 
Unlike Baimbridge et al., (1996) who captures the attractiveness by number of star players 
in each team, this study uses the wage expenditure for the respective season. All the 
monetary variables (revenue, wages, and average male earnings) are in Pound Sterling and 
are deflated by Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure) at market prices deflator at constant 
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2008 prices. The GDP deflator (YBGB)25 is taken from the United Kingdom Economic 
Accounts.  
 
Figure 5.5 Relative wage bills and match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
 
   
Forrest and Simmons (2002) show that attendance at English football matches relates 
positively to the quality of the teams and to the outcome uncertainty. As discussed in 
chapter four, there are a number of differing ways outcome uncertainty is measured in the 
literature. For example, Forrest and Simmons (2002) use pre-match betting odds and 
Forrest, Beaumont, et al. (2005) choose to model outcome uncertainty according to 
current league positions, taking into account home advantage, by averaging cumulative 
home and points gained for the current season. Outcome uncertainty can be influenced by 
a team’s past relative performance.  In general, the most unpredictable matches will be 
against the teams closest in the league table, pundits have often referred to these games 
as gaining “six points” for a win. Also, the length of time points are accumulated, either the 
current season (Forrest, Beaumont, et al., 2005) or the last five games (Allan and Roy, 
2008) is important. This study uses the difference in the team’s final position of last season 
as an approximation for outcome uncertainty. This previous season’s final position is used 
25 GDP is also measured by production and by income but is approximately equal.   
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to remove variation due to short term over or under performance. For example, for the 
first month of the 2006-2007 season, Portsmouth FC remained unexpectedly at the top of 
the Premier League table following a relegation battle in the previous season. Many fans, 
although pleased, did not expect the team to remain in first position for long and therefore 
perceived games against teams close to them in the previous season to be more uncertain. 
Table 5.5 shows the average match day revenue at each position difference between 
competing teams.  
 
Table 5.5 Average match day revenue by position difference (2004 – 2008) 
Position difference Average match day revenue 
1 1,219,342 
2 1,177,988 
3 1,187,625 
4 1,163,987 
5 1,119,106 
6 1,134,992 
7 1,169,857 
8 1,191,020 
9 1,174,244 
10 1,185,708 
11 1,260,664 
12 1,296,608 
13 1,342,011 
14 1,302,998 
15 1,473,684 
16 1,543,680 
17 1,506,785 
18 1,611,281 
19 1,711,625 
 
The average match revenue is approximately £1.2 million when the difference between the 
competing teams is 1 league place. The average match day revenue is lower for 2 to 10 
league positions difference, beyond this match day revenue rises. This suggests that match 
day revenue is highest when the match is least balanced (following on from results shown 
in chapter four) and tends to be highest when a top team is playing in the match.  
 
Substitute goods may include other local sporting events, or teams, but football fans have 
high switching costs and may watch their chosen team regardless of other attractions 
(Feehan, 2005). To these fans the direct substitute to watching the match live at the 
stadium is watching the match live on television. The strength of this substitute will depend 
on its availability and price. The assumption is that as the relative price of the substitute 
decreases it will attract fans away from the stadium and vice versa. The price per game is 
measured as the average price of obtaining Sky Sports or Setanta across different formats. 
In 2010, Setanta Sports was available on digital satellite for £12.99 per month or for ‘free’ 
when bundled with other channels from Virgin Media at £41 per month. Sky Sports was 
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available as a Sky sports mix package for £35.50 per month or on Virgin Media for £41 per 
month. The average monthly subscription is taken over the ten months of the season and 
divided by the number of games available (92 for Sky and 46 for Setanta). Due to the level 
of deep discounting and channel bundling that is involved in the pay television market, the 
average price that can be observed is used as an approximate value of price. Table 5.6 
shows the average match day revenue by television price. On average, the match day 
revenue is greater when the match is broadcast live compared to not broadcast and 
highest when broadcast on Setanta. Despite the difference in average price, the matches 
shown by each broadcaster are of similar desirability (as such, prices of broadcast matches 
do not suffer from an endogeneity issue).  
 
Table 5.6 Average match day revenue by television subscription prices (2004 – 2008) 
 Price per live TV match Average match day revenue 
Sky 2.57 1,284,967 
Setanta 5.87 1,451,578 
Not broadcast  1,181,082 
 
5.2.4 Exogenous variables  
 
The average attendance from last season is used to capture the habit persistence of fans: 
those that will turn up to a match regardless of the team’s performance (Buraimo and 
Simmons, 2005). The size of away team support is approximated by the away team’s 
average attendance in the previous season. Figure 5.6 shows match day revenue against 
the average previous season attendance for the home team. Match day revenue increases 
when the previous home team attendance is greater. However, the home team match day 
revenue does not appear to be affected directly by the away team’s previous attendance. 
In addition, the three newly promoted clubs each season are marked with a dummy 
variable, as promoted teams will have prior season attendance in the division below 
(Forrest and Simmons, 2006).  
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Figure 5.6 Match day revenue and previous attendance (2004 – 2008) 
 
 
Buraimo and Simmons (2005) and Forrest and Simmons (2006) show that teams with an 
established membership in top flight league football tend to have a greater home and away 
fan attendance. The age of the football club is used to capture this effect, similar to the 
notion of team reputation used by Czarnitski and Stadtmann (2002). Table 5.7 shows match 
day revenue and the age of the home club. The longest established club in the English 
Premier League is Reading (established in 1871) and has average gate revenues of 
£857,000, this is less than the league average (£1.1 million). The newest football club is 
Wigan (established in 1932) and has average gate revenues of £506,000. The highest gate 
revenues are (again) from teams that have spent the longest period of time occupying the 
top spot of the Premier League table (Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea). These teams, 
are 129, 121 and 102 years established and, which therefore, suggests no clear correlation 
between the age of the club and match day revenue. Instead, it is more likely that age 
along with success that is important. 
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Table 5.7 Match day revenue and age of the home club 
 
 
 
Dummy variables are added for the day the match takes place (relative to Saturday) and if 
it falls on a bank holiday. Table 5.8 shows the average match day revenue by day of the 
week. As weekday games are played during the evening unless on a bank holiday, these 
may naturally attract lower crowds. Table 5.8 shows that matches held on Sunday and 
Friday receive higher revenue. It is worth noting that many weekday games are often 
moved from Saturdays purely for the reason that they are to be broadcast live (Carmichael 
et al., 1999). 
Average age Average of Gate revenue
Reading 137                  857,631.03                              
Aston Villa 133                  981,311.32                              
Bolton 133                  720,514.30                              
Blackburn 132                  487,014.95                              
Birmingham 131                  1,148,164.40                          
Middlesbrough 131                  804,402.05                              
Everton 129                  1,141,860.93                          
Man Utd 129                  2,300,489.92                          
Sunderland 128                  938,900.13                              
WBA 128                  728,578.03                              
Fulham 128                  840,751.24                              
Watford 126                  468,760.53                              
Newcastle 126                  1,690,085.91                          
Tottenham 125                  1,651,698.70                          
Derby 124                  1,197,666.84                          
Arsenal 121                  2,784,534.70                          
Southampton 120                  734,631.16                              
Man City 120                  1,305,747.51                          
Sheff Utd 118                  793,312.00                              
Liverpool 115                  1,454,631.21                          
West Ham 112                  1,566,703.77                          
Portsmouth 109                  754,544.74                              
Norwich 103                  560,053.63                              
Chelsea 102                  2,120,329.52                          
Charlton 101                  551,557.63                              
Crystal Palace 100                  711,186.00                              
Wigan 75                     506,759.33                              
 135 
Table 5.8 Average match day revenue by day of the week (2004 – 2008) 
 
 Average match day revenue 
Saturday 1,175,111 
Sunday 1,410,736 
Monday 1,123,710 
Tuesday 1,219,261 
Wednesday 1,214,110 
Thursday 1,262,611 
Friday 1,528,151 
Bank Holiday 1,163,212 
 
Previous studies of attendance demand find that matches toward the end of the season 
attract higher attendances (Allan and Roy, 2008). However, the literature shows mixed 
results of the effect on attendance at matches during the opening part of the season in 
August. Peel and Thomas (1988) found lower attendances in all four English leagues for the 
first two weeks of the season. Wilson and Sim (1995) and Allan (2004) found that the 
opening part of the season had a positive impact, although not statistically significant. 
Here, one variable for each month of the season is included. April and May are combined 
as one to compensate for early determination of relegation and champion positions. Table 
5.9 shows the average match day revenue by month of the year. Matches held in 
December are, on average, those that receive the highest revenue.  
 
Table 5.9 Average match day revenue by month (2004 – 2008) 
 
 Average match day revenue 
August 1,148,860 
September 1,236,308 
October 1,198,825 
November 1,240,239 
December 1,250,273 
January 1,190,965 
February 1,199,976 
March 1,266,823 
April or May 1,246,759 
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5.3 Methodology 
 
Section 5.2 analysed the factors that influence match day revenue for Premier League 
football matches between 2004 and 2008. This section discusses the empirical strategy 
used to combine those components in order to test the hypothesis: Live broadcasting of a 
Premier League match is a substitute to spectating the live event at the stadium, and as 
such, has a negative and significant impact on match day revenue. To test this hypothesis 
an econometric model is formulated, based on the discussion of the existing literature in 
chapter two.  
 
When collecting the pricing information for ticketing at stadiums, it is observed that prices 
are often deliberately higher for matches where a higher demand is expected. Using the 
match day revenue, as this study uses, mitigates the capacity issues seen in attendance 
estimation literature. An estimation using attendance is shown in the analysis for 
robustness. Model 1 is constructed from the variables used in the existing literature (as 
discussed in chapter two) to measure the impact of live broadcasting on match day 
revenue: 
 
Model 1: LOG REVENUEit = f(LIVE BROADCASTINGi, GEOGRAPHICS AND DEMOGRAPHICSijk, 
ATTRACTIVENESSijk, EXOGENOUS FACTORSijk) 
 
This is a cross-sectional time-series (panel) regression model. Where j and k denote the 
home and away teams, i denotes each match and t denotes season. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of gate revenue. Data are collected for each of the twenty 
teams in the Premier League across four seasons from 2004-05 to 2007-08 (each season 
consists of 380 matches, this is 19 home matches and 19 away matches for each of the 20 
teams, a total of 1,520 observations). Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.10. 
 
As discussed in chapter four, OLS and Tobit estimations are the two commonly used 
empirical techniques in the existing literature for modelling the impact of live broadcasting 
on the demand for stadium attendance.  In light of this, the model is estimated once on 
revenue using panel fixed effects and again on attendance using Tobit with fixed effects for 
robustness and comparison. The fixed effects are controls for month, year, and teams in 
both estimations.  
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Table 5.10 Descriptive statistics for modelling match day revenue (2004 – 2008) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Match day revenue 1520 1177528 652934 254595 4211270 
TV 1520 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Demographic  1520         
Population density 1520 4602.54 3508.51 422.87 12453.33 
Distance 1520 143.85 89.17 0.90 346.00 
Pop. Wages 1520 504.22 128.18 354.47 855.30 
Unemployment 1520 4.24 1.25 1.90 7.90 
Popularity 1520         
Derby 1520 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Relative wage 1520 0.97 0.58 0.36 2.90 
Position difference 1520 7.10 4.65 1.00 19.00 
Exogenous 1520         
Legacy attendance 1520 33452 13402 11563 75826 
Age of club 1520 120 14 74 137 
Promoted  1520 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Price per TV match 1520 1.01 1.46 0.00 5.87 
Saturday 1520 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Sunday 1520 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Monday 1520 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Tuesday 1520 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Wednesday 1520 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Thursday 1520 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Friday 1520 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Bank holiday 1520 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
August 1520 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
September 1520 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
October 1520 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 
November 1520 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
December 1520 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
January 1520 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
February 1520 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
march 1520 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 
April or May 1520 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
 
Television broadcasters will wish to show the most attractive matches to gain the largest 
television audience as possible. Attractive matches that are broadcast will therefore have 
two opposing effects on gate revenue: Firstly, gate revenue will be greater for more 
attractive matches as either more fans wish to watch the match or the ticket price will be 
higher, or both. Secondly, the attractive match is broadcast live, reducing the gate 
attendance. 
 
 To decompose this effect the model is estimated once with more attractive matches and 
again with less attractive matches. The top four clubs appeared in live broadcast matches 
between 18 to 25 times each in the 2007-08 season, as the Premier League and the 
broadcasters believe these to be more attractive matches26. To estimate differences in the 
impact of live broadcasting across the popularity of teams, a quantile regression of Model 
is used. For this estimation fixed effects are used for day, month, and year, the team fixed 
26 Number of broadcast matches 2007-08 season: Manchester United, 25; Arsenal, 23; 
Liverpool, 21; Chelsea 18. 
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effects are removed due to the nature of constraining the team by distribution of match 
day revenue.  
 
5.4 Results from modelling revenue 
 
Estimated coefficients for estimations are shown Table 5.11 and 5.13. The estimation for 
match day revenue shows that 93 per cent of the variations in gate revenue can be 
explained by the variables included in the model. Statistical significance is indicated in the 
table by * and ** respectively. The day, month, season and team fixed effects are 
significant for modelling match day revenue. Full regression output including all fixed 
effects and diagnostic tests are reported in Appendix C. 
 
To confirm the use of the fixed effects estimation the Hausman test is used. A significant P-
value rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random 
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects 
estimator. This indicates that fixed effects should be used. Forrest and Simmons (2006) 
note that in models of attendance demand, the scale of attendance can vary from team to 
team. Using the logarithm of the dependent variable often mitigates heteroskedasticity but 
it can still remain, therefore robust variance covariance estimators are used for the 
standard errors, to account for any unknown order of heteroskedasticity. However, 
plotting the residuals against the fitted values shows not no obvious pattern.  
 
Multicollinearity between explanatory variables can inflate the standard errors for the 
coefficients. In addition, the residuals can display persistence throughout a season, so a 
correction for serial correlation may be needed. The Wooldridge (2010) panel test for 
autocorrelation found no evidence of serial correlation. Using a variance inflation factor 
shows that distance and distance squared are a linear combination of each other, this is 
expected. However, the home team wage bill to be potentially correlated with the legacy 
attendance at the stadium. This makes economic sense, as higher attendance would lead to 
greater revenue from ticket sales which is available to spend on players.  
 
A kernel density plot with the normal density overlaid shows that the residuals from this 
estimation do not conform to a perfect normal distribution. Further investigation by a 
standardized normal probability plot and a plot showing the quantiles of a variable against 
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the quantiles of a normal distribution, shows that there is non-normality in the middle 
range of data and near the tails. The Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality returns a p-value 
that rejects the assumption that the distribution is normal. Although normality of residuals 
is required for valid hypothesis testing, assuring validity of the p-values, it is not essential 
for unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. A Ramsey specification test shows 
that the model is missing explanatory variables, however, from review of the existing 
studies, there is little economic explanation for including variables that are not already in 
use in this model.  
 
Table 5.11 Results for modelling match day revenue  
 Match day Revenue (Ln)  
Stadium Attendance (Ln) Tobit 
estimation 
 Coeff se   Coeff se   
Broadcast on TV -0.008 0.008   -0.035 0.008 ** 
Home Population density -2.1E-06 0.000   3.0E-05 0.000 ** 
Away Population density 1.9E-07 0.000   2.9E-06 0.000   
Distance -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 ** 
Distance (squared) 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 * 
Home Male earnings -0.001 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000   
Away Male earnings 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 ** 
Home Unemployment -0.018 0.006 ** -0.010 0.005 ** 
Away Unemployment 4.1E-04 0.003   0.008 0.003 ** 
Derby match 0.040 0.017 ** 0.006 0.017   
Home Wages/PL average 0.141 0.061 ** 0.136 0.066 ** 
Away Wages/PL average 0.115 0.009 ** 0.104 0.008 ** 
Probability of Draw -0.427 0.133 ** -0.552 0.172 ** 
Attendance Last Season 0.389 0.061 ** 0.287 0.062 ** 
Home Club age -0.116 0.068 * -0.148 0.051 ** 
Away Club age 1.8E-04 0.000   2.2E-04 0.000   
Win% Last Season -0.140 0.072 * 0.057 0.065   
Promoted  0.161 0.025 ** 0.102 0.028 ** 
Constant 25.456 7.905 ** 25.787 15.675   
Fixed effects significance:             
Team Yes   No    
Day Yes   No    
Month Yes   No    
Season Yes     Yes    
F value | Log likelihood  710.090   ** 402.230     
R Squared | Rho 0.934   3.18E-13 1.31E-13   
Uncensored observations 1520   727    
Right-censored observations -   793    
Wald chi2 -     18909.52   ** 
** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.    
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Live broadcasting 
To aid understanding of the magnitude of the marginal effect of each variable on gate 
revenue, the monetary value will be shown in parenthesis, as a percentage of the average 
gate revenue (£1,177,528) for all clubs.  The estimation of match day revenue finds that 
gate revenue is unaffected when the match is broadcast live. The robust standard error is 
larger than this estimate, showing that the estimated impact is not statistically significantly 
different from zero. The potential negative impact of live broadcasting is offset by 
increased interest in the match. 
 
The estimated marginal impact of a live broadcast by Tobit regression is a decrease in 
revenue of 3.5 per cent and statistically significant. This model shows a reduction in 
attendance but when modelled using match day revenue, the estimates show no significant 
impact. This results is likely reflecting the changes in stadium ticket price imposed by a 
number of clubs for matches that are more (less) popular. If price rises proportionally to a 
decrease in attendance then revenue remains unaffected.   
 
 The above linear regression techniques summarise the average relationship between the 
regressors and the dependent variable based on the conditional mean, providing a partial 
view of the relationship. Describing the relationship at different points in the conditional 
distribution of match day revenue is done by quantile regression. Estimates for quantile 
regression of match day revenue are show in Table 5.13. Estimates in this table are for 10th 
to 90th quantiles. Estimates for the impact of live broadcasting at each percentile, except 
the 30th and 50th, are not statistically significant. Results show that match day revenue is 
reduced by 3.3 per cent at the 30th percentile and by 3.1 per cent for revenues at the 50th 
percentile (the median quantile). These results show that the impact of live broadcasting 
on match day revenue does vary depending on the revenue taken at the match. Table 5.12 
shows the match day revenue associated with each percentile of the quantile regressions.  
 
At the 30th percentile, the teams that attract approximately the corresponding revenue are 
Portsmouth, Fulham, and Southampton. Those that attract the revenue associated with the 
50th percentile are Aston Villa, Birmingham, and Everton. Matches hosted by these teams 
are negatively affected by live broadcasting. All other matches are unaffected. 
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Table 5.12 Match day revenue (2004 – 2008) at 10 percentile intervals 
Percentile Match day revenue 
Lowest 254,595 
10th 551,691 
20th 689,592 
30th 766,080 
40th 874,260 
50th 1,064,160 
60th 1,199,550 
70th 1,458,501 
80th 1,673,664 
90th 2,139,195 
Highest 4,211,270 
 
Holding other variables constant, a negative marginal impact on match day revenue from 
broadcasting a match live is not supported, however, the estimates indicate the differences 
in demand for matches across match day revenues.  
 
Geographic and demographic variables 
The population density local to the home team’s stadium decreases attendance by 0.002 
per cent (£32.50) with every additional person per square kilometre, when estimating 
attendance. This is an approximation of the potential market a football club can attract. 
However, this has no significant effect on match day revenue, showing that clubs adjust 
their pricing policy enough to overcome changes in market size. The size of the away team 
potential market has no significant effect on the home stadium gate revenue  
 
Higher travel cost (measured by distance) reduces the number of travelling supporters and 
therefore reduces the home team’s gate revenue by 0.01 per cent for every additional 
mile. This impact is smaller than the 1.2 per cent effect found by Forrest, Simmons and 
Szymanski (2004). This is a non-linear relationship, showing that an additional mile 
travelled has less of an impact when the distance is larger. The a turning point at 
approximately 235 miles, beyond this distance, there is likely no further negative impact on 
attendance.  This relationship is common across all percentiles of match day revenue.  
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Table 5.13 (part 1) Match day revenue across percentiles of revenue (10th to 90th) 
 10th percentile 20th percentile 30th percentile 40th percentile 50th percentile 
 Coeff se   Coeff se   Coeff se   Coeff se   Coeff se   
Broadcast on TV -0.011 0.024   -0.032 0.019   -0.033 0.014 ** -0.016 0.012   -0.031 0.011 ** 
Home Population density 9.72E-05 8.56E-06 ** 7.2E-05 0.000 ** 6.56E-05 8.02E-06 ** 7.45E-05 8.00E-06 ** 7.66E-05 3.20E-06 ** 
Away Population density -1.48E-06 4.44E-06   -1.9E-06 0.000   -7.87E-07 2.78E-06   9.39E-07 3.44E-06   2.70E-06 3.60E-06   
Distance -0.002 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 2.76E-04 ** -0.001 2.97E-04 ** 
Distance (squared) 4.88E-06 2.00E-06 ** 0.000 0.000 * 4.34E-06 1.21E-06 ** 3.65E-06 8.60E-07 ** 2.42E-06 8.94E-07 ** 
Home Male earnings -7.39E-04 2.05E-04 ** 0.000 0.000   -3.54E-04 1.94E-04 * -5.77E-04 1.82E-04 ** -6.65E-04 9.33E-05 ** 
Away Male earnings -4.78E-05 1.61E-04   0.000 0.000   -1.19E-04 6.59E-05 * -1.02E-04 8.02E-05   -1.31E-04 1.01E-04   
Home Unemployment 0.022 0.017   -0.008 0.013   0.002 0.007   -0.001 0.007   0.006 0.006   
Away Unemployment -5.97E-04 0.008   -3.0E-03 0.007   3.72E-03 0.006   0.004 0.006   0.001 0.005   
Derby match -0.070 0.057   -0.007 0.042   0.004 0.030   0.029 0.029   0.034 0.029   
Home Wages/PL average 0.031 0.067   -0.010 0.048   0.015 0.036   0.000 0.038   0.021 0.032   
Away Wages/PL average 0.091 0.030 ** 0.122 0.019 ** 0.127 0.014 ** 0.113 0.011 ** 0.116 0.012 ** 
Probability of Draw 0.330 0.476   -0.308 0.282   -0.448 0.268   -0.307 0.268   -0.152 0.197   
Attendance Last Season 1.125 0.070 ** 1.219 0.058 ** 1.137 0.060 ** 1.131 0.062 ** 1.091 0.043 ** 
Home Club age 0.004 0.001 ** 0.002 0.002   0.000 0.001   -0.001 0.001   -0.002 0.001   
Away Club age 8.5E-04 0.001 * 3.5E-04 0.001   -1.2E-04 0.001   3.2E-05 0.001   -2.0E-04 0.000   
Win% Last Season 0.482 0.222 ** 0.331 0.163 ** 0.219 0.117 * 0.244 0.118 ** 0.184 0.103   
Promoted  0.010 0.068   0.059 0.068   0.056 0.051   0.071 0.052   0.206 0.034 ** 
Constant 0.952 0.810   0.551 0.610  1.867 0.580   2.130 0.627 ** 2.676 0.451 ** 
Fixed effects significance:                               
Day Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes   No    
Month Yes    Yes   Yes    No   Yes    
Season No     Yes     Yes     No     Yes     
Pseudo R Squared 0.573    0.577   0.595    0.617   0.635    
Observations 1520     1520                       
** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.              
 
 143 
Table 5.13 (part 2) Match day revenue across percentiles of revenue (10th to 90th) 
 60th percentile 70th percentile 80th percentile 90th percentile 
 Coeff se  Coeff se   Coeff se  Coeff se   
Broadcast on TV -0.021 0.013   -0.018 0.012   -0.012 0.011   -0.018 0.015   
Home Population density 7.54E-05 2.80E-06 ** 7.19E-05 2.88E-06 ** 6.83E-05 3.66E-06 ** 7.32E-05 4.30E-06 ** 
Away Population density 3.73E-06 2.13E-06   3.47E-06 1.89E-06 * 1.40E-06 2.47E-06   8.35E-07 2.99E-06   
Distance -0.001 2.61E-04 ** -0.001 2.52E-04 ** -0.001 1.65E-04 ** -0.001 2.73E-04 ** 
Distance (squared) 2.16E-06 7.08E-07 ** 1.59E-06 6.16E-07 ** 1.87E-06 4.39E-07 ** 1.07E-06 7.61E-07   
Home Male earnings -5.87E-04 6.71E-05 ** -5.05E-04 7.03E-05 ** -3.74E-04 7.94E-05 ** -2.77E-04 1.55E-04 * 
Away Male earnings -1.82E-04 6.90E-05 ** -1.15E-04 7.29E-05   -2.66E-05 7.20E-05   1.11E-05 9.16E-05   
Home Unemployment 0.009 0.004 ** 0.011 0.004 ** 0.014 0.004 ** 0.016 0.005 ** 
Away Unemployment -0.001 0.005   0.000 0.004   0.002 0.003   -0.004 0.004   
Derby match 0.012 0.024   0.048 0.027 * 0.063 0.029 ** 0.068 0.029 ** 
Home Wages/PL average 0.012 0.021   0.004 0.018   0.002 0.025   0.121 0.057 ** 
Away Wages/PL average 0.113 0.012 ** 0.100 0.012 ** 0.101 0.011 ** 0.120 0.015 ** 
Probability of Draw -0.096 0.202   -0.030 0.213   0.011 0.218   -0.127 0.302   
Attendance Last Season 1.082 0.028 ** 1.077 0.024 ** 1.041 0.026 ** 0.909 0.053 ** 
Home Club age -0.001 0.001 * -0.001 0.001   0.000 0.001   0.001 0.001   
Away Club age -1.3E-04 3.6E-04   -2.2E-05 2.7E-04   -1.8E-04 3.1E-04   3.0E-04 4.9E-04   
Win% Last Season 0.183 0.102 * 0.236 0.084 ** 0.255 0.076 ** -0.154 0.150   
Promoted  0.217 0.025 ** 0.236 0.021 ** 0.240 0.027 ** 0.372 0.048 ** 
Constant 2.728 0.271 ** 2.647 0.184 ** 2.885 0.240 ** 4.141 0.508   
Fixed effects significance:                         
Day Yes   No    Yes   Yes    
Month Yes   Yes    No   No    
Season Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
Pseudo R Squared 0.648   0.656    0.659   0.646    
Observations 1520     1520     1520     1520     
** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.           
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 An increase in the average male weekly earnings of residents surrounding the home 
stadium reduces gate revenue by 0.1 per cent for every additional pound. This suggests 
that attending football at the stadium is viewed as an inferior good, in line with findings by 
Baimbridge et al. (1996). This effect is larger at the 10th percentile of match day revenue 
than any other percentile, showing that an increase in earnings reduces gate revenue to a 
larger extent for matches that gain the least revenue.  
 
Decreases in economic activity around the home stadium, approximated by higher 
unemployment rates, decreases gate revenue by 1.8 per cent for every additional 
unemployment benefit claimant as a proportion of resident working age population. 
Holding earnings constant, a contraction in economic activity decreases the revenue a club 
will take on match day. However, higher unemployment rates has a positive impact of gate 
revenue for matches at the 60th percentile and above. Unemployment rates local to the 
visiting team‘s stadium have little effect on the home gate revenue. Unemployment rates 
were highest in industrial cities such as Birmingham, Liverpool and Sunderland. Other 
things held constant, revenues will be smaller for matches hosted by these clubs and also 
smaller when these clubs are the away team.  
 
Popularity or attractiveness of the football match  
Derby matches that display the rivalry between neighbouring teams increase match day 
revenue by 4 per cent. Derby matches that attract the 70th to 90th percentile of match day 
revenue increase this revenue by 4.8 to 6.8 per cent. This is larger than the increase of all 
other percentiles, which show a non-significant impact. This emphasises the higher 
desirability of matches hosted by teams at the top of the league table.  
 
An increase in the club wage bill relative to the Premier League average increases gate 
revenue by 14 per cent, similarly, an increase in the away club wage bill has a similar effect. 
This is a key factor in match attractiveness, fans are interested in watching the best talent 
playing football. Wage expenditure is most important for clubs at the top of the match day 
revenue distribution, the evidence shows that matches attracting less revenue are 
unaffected by heavier investment in playing talent by the home team.  
 
A decrease in outcome uncertainty of a match, approximated by an increase in the 
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probability of the match ending in a draw has a negative effect on gate revenue by 0.42 per 
cent for every per cent increase in draw probability. Further discussion on the impact of 
outcome uncertainty on demand for Premier League football matches is found in chapter 
four.  
 
Exogenous variables 
The habit persistence of fans is captured by the average attendance at the home stadium 
last season. Gate revenue increases by 0.38 per cent for every a 1 per cent increase in 
supporters in the previous season. The effect of habit persistence is slightly greater for 
matches with lower match day revenue. Gate revenue is increased if the home side is one 
of the three newly promoted clubs each season, this impact is significant only for the 
matches at the median percentile and above. This shows there is an estimated spill over 
effect of being champions of the lower league in the previous season and greater interest 
in matches against incumbent clubs but only at matches with the highest revenue.  
 
Weekday matches reduce gate revenue compared to matches played on Saturdays. Allan 
(2004) found these matches to decrease revenue by 7.1 per cent. The matches played 
towards the end of the season (in April and May) increase revenue. These end of season 
matches become more important to fans as they often wish to spectate matches more 
crucial to the final league position. This positive impact is also found in Wilson and Sim 
(1995) and Allan (2004).  
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
The impact of live broadcasting on stadium attendance, using a Tobit method, is negative 
and statistically significant. However, modelling match day revenue to account for changes 
in ticket pricing to reflect demand changes, the impact of live broadcasting a no significant 
impact on match day revenue for Premier League clubs (2004 to 2008). Table 5.14 shows 
the magnitude of the impact of broadcasting in existing studies, all of which show a 
negative impact on attendance. The effect of broadcasting in this study is found to be much 
smaller compared to the existing studies reviewed. 
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Table 5.14 Magnitude of the effect of broadcasting in existing studies 
Effect of broadcasting (all 
negative) Author(s) Data set (Premier League unless stated) 
15.8 to 21.4% Forrest and Simmons (2006) 1999-00 to 2001-02  
31% to 46% Garcia and Rodgiguez (2002) 1992-93 to 1995-96 (La Liga) 
4.8% Buraimo et al. (2009) 1997-98 to 2003-04 
2.9% to 8.3% Buraimo et al. (2010) 2003 to 2007  
Up to 31.9% Allan and Roy (2008) 2002-03 (Scottish Premier League) 
4.1 to 17.7% Buraimo (2008) 1993-94  
7.6% Buraimo and Simmons (2006) 1997-98 to 2003-04 
9.1% to 12.9% Forrest, Simmons, and Szymanski (2004) 1992-3 to 1997-98 
15.2% Baimbridge et al. (1996) 1993-94  
7.75% Allan (2004) 1995-96  (Aston Villa only) 
 
 
By quantile regression, the marginal impact of a live broadcast on match day revenue is 
shown to be significant for matches that gain a match day revenue in the 30th and the 50th 
percentile. This shows that there is heterogeneity in the impact of live broadcast across the 
league teams. Table 5.15 shows payments to each club by the Premier League for the 2007 
– 2008 season. Each club receives an equal share allocated by the Premier League and a 
merit payment awarded for final league position as well as a facility fee. Facility fees are 
based on how many appearances the team makes on live television (this part of the 
payments is the only part to vary with the amount of games broadcast).  
 
Table 5.15 Payments to Premier League clubs from live broadcasting (2007-2008) 
 
Place Live appearances 
Live 
home 
matches 
Payments to clubs (£ million) 
 Share Facility Merit Total1 
Arsenal 3 23 9 13.53 11.36 13.05 37.95 
Aston Villa 6 17 7 13.53 8.73 10.88 33.14 
Birmingham 19 10 4 13.53 5.66 1.45 20.65 
Blackburn 7 14 5 13.53 7.42 10.15 31.10 
Bolton 16 10 5 13.53 5.66 3.63 22.82 
Chelsea 2 18 10 13.53 9.17 13.78 36.48 
Derby 20 10 4 13.53 5.66 0.73 19.92 
Everton 5 15 7 13.53 7.85 11.60 32.99 
Fulham 17 10 7 13.53 5.66 2.90 22.10 
Liverpool 4 21 10 13.53 10.48 12.33 36.34 
Manchester City 9 16 12 13.53 8.29 8.70 30.53 
Manchester Utd 1 25 14 13.53 12.24 14.50 40.27 
Middlesbrough 13 10 3 13.53 5.66 5.80 25.00 
Newcastle 12 20 11 13.53 10.05 6.53 30.11 
Portsmouth 8 16 7 13.53 8.29 9.43 31.25 
Reading 18 10 4 13.53 5.66 2.18 21.37 
Sunderland 15 12 5 13.53 6.54 4.35 24.42 
Tottenham 11 11 4 13.53 6.10 7.25 26.89 
West Ham 10 11 4 13.53 6.10 7.98 27.61 
Wigan 14 10 6 13.53 5.66 5.08 24.27 
Total   289 138 270.69 152.26 152.26 575.21 
        
1. Excludes payments for international broadcast rights sales    
Source: Adapted from Premier League Annual Report 2008    
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The average facility fee for games broadcast in the 2007 - 2008 season was £497,998 for 
the top four clubs and £551,101 for the bottom five clubs. Taking into account the 
estimated average loss of gate revenue from fans watching a game on television instead of 
at the stadium, the facility fee payment appears not to reflect the heterogeneous impact 
on clubs. Throughout the league, the average revenue of selling broadcast rights heavily 
outweighs the perceived largest cost of doing so (the reduced revenue at the stadium). 
Assuming the marginal cost of live broadcasting is the average reduction in gate revenue, 
and the marginal revenue gained is the average payment for broadcast rights: Then the 
collective selling method is producing a quantity where marginal revenue is greater than 
marginal cost, a quantity that is less than the profit maximising level of production. Thus, 
the key policy recommendation stemming from this result is to provide a greater quantity 
of broadcast games, an increase from 138 matches should increase profit.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The Premier League argued that live broadcasting of football matches can be considered a 
direct substitute to spectating at the stadium and so restricting the quantity of broadcasts 
will control the loss of gate revenues. This chapter furthers the discussion regarding the 
impact on Premier League stadium revenue of live broadcasts. Broadcasters wish to show 
the most popular games in order to attract strong television advertising revenues and, as 
such, an endogeneity problem arises. 
 
This chapter uses a measure of match day revenue rather than attendance numbers to 
account for ticket price changes based on match popularity to estimate the impact of live 
broadcasting. Furthermore, this chapter uses a quantile estimation method to untangle the 
endogeneity issue embedded with estimating the impact of live broadcasting on match day 
revenue by modelling subsets of match day revenue. The impact of live broadcasting on 
stadium attendance is negative but when modelled on match day revenue, is found to not 
statistically significant except for matches at the 30th and 50th percentile of revenue. 
 
These results highlight the heterogeneity of response to live broadcasting across the league 
position of the home team. However, the results show that on average there is no 
significant effect of live broadcasting on match day gate revenue. Thus, these findings 
indicate that the argument put forward for controlling the number of broadcast rights for 
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sale has little grounding. The broadcast facility fee and the average sale price of rights to 
broadcast a live match outweigh the loss of gate revenue, in other words, revenue is 
greater than cost. Although the price may fall as a larger number of rights are offered for 
sale, relaxing the quantity constraint on broadcast matches should increase profit. This is to 
say, the fans, the broadcasters and the clubs involved in the market may well be made 
better off by an increase in Premier League matches shown live on TV.
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Chapter 6 – Investment and match performance 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter three discussed how the Premier League uses a policy to share revenues with a 
view to enhance the competitive balance in the league. Enhancing the balance in a league 
requires enhancing the performance of weaker teams (all teams wining 50 per cent of 
matches is most balanced27). Beyond the Premier League, competitive balance policies are 
more limited (such as the UEFA Financial Fair Play rules), although additional revenues are 
gained by participation in European competitions. These revenues from outside the 
Premier League (usually stemming from media rights revenue) are only available for the 
elite few that qualify for the UEFA Champions League or the Europa League. The Premier 
League is an environment of increasing dispersion in resources between elite and lower 
league clubs (Pawlowski et al., 2010) and not directly addressing issues stemming from this 
additional revenues will assume that member clubs can effectively use shared revenue to 
win matches regardless of league position (Forrest et al., 2005). Clubs struggling to raise 
finance (or attract wealthy owners to buy a team of players of greater relative strength 
compared to other teams) turn to other strategies in search of wining on the playing field 
(Cox et al., 2015). The average league expenditure on club wage bills has risen 109 per cent 
from £39 million to £82 between 2004 and 2012. The increase in average expenditure is 
caused by the relative nature of competition. Upward pressure is placed on other teams 
when a club increases its spending on players. This puts a downward pressure on profits 
and increases the rent received by players with no league level wage cap policy (Szymanski 
and Smith, 1997). 
 
Participation in additional competitions can have a positive impact on league performance 
by promoting team confidence (and revenues) or can have a negative impact by player 
fatigue (Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004). Despite the large amounts of expenditure by 
clubs on employing playing staff in order to achieve a higher position in the league table, 
there is little existing evidence to show that participation in the Europa League (usually only 
available to positions 5 and 6) has a positive impact to the club. Dupont et al. (2010) 
27 Balance is usually measure by win per cent , however, if all matches are drawn then 
arguably this would be equally as balanced  as each team winning 50 per cent. 
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showed evidence that playing two matches per week does not impact on player 
performance, but can increase the number of injuries to players. Forrest, Goddard, et al. 
(2005); Goddard (2005); Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) Forrest, Beaumont, et al. 
(2005) forecasted football match results with an ordered Probit model, finding that 
elimination from the FA Cup has a negative impact on domestic league performance. These 
studies concluded that the negative impact is seen due to the loss of team confidence from 
being knocked out of the additional competition.  
 
This chapter analyses the factors affecting a match win, including spending on playing 
talent and participation in European competitions.  The aim is to assess the impact of such 
a focus on the club’s performance in the Premier League using a statistical method 
(ordered Probit model) similar to that used in existing studies to forecast match results 
(Forrest, Beaumont, et al., 2005; Goddard, 2005; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004). The 
unique contribution of this chapter is to estimate the impact of Europa League 
participation and additional wage expenditure on domestic league performance using 
statistical modelling methods. These are two issues that see no clear consensus drawn in a 
formal setting (Cox et al., 2015). The chapter first discusses each element of the statistical 
model to be estimated before discussing the method. The analysis and discussion of the 
results follows. 
 
 
6.2 Winning a football match 
 
Of the 3,040 Premier League matches played during the 2004 to 2012 seasons, 1,450 (48 
per cent) were won by the home team, 794 ended as a draw (26 per cent), and 796 (26 per 
cent) were won by the away team. Table 6.1 shows the average number of goals each 
Premier League team scored and conceded per match over the data period. On average, 
2.6 goals are scored in each Premier League match, 1.52 per match of these are scored by 
the home team and 1.08 by the away team. Manchester United scored an average of 2.3 
goals per match and conceded only 0.63 goals and as such, they won 80 per cent of home 
matches and over 50 per cent of their away matches.  
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Table 6.1 Goals and match wins by Premier League teams (2004 – 2012) 
 Goals scored per match 
Goals conceded 
per match 
Per cent of home 
matches won 
Per cent of away 
matches won 
Arsenal 2.15 0.80 0.66 0.44 
Aston Villa 1.34 1.01 0.38 0.28 
Birmingham 1.17 0.98 0.36 0.16 
Blackburn 1.34 1.12 0.43 0.22 
Blackpool 1.58 1.95 0.26 0.26 
Bolton 1.36 1.20 0.41 0.22 
Burnley 1.32 1.58 0.37 0.05 
Charlton 1.26 1.19 0.42 0.18 
Chelsea 2.21 0.67 0.72 0.58 
Crystal Palace 1.11 1.00 0.32 0.05 
Derby 0.63 2.26 0.05 0.00 
Everton 1.56 0.98 0.53 0.32 
Fulham 1.47 1.14 0.49 0.14 
Hull 1.11 1.71 0.24 0.13 
Liverpool 1.89 0.66 0.63 0.39 
Man City 1.70 0.86 0.59 0.28 
Man Utd 2.30 0.63 0.80 0.53 
Middlesbrough 1.34 1.20 0.41 0.17 
Newcastle 1.44 1.18 0.41 0.22 
Norwich 1.50 1.63 0.37 0.13 
Portsmouth 1.29 1.23 0.39 0.19 
QPR 1.26 1.32 0.37 0.16 
Reading 1.21 1.13 0.50 0.16 
Sheffield Utd 1.47 0.89 0.58 0.16 
Southampton 1.58 1.58 0.26 0.05 
Stoke 1.34 0.97 0.45 0.17 
Sunderland 1.20 1.28 0.34 0.16 
Swansea 1.42 0.95 0.42 0.21 
Tottenham 1.78 1.00 0.57 0.28 
Watford 0.95 1.21 0.21 0.11 
WBA 1.21 1.40 0.34 0.15 
West Ham 1.39 1.33 0.42 0.21 
Wigan 1.08 1.31 0.32 0.23 
Wolves 1.09 1.67 0.28 0.16 
Average 1.52 1.08 0.48 0.26 
 
 
Only Chelsea had a stronger away win record (58 per cent of away matches won), but they 
won less home matches than Manchester United (72 per cent). During this time period, 
Derby conceded 2.26 goals per match and scored 0.63 goals, resulting in Derby winning just 
5 per cent of home matches and winning no away matches. They appeared in the Premier 
League for the 2007 – 2008 season, beating only Newcastle at home, the remaining 8 
points scored that season came from match draws. All teams during this data period won 
more home matches than away matches (expect Blackpool who won 26 per cent of both 
home and away matches). This shows an inherent advantage to playing matches at home. 
However, no team has a stronger home record (compared to away record) than Sheffield 
United. They won 58 per cent of home matches and just 16 per cent of away matches, 
showing that this team could perform far better at their home ground. 
 
During the data period there were a number of match results that precisely met the 
expectations set by bookmaker’s odds. These are matches where the average home win 
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per cent precisely matches the average probability of the home team winning (in 
parenthesis). This includes matches such as: Birmingham Arsenal (20 per cent); Reading 
Fulham (50 per cent); Liverpool Portsmouth (67 per cent); and Blackburn Reading (50 per 
cent). 
 
Table 6.2 The most unexpected results in the Premier League (2004 – 2012) 
Match pair Average Home wins 
Average prob of home 
win Difference 
Everton Fulham 1.00 0.54 0.46 
Man Utd Liverpool 0.88 0.49 0.38 
Man City Aston Villa 0.88 0.50 0.38 
Liverpool Bolton 1.00 0.62 0.38 
Bolton Tottenham 0.63 0.32 0.30 
      
Tottenham Man Utd 0.00 0.27 -0.27 
Bolton Aston Villa 0.13 0.40 -0.28 
Man City Fulham 0.25 0.55 -0.30 
Chelsea Everton 0.38 0.68 -0.30 
Everton Aston Villa 0.13 0.44 -0.31 
 
Table 6.2 shows the top and bottom five match pairs by the difference between result 
(home win =1, loss =0) and pre match probability of a home win (1 = 100 per cent 
certainty). These are the most unexpected results in the Premier League from 2004 to 
2012, where each match occurred in every season of the data period and, as such, shows 
matches that the bookmakers consistently predicted incorrectly. Everton won all home 
matches against Fulham, where Everton had only 54 per cent probability of winning. 
Similarly, Everton won only 13 per cent of matches against Aston Villa when they were 
tipped to win the matches with 44 per cent probability. The pre match fixed betting odds 
tend to favour team’s recent success and team quality. However, the discrepancies in pre 
match probability (or unexpected match results) show that bookmaker’s predictions are 
not always accurate, meaning there are other factors important to modelling match results 
than recent performance.  
 
6.2.1. Control of debt and spending on players  
 
Control of debt (or lack of)  
As discussed in chapter three, expenditure on wages is assumed to increase the team 
quality, and greater expenditure, than an opponent will increase a team’s chances of 
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winning a match. The analysis in that chapter also identified the relative performance 
nature of firm objectives, such that clubs are required to increase expenditure not 
absolutely, but relative to competing teams. This observation, combined with the argument 
that the firm objective function is a weighted linear function of profit and winning, suggests 
that clubs will seek to increase expenditure beyond their means.  
 
Table 6.3 Revenue, wage expenditure, profit and funds, Premier League (2010 - 2011) 
  Revenue Wage Expenditure Profit before tax Net Debt 
Arsenal 226,825,000  124,401,000  14,776,000  -97,827,000  
Aston Villa 92,028,000  94,795,000  -54,013,000  -153,169,000  
Chelsea 228,574,000  191,214,000  -78,262,000  -816,038,000  
Everton 82,021,000  58,026,000  -5,413,000  -44,914,000  
Fulham 77,109,000  57,672,000  4,792,000  -192,947,000  
Liverpool 183,690,000  134,768,000  -49,317,000  -61,274,000  
Man City 153,186,000  173,977,000  -197,491,000  -42,900,000  
Man Utd 331,441,000  152,915,000  12,004,000  -308,258,000  
Newcastle 88,464,000  53,585,000  32,619,000  -130,485,000  
Norwich 23,391,000  18,445,000  -7,065,000  -16,778,000  
QPR 16,229,000  29,739,000  -25,383,000  -53,963,000  
Reading 23,138,000  20,511,000  -5,371,000  -34,842,000  
Southampton 13,370,000  13,460,000  -11,740,000  -26,450,000  
Stoke 66,809,000  47,093,000  -5,558,000  -339,000  
Sunderland 79,447,000  60,882,000  -7,838,000  -76,841,000  
Swansea 11,669,000  17,392,000  -11,173,000  -754,000  
Tottenham 163,486,000  91,255,000  402,000  -56,080,000  
West Brom 65,086,000  43,903,000  18,934,000  -1,948,000  
West Ham 80,939,000  55,704,000  -18,565,000  -41,614,000  
Wigan 50,507,000  39,948,000  -7,155,000  -72,696,000  
Sum 2,057,409,000  1,479,685,000  -400,817,000  -2,230,117,000  
Average 102,870,450  73,984,250  -20,040,850  -111,505,850  
 
Table 6.3 shows club total revenue, the expenditure on wages, pre-tax profit, and net debt 
for Premier League teams during the 2010-2011 season. This season is chosen for analysis 
as UEFA announced plans to regulate expenditure during this time period.  Almost one and 
a half billion pounds was spent on paying staff of Premier League football clubs during this 
time period, an average of £73.9 million per club per year. League total revenue (£2 billion) 
outweighs the league total amount spent on wages. However, the league made a total loss 
of £400 million and accrued a total net debt of £2.2 billion. Net debt, although large, has 
fallen over the period 2008 to 2013 as shown in Figure 6.1. This chart shows changes in 
total finances by an index over this time period.  
 
The league total revenue grew from 2008 to 2013, mainly from growth in media rights 
revenue (discussed in chapter three). However, wage expenditure grew at a faster rate 
than revenues, and thus an increase in the total league pre-tax loss. Over this period, clubs 
have reduced net debt. This is most commonly seen in wealthier clubs (such as Arsenal) 
who return a profit in each season in this analysis.  
 
 154 
Figure 6.1 Index of total Premier League finances (2008 – 2013) 
 
 
 
As absolute expenditure has little bearing on league positions (relative expenditure is key) 
policies adopted to curb expenditure are seen frequently in other sports. These measures 
often take the form of a maximum wage expenditure permitted, seen in English Rugby and 
a number of North American sports. No such policy measures exist in the Premier League 
that aim to manage wage expenditure until the introduction of the UEFA Financial Fair Play 
regulations.  
 
In May 2010, UEFA approved a series of Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations with the 
objective of introducing more discipline within clubs’ finances and encouraging more 
responsible investment. Despite a backdrop of increasing public and commercial interest in 
European club football at this time, many clubs across Europe are in poor financial health. 
Similar to a number of Premier League clubs, others are seen to be struggling to meet 
financial obligations and have reported consistent financial losses (Hamill and Williams, 
2010).  
 
 
 
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Revenue
Pre tax loss
Net Debt
Wages
 155 
The FFP regulations look at five key indicators to analyse the financial health of a club. 
These indicators are: 
 
1. There is Negative Equity with Deterioration (NED) compared with previous year.  
2. The Cumulative Break Even (CBE) calculation taken for two most recent seasons is 
within the threshold of minus 5m Euros (approximately £5m/1.25 = £4m). 
3. The CBE calculation including lending from the club owner to be within the 
threshold of 45m Euros (approximately £45m/1.25 = £36m). 
4. Net debt does not exceed total revenue (Debt/rev). 
5. Employee benefits expenses do not exceed 70 per cent of total revenue 
(Wage/rev). 
 
Table 6.4 shows the key financial indicators for the Premier League clubs during the 2010-
2011 season. During this time period, eight clubs saw a decline in equity compared to the 
previous year. All but four clubs over spent based on the CBE (cumulative deficit) measure 
when including expenditure backed by club owners. This highlights the importance of 
wealthy club owners in Premier League finance. Eight clubs hold a debt that is greater than 
their annual revenue, and the lowest debt to revenue ratios belong to clubs that were 
recently promoted to the Premier League (Stoke, Swansea, West Bromwich). These clubs 
played recently in the Championship (one tier lower than the Premier League) where 
revenues, debt, and expenditure tend to be lower. This reiterates the heightened culture of 
over expenditure present in the Premier League. The majority of Premier League clubs 
spend more than 70 per cent of annual revenues on their wage bill (the league average is 
85 per cent). Aston Villa, Manchester City, QPR, Southampton, and Swansea all spend 
above 100 per cent of revenue on wages.  
 
The financial information shown here suggests that several Premier League teams face 
potential problems unless action is taken to reduce debt. Only Arsenal and Tottenham pass 
all of the five FFP measures and the majority of clubs are spending well beyond their 
means. However, the FFP regulations only impact those teams competing in European 
leagues (Champions League and Europa League).  
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Table 6.4 UEFA FFP indicators for Premier League clubs (2010 - 2011) 
 
 NED CBE <-£4m  CBE <-£36m  Debt/rev  Wage/rev  Red Flags 
Arsenal  70,744,000  70,744,000  -0.43  55%  0 
Aston Villa Yes -91,584,000 * -91,584,000 * -1.66 * 103% * 5 
Chelsea Yes -138,258,000 * -138,258,000 * -3.57 * 84% * 5 
Everton Yes -6,016,000 * -6,016,000  -0.55  71% * 3 
Fulham  -8,886,000 * -8,886,000  -2.50 * 75% * 3 
Liverpool  -13,477,000 * -13,477,000  -0.33  73% * 2 
Man City  -308,471,000 * -308,471,000 * -0.28  114% * 3 
Man Utd  -16,819,000 * -16,819,000  -0.93  46%  1 
Newcastle  102,828,000  102,828,000  -1.48 * 61%  2 
Norwich  -9,602,000 * -9,602,000  -0.72  79% * 2 
QPR Yes -37,671,000 * -37,671,000 * -3.33 * 183% * 5 
Reading  1,123,000  1,123,000  -1.51 * 89% * 2 
Southampton Yes -19,050,000 * -19,050,000  -1.98 * 101% * 4 
Stoke  -9,355,000 * -9,355,000  -0.01  70% * 2 
Sunderland  -33,407,000 * -33,407,000  -0.97  77% * 2 
Swansea Yes -9,835,000 * -9,835,000  -0.06  149% * 3 
Tottenham  1,913,000  1,913,000  -0.34  56%  0 
West 
Bromwich  13,674,000  13,674,000  -0.03  67%  1 
West Ham Yes -32,832,000 * -32,832,000  -0.51  69%  3 
Wigan Yes -10,810,000 * -10,810,000  -1.44 * 79% * 4 
Sum  -555,791,000  -555,791,000       
Average  -27,789,550  -27,789,550  -1.13  85%  3 
 
In light of the FFP regulations, the Premier League announced spending controls to take 
affect from the 2013 – 2014 season (club level financial information for this time period will 
be realised July 2015). The regulations state that each team, over the next three seasons, 
cannot make a total loss of more than £105 million. In the same period, clubs whose total 
wage bill is more than £52 million will only be allowed to increase their salaries by an 
accumulative £4 million per season. Furthermore, any club making a loss of more than £5 
million a year will have to guarantee those losses against the owner's assets. The severest 
punishment for breaking the regulations will be deduction of league points. The impact of 
these regulations will likely be seen beyond the 2015-2016 season28. 
 
Spending on players 
The quality of a team is influenced by the cost of individual players. Given a competitive 
market for players, the wage expenditure is likely  to be a strong predictor of team strength 
(Buraimo, 2008; Forrest et al., 2004). This study uses team wage bills, taken from various 
issues of the Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance as a measure of team quality. 
28 The estimation of match results could be further refined by the inclusion of data 
containing wage expenditure information when Premier League clubs have been made 
subject to binding expenditure regulation. The current policy should impact the member 
clubs from 2016 onwards. 
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Team home and away win percentages from Premier League matches from 2004 to 2012 
are shown ordered by the wage expenditure of each team in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 Wage expenditure and match wins (2004 – 2012) 
 Average wage bill Average Home wins Average Away wins Wage bill / PL average 
Chelsea 154,221,375.00 0.72 0.28 2.58 
Man Utd 118,255,500.00 0.80 0.44 1.95 
Arsenal 102,788,125.00 0.66 0.16 1.71 
Liverpool 97,968,500.00 0.63 0.22 1.61 
Man City 94,356,375.00 0.59 0.26 1.40 
QPR 64,346,000.00 0.37 0.19 0.78 
Newcastle 60,698,714.29 0.41 0.53 1.07 
Tottenham 60,206,250.00 0.57 0.05 0.97 
Aston Villa 60,102,250.00 0.38 0.13 0.97 
West Ham 51,797,833.33 0.42 0.14 0.85 
Sunderland 47,152,000.00 0.34 0.05 0.68 
Everton 46,957,500.00 0.53 0.18 0.78 
Fulham 44,211,375.00 0.49 0.05 0.73 
Stoke 43,823,750.00 0.45 0.00 0.58 
Blackburn 41,802,250.00 0.43 0.32 0.70 
Bolton 41,451,625.00 0.41 0.28 0.68 
Hull 35,925,000.00 0.24 0.21 0.52 
Swansea 35,621,000.00 0.42 0.13 0.43 
Wolves 35,471,000.00 0.28 0.28 0.46 
Portsmouth 35,354,250.00 0.39 0.22 0.73 
Wigan 35,228,714.29 0.32 0.16 0.55 
WBA 33,265,000.00 0.34 0.17 0.53 
Middlesbrough 33,095,600.00 0.41 0.17 0.66 
Charlton 32,469,000.00 0.42 0.39 0.75 
Reading 31,469,000.00 0.50 0.58 0.59 
Birmingham 28,901,600.00 0.36 0.16 0.53 
Southampton 27,805,000.00 0.26 0.11 0.71 
Norwich 27,282,000.00 0.37 0.16 0.44 
Derby 26,109,000.00 0.05 0.16 0.44 
Blackpool 24,624,000.00 0.26 0.15 0.31 
Sheff Utd 22,421,000.00 0.58 0.22 0.46 
Burnley 22,372,000.00 0.37 0.16 0.32 
Crystal Palace 18,081,000.00 0.32 0.21 0.46 
Watford 17,636,000.00 0.21 0.23 0.37 
Average 60,816,265.82 0.48 0.26 1.00 
 
 
On average over the data period, Chelsea spent the largest amount on wages (£154 million 
per year), although Manchester United have the best match win results with a wage bill of 
£118 million per year. There is a high correlation between spending on wages and the 
number of matches won (correlation index 0.77), showing that an increase in spending on 
wages increases the team quality. This high correlation is important evidence supporting 
the assertion that the labour market for football players is competitive (Szymanski and 
Smith, 1997). Figure 6.2 shows this correlation for the 2011 – 2012 season. Those teams sat 
north of the trend spend more on wages to gain the same points as those below the line. 
For example, Chelsea and Newcastle achieved 64 and 65 points respectively but the wage 
bill was 174 and 64 million, respectively.  
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Figure 6.2 Wage expenditure and points won during the 2011 – 2012 season 
 
 
Over the data period, there are also a hand full of teams which appear to under or over 
perform compared to their relative expenditure. QPR spent the sixth highest amount on 
wages (£64 million) yet won just 37 per cent of home matches and 19 per cent of away 
matches, well below the league average. Conversely, Reading spent £31 million on wages 
and won 50 (home) and 58 per cent (away) of matches. Similar to Reading, Sheffield United 
also over performed based on wage expenditure, winning 58 per cent of home matches by 
spending £22 million. Variations in performance not correlated with wage expenditure are 
greater for performance in away matches (correlation index 0.19). The smaller correlation 
arises from a greater number of these anomalies, for example, Arsenal spent £102 million 
per year and won just 16 per cent of away matches and Watford spent £17 million per year, 
winning 23 per cent of away matches. This shows that performance cannot be precisely 
predicted by the amount of expenditure on wages. This follows Szymanski and Smith (1997) 
who argued that the final league position would otherwise be decided before the start of 
playing any matches.  
 
 
6.2.2 FA Cup, Champions League and Europa League 
 
The FA Cup is a knockout competition open to all teams in the Premier League, the Football 
League, and National League System (736 teams participated during the 2014 – 2015 
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season). Of all Premier League matches in the data period, 72 per cent contain a team 
competing in the FA Cup alongside the Premier League match29. The FA Cup competition 
starts at the beginning of the Premier League season, however, Premier League teams do 
not participate until the third round taking place in January each year. Being eliminated 
from this additional competition could allow teams to focus resources on domestic 
performance, or it can have a negative impact on league performance due to a loss of team 
confidence (Goddard, 2005).  
 
Expanding this argument, participating in the Champions League and Europa League can 
also have positive (confidence) or negative (match fatigue) effects on domestic league 
performance. The Champions League is a European wide tournament only available to the 
top teams around Europe. The top four Premier League teams by final league position in 
the previous season qualify (Manchester City, Manchester United, Arsenal, and Chelsea 
from the 2011 - 2012 season). The defending champions of the Champions League are 
granted access to the following season’s tournament regardless of league placement (as 
granted to Chelsea at the end of the 2011 -2012 season). The Europa League is a secondary 
(and inferior) competition to the Champions League, based on similar principles that club 
teams across Europe compete. The two league positions below Champions League 
qualification spots are granted access, along with the winner of the Football League Cup 
(Tottenham, Newcastle, and Liverpool form the 2011 – 2012 season). Across the data 
period, 8 per cent and 7 per cent of matches involve at least one team that is also 
competing in the Champions League or Europa League (respectively).  
 
Taking Premier League payment information for the 2007-2008 season from Table 3.4, 
Table 6.6 adds the revenues earned from participation in UEFA competitions. The table 
shows that four clubs entered the Champions League (Manchester United, Chelsea, 
Arsenal, and Liverpool) and four teams entered the Europa League in 2006-2007 
(Tottenham, Everton, Bolton and Blackburn). The additional revenues earned by 
Champions League participants depend on the success in the competition as media rights 
for broadcast matches are shared amongst those clubs competing in subsequent rounds of 
the tournament. Teams staying in the tournament till the final match will earn the largest 
29 A dummy variable is used to identify participation, showing a value of 1 until a team has 
been knocked out of the FA Cup, 0 thereafter. The FA Cup participation dummy is 
calculated using the results published on the official website of the FA.  
 
 160 
                                                          
share of revenues.  Manchester United earned approximately £50 million from Premier 
League media rights sales and a further £34 million from Champions League media rights 
sales. Combined (£83.6 million), this is approximately 2.5 times larger than the monies 
presented to bottom club Wigan (£33.9 million) in the Premier League in the same season. 
The remaining Champions League participants earned between 9 and 13 per cent of their 
total revenue from the competition, although this is smaller than the monies earned from 
the Premier League (between 22 and 28 per cent of total revenue) the addition of these 
revenues without further redistribution alters the balance of spending power in the league.  
 
The Europa League competition attracts a smaller television audience and with it, smaller 
revenues are shared to participants. The four competing clubs earned up to 1 per cent of 
their total revenue in the Europa League. With additional matches to play that often 
require travelling long distances, there is a need to further investigate the cost of Europa 
League participation on domestic league performance. If playing matches in the Europa 
League has a significant impact on Premier League match results, then there may arise an 
opportunity for would-be participants to behave strategically in their choice to enter the 
competition. 
 
Table 6.6 Club revenues from the Premier League and UEFA competitions (2007-2008) 
 
  Club total revenue 
Total Payment from 
FAPL (as % of TR) 
Total Payment from UEFA 
(as % of TR) 
Media Payment (PL + 
EUFA)  (as % of TR) 
Manchester United 257,116,000 49,851,273 19% 33,788,652 13% 83,639,925 33% 
Chelsea 213,648,000 46,058,490 22% 28,663,500 13% 74,721,990 35% 
Arsenal 209,294,000 47,524,659 23% 18,285,540 9% 65,810,199 31% 
Liverpool 164,222,000 45,923,106 28% 21,130,220 13% 67,053,326 41% 
Tottenham 114,788,000 36,465,219 32% 365,494 0% 36,830,713 32% 
Newcastle 100,866,000 39,684,372 39%   39,684,372 39% 
Manchester City 82,295,000 40,106,571 49%   40,106,571 49% 
West Ham United 81,726,000 23,655,817 29%   23,655,817 29% 
Everton 75,650,000 42,568,569 56% 412,774 1% 42,981,343 57% 
Aston Villa 75,639,000 42,720,000 56%   42,720,000 56% 
Portsmouth 71,556,000 40,831,632 57%   40,831,632 57% 
Sunderland 63,597,000 34,003,221 53%   34,003,221 53% 
Bolton 59,072,000 32,401,668 55% 365,494 1% 32,767,162 55% 
Reading 58,023,000 30,951,546 53%   30,951,546 53% 
Blackburn 56,395,000 40,680,201 72% 78,800 0% 40,759,001 72% 
Fulham 53,670,000 31,676,607 59%   31,676,607 59% 
Birmingham 49,836,000 30,226,485 61%   30,226,485 61% 
Derby 48,558,000 29,501,424 61%   29,501,424 61% 
Middlesbrough 47,952,000 34,576,851 72%   34,576,851 72% 
Wigan 43,455,000 33,851,790 78%   33,851,790 78% 
Source: Deloitte, 2009; Premier League, 2009; UEFA Financial Report, 2009.    
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Table 6.7 shows the per cent of matches won, drawn and lost when the home and away 
teams participate in each of the FA Cup, Champions League30, and Europa League 
competitions. The home team won 48 per cent of matches regardless of participating in the 
FA Cup or not. However, there is evidence of the impact of FA Cup participation seen when 
the away team are still in the tournament. The home team won more matches (52 per 
cent) when the travelling team was no longer in the competition (46 per cent when they 
were). Furthermore, the away team won 28 per cent of matches compared to 23 per cent 
when they were still in the FA Cup competition, suggesting a positive impact of 
participation for the away team31.  
 
Table 6.7 Win per cent by participation in the FA Cup, CL, and EL 
 
 Home team participation Away team participation 
 Home wins Draws Away Wins Home wins Draws Away Wins 
FA Cup 48% 26% 27% 46% 27% 28% 
No FA Cup 48% 27% 25% 52% 25% 23% 
CL 69% 19% 12% 25% 26% 49% 
No CL 46% 27% 28% 48% 26% 26% 
EL 55% 17% 28% 50% 20% 30% 
No EL 47% 26% 27% 47% 26% 27% 
 
Competing in the Champions League corresponds to a higher per cent of home wins (69 per 
cent compared to 46 per cent) as does competing in the Europa League (55 per cent 
compared to 47 per cent). Both differences in win per cent are statistically significant by T-
test at a 95 per cent confidence interval. Europa League participation also shows more 
matches won for the away team (30 per cent compared to 27 per cent), and participation 
reduced the number of matches drawn (20 per cent compared to 26 per cent). As such, the 
home team won more matches when the away team participated in the Europa League (50 
per cent compared to 47 per cent). This shows that although a greater number of matches 
are won by Champions League participants, the Europa League has a positive impact on 
home matches and a negative impact on away matches. However, as the Champions 
30 As with the FA Cup, a dummy variable is used to identify participation at the time of the 
league match.  
31 A T-test shows no statistical significance between results when a team is participating 
and not participating (for each competition).  
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League and Europa League are available to those teams that are placed highest in the 
league the previous season, there are other factors that influence match performance32. 
 
6.2.3 Previous performance 
 
Dobson and Goddard (2007) and Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) used match results 
from previous home matches and away matches to capture current team performance. 
Here, a measure of current form is taken from a rolling window of the six previous matches 
(Forrest and Simmons, 2000). This takes a value between 0 and 6, where 1 point is awarded 
for a win and 0.5 for a draw in recent results. Figure 6.3 shows the average home team win 
per cent against recent form for match pairs from 2004 to 2012. Over the data period, 
there are a number of matches that the away team always won (Aston Villa Arsenal; Aston 
Villa Man Utd; Bolton Chelsea; Tottenham Man Utd) or the home team always won 
(Everton Fulham; Liverpool Bolton; Man Utd Bolton; Man Utd Fulham).  
 
Figure 6.3 Average home team win per cent and recent form (2004 – 2012) 
 
 
32 The observed relationship here is a correlation in the data. However, it is possible that 
poorly performing teams are more likely to be knocked out of secondary competitions. In 
this case, it could be considered that poor performance causes exit from the competition. 
Although this appears a reasonable argument, the range of data does not allow for 
causality to be formally tested. 
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Between these extremes, the home team wins between 12 and 87per cent of the match 
pairs. The home win per cent appears to be weakly positively correlated with the recent 
run of form, showing some momentum of success: more matches are won by teams that 
have a greater recent run of successful results. 
 
The advantage to the home team may be greater when there are larger numbers of home 
fans in attendance (Nevill, Balmer, and Williams, 2002). Forrest and Simmons (2008), 
Dawson et al. (2007), Forrest, Goddard, et al. (2005), and Goddard (2005) include a 
measure of match day attendance in modelling match outcome, as greater attendance is 
expected to have a positive effect on home results. There is a 24 per cent positive 
correlation between the match day attendance and Premier League match results between 
2004 and 2012. The match result is recorded by the difference in goals scored and 
conceded such that, a positive number is a home team win, and zero is a draw, this 
relationship is shown in Figure 6.4. However, as discussed earlier in this thesis, the reverse 
causality may also be true, fans are more likely to attend matches involving better teams 
based on previous  performance (Borland and MacDonald, 2003). 
 
Figure 6.4 Goal difference and match day attendance (2004 – 2012) 
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Matches between rivals are expected to reduce home advantage (Nevill et al., 2002) by 
increasing the intensity of competition, but also an increased distance between teams will 
increase the difficulty of travel for the away team, thus increasing the home advantage 
(Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004).  A number of previous studies have incorporated the 
distance travelled by the away team as an explanatory variable, with an expected positive 
relationship to the likelihood of a home win (Forrest, Goddard, et al., 2005).  A coefficient 
of a 5 per cent positive correlation is shown between the distance between stadia and the 
home team matches won. However, a positive relationship is not immediately evident in 
the data. To show this in more detail, by example, data from Arsenal’s performance are 
analysed. Arsenal’s home match win per cent for all match pairs from 2004 to 2012 by 
distance between stadia is shown in Table 6.8. The match pairs that took place only once 
have been removed.  
 
Table 6.8 Arsenal’s win per cent by distance between stadia (2004 – 2012) 
 
Match pair Distance Home win per cent Times played 
Arsenal Newcastle 280 0.71 8 
Arsenal Sunderland 277 0.67 5 
Arsenal Middlesbrough 249 0.60 8 
Arsenal Burnley 235 1.00 8 
Arsenal Hull 212 0.50 3 
Arsenal Bolton 211 0.75 8 
Arsenal Man City 207 0.63 8 
Arsenal Man Utd 204 0.38 8 
Arsenal Wigan 201 0.86 2 
Arsenal Swansea 193 1.00 8 
Arsenal Sheff Utd 158 1.00 8 
Arsenal Stoke 155 1.00 8 
Arsenal Wolves 128 0.67 5 
Arsenal Derby 126 1.00 7 
Arsenal WBA 122 0.60 2 
Arsenal Birmingham 116 0.80 6 
Arsenal Norwich 112 0.50 2 
Arsenal Reading 46.4 1.00 4 
Arsenal Watford 19 1.00 6 
Arsenal Fulham 11.6 0.75 8 
Arsenal West Ham 10 0.50 5 
Arsenal QPR 8.5 1.00 6 
Arsenal Chelsea 7.7 0.25 7 
Arsenal Tottenham 4.5 0.63 3 
 
When the distance between stadia is greater than 200 miles Arsenal won 68 per cent of 
matches. This is a smaller win per cent compared to matches when the distance was 
between 100 and 200 miles (82 per cent of matches won), and less than 100 miles (73 per 
cent). This shows that Arsenal did not win more matches when the distance travelled by 
the away team was larger, showing a nonlinear relationship. This is representative of 
geographical clusters of footballing strength: teams in Merseyside (> 200 miles) and in 
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London (<100 miles) are stronger than teams situated in the Midlands or surrounding areas 
(>100 and <200 miles). 
 
6.3 Methodology  
 
Section 6.2 analysed the factors that influence Premier League match results, this section 
discusses the empirical method used to test the following hypotheses: 
1) Spending on wages is the largest influence on the match outcome33. 
2) The magnitude of the influence of wages is heterogeneous across teams in the 
league. 
3) Participation in additional competitions has a negative impact on league 
performance.  
 
To test these hypotheses an econometric model is formulated based on the discussion of 
the existing literature in chapter two. The technique used to forecast the probability of 
winning, drawing or losing a football match is an ordered Probit regression model (Forrest, 
Goddard, et al., 2005; Goddard, 2005; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004). There are three 
empirical techniques commonly used in the existing literature for modelling match 
outcomes, a Poisson for estimation of goals scored, or an ordered Logit or ordered Probit 
for estimation of match win – lose – draw. The Logit and Probit models differ by assumed 
distribution. The Probit model follows a standard normal cumulative distribution, whilst a 
cumulative Logistic distribution is followed in the Logit model. However, the two models 
are considered to produce similar results (Stock and Watson, 2012). 
 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑦 will give a value of 0 for an away team win, a value of 0.5 for a 
draw, and a value of 1 for a home win in the ordered Probit model (Wooldridge, 2010): 
 y∗  =  β1x1  + ⋯  +  β𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  e 
 
where e is a normally distributed error term. y takes the three values as discussed: 
 
 
33 It can be argued that a non-linear relationship may exist such that the marginal impact of 
expenditure diminishes at a higher rate of expenditure. However, estimates of a non-linear 
relationship are not statistically significant. 
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y =  0 if y∗ ≤ 𝛼𝛼1  (Away win) y =  0.5 if 𝛼𝛼1 < y∗ ≤ 𝛼𝛼2 (Draw) y =  1 if 𝛼𝛼2 < y∗ (Home win) 
 
where 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2 are …. The probability of observing y = 0, 0.5, 1 is defined as: 
 Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 0|𝑚𝑚) = Pr(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 + 𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝛼𝛼1)  = Pr(𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝛼𝛼1 −  𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙) = 1 −Φ(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝛼𝛼1) 
 Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 0.5|𝑚𝑚) = Pr(𝛼𝛼1 < 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 + 𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝛼𝛼2) = Pr(𝑒𝑒 > 𝛼𝛼1 −  𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙, 𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝛼𝛼2 −  𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙) = [1 −Φ(𝛼𝛼1 − 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙)] −Φ(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝛼𝛼𝟐𝟐) = 1 − (1 −Φ(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝛼𝛼1)) −Φ(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝛼𝛼𝟐𝟐) = Φ(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝛼𝛼𝟏𝟏) −Φ(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝛼𝛼𝟐𝟐) 
 Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑚𝑚) = Pr(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 + 𝑒𝑒 > 𝛼𝛼2) = Pr(𝑒𝑒 > 𝛼𝛼2 −  𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙) = 1 −Φ(𝛼𝛼2 − 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙) = Φ(𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝛼𝛼2) 
 
where the probabilities sum to one. The model is estimated using Maximum Liklihood 
Estimation, so a log-likelihood function is defined an indicator variable 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, equal to1 if y = j 
and 0 otherwise. The log-likelihood is  
 
ln ℒ = ��𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗ln [Φ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − Φ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−1]𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗=0
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
were 
Φ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = Φ[α𝑗𝑗 −  𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙] 
and  
Φ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−1 = Φ[α𝑗𝑗 − 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙] 
 
 
In light of the existing studies, this analysis uses the ordered Probit model for estimating 
match results. Estimation is based on the variables used in the existing literature (as 
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discussed in chapter two). To measure the impact of wages and additional competitions on 
match results, additional variables are included. In this case, the ordered dependent 
variable (0, 0.5, 1) is estimated by an x vector of explanatory variables such that: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑤𝑤 =  𝑓𝑓(𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 + 𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒) 
 
This is a panel estimation of match results for all matches between 2007 and 2012, where 
each variable is included separately for the home and away teams in each match. Fixed 
effects are included for season. An additional model is estimated for robustness that 
includes fixed effects for day of the week, the month, season, and home team. 
 
Data are collected for each of the 20 teams in the Premier League across the 2007 - 2008 to 
2011 - 2012 seasons, descriptive statistics are shown in Table 6.9. Financial information was 
not available for Portsmouth FC during the 2008 – 2009 season due to administration 
proceedings, this reduces the data set used from 1,900 to 1,824 observations.  
 
Table 6.9 Descriptive statistics for modelling match results (2007 -2012) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Match result 1900 0.60 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Spending on wages       
H Wages 1824 1.00 0.59 0.31 2.90 
A Wages 1824 1.00 0.59 0.31 2.90 
Additional Competitions       
H FA Cup 1900 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
A FA Cup 1900 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
HCL 1900 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
ACL 1900 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
HEL 1900 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
AEL 1900 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Legacy performance       
HForm 1900 3.56 1.29 0.00 6.00 
AForm 1900 2.38 1.27 0.00 6.00 
Attendance 1900 34998.19 14342.52 14007.00 76013.00 
Distance 1900 139.10 84.53 0.90 361.00 
 
 
A further two models are estimated using the top five and bottom five clubs. These are 
estimated to show differences between top and bottom clubs for the impact of wage 
expenditure and additional competitions on match results. The top 5 clubs is a sub set of 
434 matches where the home team is in one of the top four league positions at the time of 
the match. The bottom 5 clubs are data constrained to matches played at the stadia of 
bottom five clubs. The data set consists of 598 observations across the teams. These teams 
and the corresponding number of matches in the data period are shown in Table 6.10. 
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Table 6.10 Top four and bottom five teams (2007 -2012) 
Top 5 teams Number of matches Bottom 5 teams Number of matches 
Man Utd 88  Wigan 67 
Chelsea 85  Wolves 50 
Arsenal 79  Bolton 49 
Man City 55  Blackburn 46 
Tottenham 44  West Ham 41 
Liverpool 41  Fulham 37 
Aston Villa 21  Sunderland 36 
Newcastle 11  WBA 32 
Everton 10  Birmingham 30 
 434  Hull 22 
   Tottenham 22 
   Stoke 20 
   Derby 19 
   Middlesbrough 18 
   Newcastle 17 
   Everton 16 
   Aston Villa 15 
   QPR 14 
   Reading 11 
   Burnley 10 
   Blackpool 10 
   Portsmouth 8 
   Swansea 8 
    598 
 
6.4 Results from modelling match results 
 
Coefficients for estimations of modelling match results by ordered Probit are shown in 
Table 6.11. Usually, the coefficient estimates are the Probit index coefficients and do not 
correspond to the average partial effects. However, the coefficients shown are the 
marginal effects after MEGLM34. The estimation for all clubs shows that jointly the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero (by Chi squared test probability <0.01).  Full 
regression output including all fixed effects and diagnostic tests are reported in Appendix 
D.  
 
Given the estimation type, ordered Probit, a number of diagnostic tests usually performed 
for a linear regression are not available. The Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality returns a p-
value that rejects the assumption that the distribution is normal. This non-normality is 
likely a feature of including fixed effects in a random effects estimation, however, fixed 
effects are important to include in estimation from an economic standpoint. Furthermore, 
although normality of residuals is required for valid hypothesis testing, assuring validity of 
the p-values, it is not essential for unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. 
 
34 MEGLM fits multilevel mixed-effects generalised linear model, allowing a variety of 
distributions for the response conditional on normally distributed random effects. 
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Individually, 6 of the 12 variables (not including the referee dummies) are significant at the 
10% or 5% level, indicated in the table by * and ** respectively. In its equation form, results 
are as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑌∗ =  0.47(𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) − 0.48(𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 0.01(𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶) − 0.09(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶)+ 0.12(𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) − 0.26(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) +  0.02(𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶) − 0.02(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶) + 0.03(𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚)
− 0.05(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚) + 0.00007(𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛) + 0.0003(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒) + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 
 
Predicted probabilities are estimated as: Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛|𝑚𝑚) Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 0|𝑚𝑚) = Pr(𝑌𝑌∗ + 𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝛼𝛼1) =Pr (𝑌𝑌∗ + 𝑒𝑒 ≤ −0.43498) 
 Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤|𝑚𝑚) Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 0.5|𝑚𝑚) = Pr(−0.43498 < 𝑌𝑌∗ + 𝑒𝑒 ≤ 0.35678) 
 Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛|𝑚𝑚) Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑚𝑚) = Pr(𝑌𝑌∗ + 𝑒𝑒 > 0.35678) 
 
where 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2 are Cut 1 and Cut2 estimates, shown in Table 6.11. 
 
 
Spending on players  
Spending on wages is the most important club level influence on winning a Premier League 
football match.  An increase in the club wage bill relative to the Premier League average 
increases the likelihood of winning a match by 47 per cent. A one unit increase in wage 
expenditure relative to the league average is equivalent to a spending increase of 100 per 
cent. For example, if Team A spends £100 million a year and this is also the league average, 
then the relative measure is equal to 1 (£100 / £100). A one unit increase in the relative 
measure (a value of 2) is seen when Team A spends £200 million (£200 / £100). The impact 
is less important for matches hosted by teams in the top five league positions (0.43). The 
average wage bill for clubs in the top five positions (£88,394,954) is larger than the league 
average (£60,816,265), shown by the (wage bill / League average) measure of 1.45. This 
shows that once wage expenditure is above the league average, additional expenditure has 
less of an impact on winning matches (akin to a diminishing marginal returns argument)35. 
35 This is not a formal test of diminishing marginal returns. In this setting a non-linear 
relationship of wage expenditure was tested but shown to not be statistically significant.  
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For comparison, the model is estimated with fixed effects36, showing that home team wage 
expenditure is significantly important to winning a match when variations between home 
teams are accounted for, confirming the result from the ordered Probit model. 
 
Conversely, the impact of wage expenditure on winning is far greater for teams in the last 
five positions of the league (0.70). For these matches, the impact of wage expenditure by 
the away team (-0.46) is outweighed by the impact of home team expenditure. This shows 
that wage expenditure is less important to the match result when visiting a bottom five 
team. Whereas, increasing wage expenditure is more important when visiting the top four 
clubs (estimated impact of -0.64).  
 
Table 6.11 Results from modelling match results by ordered Probit 
  All Clubs Top 5 Bottom 5  All Clubs with fixed effects 
 Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE   
Spending on wages                         
Home Wages 0.47 0.08 ** 0.43 0.12 ** 0.70 0.26 ** 0.58 0.18 ** 
Away Wages -0.48 0.06 ** -0.64 0.14 ** -0.46 0.11 ** -0.45 0.06 ** 
Additional Competitions             
Home FA Cup 0.01 0.08  -0.24 0.18  0.29 0.16 * -0.03 0.11  
Away FA Cup -0.09 0.08  0.06 0.17  -0.28 0.16 * -0.08 0.10  
Home Champions League 0.12 0.15  -0.02 0.19  6.39 6.22  0.10 0.15  
Away Champions League -0.26 0.15 * -0.14 0.31  -0.25 0.26  -0.25 0.15 * 
Home Europa League 0.02 0.15  -0.51 0.36  0.03 0.24  -0.18 0.16  
Away Europa League -0.02 0.14  0.14 0.35  0.01 0.23  -0.06 0.15  
Legacy performance             
Home Form 0.03 0.03  0.05 0.08  -0.01 0.05  -0.06 0.03 * 
Away Form -0.05 0.03 * 0.04 0.06  -0.05 0.05  -0.07 0.03 ** 
Attendance 6.7E-06 3.1E-06 ** 1.5E-05 4.8E-06 ** -8.8E-06 7.3E-06  -1.6E-05 1.3E-05  
Distance 3.1E-04 3.4E-04  -1.8E-04 7.1E-04  1.2E-03 6.1E-04 * 4.3E-04 3.7E-04  
Fixed effects significance:                   
Team -    -   -    Yes    
Day -    -   -    No    
Month -    -   -    No    
Season Yes    No   Yes     Yes     
Cut 1 -0.43   ** -0.26     -0.41     -1.87     
Cut 2 0.36  ** 0.62    0.33    -1.06    
Log likelihood -1766    -344    -612    -1726    
Observations 1824     434     598     1824     
** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
36 The estimated coefficients for home team fixed effects are not reported in this table. 
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FA Cup, Champions League and Europa League 
Participation in the FA Cup has a positive impact (0.29) for the home team of a match 
hosted by a team in the bottom five league positions. Similarly, results for these matches 
are influenced by the away team’s participation in the FA Cup (-0.28). This result concurs 
with other studies to the extent that participation has a positive impact on winning a 
league match (Forrest, Goddard, et al., 2005; Goddard, 2005; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 
2004). This is a result that appears to go against football folklore that argues participation 
would detract from league performance (Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004).  
 
However, FA Cup participation has no impact for the home team in matches hosted teams 
occupying the top four league positions. This result shows that FA Cup participation has no 
detrimental impact on league performance, although these teams often field squads that 
do not usually participate in the domestic league. In essence, the evidence here shows that 
behaviour of top and bottom teams differ. Although it is expected that top teams are more 
capable of participating in a larger number of matches and competitions, wage expenditure 
held constant, teams are plausibly using their players in a different manner.  
 
Participation by the home team in the Champions League has no statistically significant 
impact on match results for all models. Although, if the away team participates in the 
Champions League then this has a significant negative impact (-0.26) on the home team 
winning a match, using data for all matches. This shows that (controlling for wage 
expenditure, domestic league form, distance etc.) teams participating in the Champions 
League performed significantly better than other teams whilst travelling away for Premier 
League matches. Given that team quality and performance measures are held constant, 
this result indicates that experience of Champions League matches (which involve travelling 
to play teams in across Europe) aids the performance of teams travelling to play domestic 
matches.  
 
This cannot be said for participation in the Europa League competition, however. All 
models return estimates showing no statistically significant impact of Europa League 
participation on league match results. The result shows that the tensions surrounding 
Europa League participation, as discussed by (Cox et al., 2015), have a mitigating influence 
on one another in this data period. That is to say, following the FA Cup participation 
argument from (Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004), the cost (fatigue) and benefit 
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(motivation) of participation appear equal enough to show no significant impact on match 
results.  
 
Legacy Performance 
An increase in the recent league form of the home (measured by performance over the 
previous six matches) has a no significant impact on the winning a match. However, the 
form of the away team is significant and will reduce the chances of the home team winning 
when the away team is performing well over the previous six matches. 
 
Match day attendance has a positive impact on the home team winning a match. For every 
additional 10,000 fans in attendance, the estimated marginal impact is 0.067. Although a 
small impact, this result is in line with existing evidence surrounding home field advantage 
(Carmichael and Thomas, 2005).  
 
The distance between stadia is only influential for matches hosted by clubs occupying the 
bottom five league positions (estimate of 0.31 for every 1,000 miles). This is a positive 
impact on the home team winning, showing that a larger distance travelled by visiting 
teams to the bottom five clubs increases the home team advantage. The result provides 
some support of the evidence shown by Goddard (2005), however, the impact is not 
significant for matches hosted by teams in the top four league positions.  
 
6.5 Discussion 
 
Estimation of match results for all Premier League matches between 2007 and 2012 shows 
that the likelihood of the home team winning is increased by the home team increasing 
expenditure on wages. Estimation of the impact on league match results from the 
participation in additional competitions shows an opposing impact on the top and the 
bottom teams in the Premier League. For matches hosted by teams in the bottom five 
league positions there is an increase in the likelihood of the home team winning when that 
team participates in the FA Cup (0.29 for the home team participation, -0.28 for away team 
participation). Table 6.12 shows the magnitude of the impact of participation in additional 
competitions found by existing studies. The effect of FA Cup participation is found to be 
similar to (but larger than) the existing studies reviewed in Table 6.12. These existing 
studies all use a similar ordered Probit method (as estimated in this study) however, the 
estimations in the existing studies are based on elimination from the FA Cup, such that, the 
 173 
home team sees a negative impact on the likelihood of wining from elimination. 
 
Table 6.12 Existing evidence on competing in additional competitions 
Author(s) Data 
Impact of additional 
competition 
Forrest,  et al. (2005) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1983 - 2000  -0.103 , 0.062 (FA Cup) 
Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1989 - 1999  -0.094 , 0.086 (FA Cup) 
Goddard (2005) English  League Football (1 - 4) 1977 - 2002  -0.112 , 0.064 (FA Cup) 
Dupont et al. (2010) Scottish Premier League 2007 - 2009 
No impact (Champions 
League) 
Cox, Gilmore and Graham (2015) English Premier League 2006 - 2013 
0.41 league points lost per 
game 
 
For matches hosted by teams in the top five league positions, the estimated impact refutes 
the findings from the literature in Table 6.12: participation in the FA Cup has no significant 
impact on the likelihood of winning the match. Manchester City were winners of the 2011 – 
2012 Premier League season, during that season the team played 55 competitive matches 
(38 Premier League, 1 FA community shield, 1 FA Cup, 5 Football League Cup, 6 Champions 
League, and 4 Europa League matches). Last placed in the Premier League the same season 
was Wolverhampton Wanderers, who played in 43 matches (38 Premier League, 2 FA Cup, 
and 3 Football League Cup matches). As such, Manchester City played in 28 per cent more 
matches than Wolverhampton Wanderers, suggesting that for higher placed teams such as 
Manchester City the impact of FA Cup participation could did not occur player fatigue from 
number of fixtures.  
 
Refuting the findings from Dupont et al. (2010) showing no significant impact on 
performance, results from this chapter find evidence to suggest that participation in the 
Champions League has an impact on domestic league match results. Albeit, the impact is 
significant for a travelling team only. However, results show that participation in the 
Europa League is not important to Premier League match results. The lack of significant 
impact of Europa League participation refutes the argument put forward by Cox et al. 
(2015) that participation in this competition reduces the number of points won in the 
Premier League for every match played in the Europa League.  Following the argument 
from Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004), the cost of Europa League participation (player 
fatigue) approximately matches the benefit (player motivation), resulting in no significant 
effect on Premier League performance. Thus, these findings suggest that participation in 
the Europa League could be a useful way to increase revenues without detrimental impact 
on league performance.  
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Champions League participants are subject to UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations, aimed at 
creating equality of team quality across the participants. This policy does not apply to the 
other teams in the Premier League, as such it is a policy that is binding only for those at the 
top of the league table. Further research into the impact on Premier League competitive 
balance of this regulation is of interest to the discussion surrounding league revenue 
distribution.  
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The Premier League redistributes revenues between the member teams in order to 
promote competitive balance, however, a handful of elite teams have access to secondary 
competitions that attracted lucrative media rights payments. The participants in the 
European competitions (UEFA Champions League and Europa League) gain access to 
revenues that are not shared between the remaining (weaker) teams in the Premier 
League. However, additional competitions mean a greater strain on the player squad and 
financial resources and so additional revenues should compensate for requirements of 
meeting extra match fixtures. If the cost requirements of competing in more matches are 
easily met, then additional competitions dampen the Premier League policies put in place 
to promote competitive balance.  
 
This chapter tested two hypotheses: Firstly, that increasing wage expenditure has an equal 
impact on winning a match for all teams in the league. Secondly, participating in European 
competitions has a negative impact on winning a Premier League match. The hypotheses 
were tested using an ordered Probit model, popular in the match forecasting literature. 
Results from data of Premier League matches between 2007 and 2012 show that weaker 
teams gain a greater impact on match results from increasing wage expenditure, compared 
to teams at the top of the league. The results go some way to suggest lower teams (by 
league position) are able to better enhance playing strength and increase the disparity of 
quality between top and bottom teams (given equal funding to do so). Combined with 
results from chapter three (suggesting that competitive balance is only enhanced with 
larger amounts revenue sharing), this shows that competitive balance may be enhanced 
effectively with a greater amount of revenue sharing.  
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Results also show that participation in the FA Cup strengthens the likelihood of winning 
matches for weaker teams. Suggesting that top four teams are unaffected by the FA Cup 
and the bottom five teams are best to compete in the FA Cup. Participation in the 
Champions League positively impacts the participant’s chances of winning a match. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Europa League participation is 
detrimental to league performance. As such, participants gain lucrative revenue streams 
without significant cost to domestic league performance. The evidence here suggests that 
policies aimed at redistributing revenues in order to affect league competitive balance, 
which do not consider revenue streams from addition competitions, may well be futile.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
Rottenberg (1956), Neale (1964) and Sloane (1971) addressed the economic implications of 
the structural features of professional sports markets. Neale (1964) argued that the firm is 
the league not the individual clubs. A sports league, as a firm, then competes against other 
types of sports for fans. This lead to the idea that clubs must cooperate with each other in 
joint production of matches in a league competition. The league itself is therefore a natural 
monopoly provider so will be the only supplier in the market. The idea allowed legislators 
to accept that sports leagues should have the power to practice collective decision making 
behaviour. Sloane (1971) disputed these conclusions, arguing that the joint decision of 
production and price are not enough to show that the league is not a collection of clubs 
organised in such a way as to sell their product via a single outlet (a cartel).  
 
Collective selling of broadcast rights for live sporting events has two main benefits: The 
league’s governing body has overall control of price or quantity of matches to be broadcast; 
and also has the ability to distribute this revenue how it sees fit. Sharing revenue amongst 
teams in a professional league is a policy that aims to create a more interesting spectacle 
and thus increase the desire to watch. The idea is that sports clubs must cooperate with 
each other in joint production of matches (Neale, 1964). Controlling the number of live 
matches broadcast is a policy that can control a direct substitute to watching a match live 
at a stadium.  
 
This thesis tested each hypothesis that contributes to the argument for the use of a 
collective selling method to market broadcast rights for live matches in the Premier League. 
These hypotheses were as follows: 
 
• Revenue sharing and balance: Revenue sharing has a positive impact on 
competitive balance when the weighting between profit and winning is brought in 
to the firm objective function. 
 
• Competitive balance and demand: Stadium and television demand for Premier 
League matches is greater when the outcome is more uncertain. 
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• Broadcasting and demand: Live broadcasting of Premier League matches has no 
impact on match day revenue when mitigating the problem that broadcast 
matches are already likely the most popular matches. 
 
• Investment and performance: The magnitude of the impact of wage expenditure 
on Premier League match performance is heterogeneous across teams. 
Participation in European League competitions has a positive impact on Premier 
League match performance. 
 
These hypotheses have a unique contribution to the literature, chapter two showed 
sufficient gap in the existing evidence that further study contributed towards building a 
clear consensus view of these issues in Premier League football. The empirical literature 
has developed to overcome some of the difficulties surrounding the nature of professional 
sport events. In particular, the analysis in this research acknowledges the complications 
with estimating demand with a binding supply constraint. Less considered in the 
surrounding literature, is the issue of endogeneity. This provided an opportunity to adapt 
existing methods and apply these to the case study of the Premier League for the first time. 
In the case of estimating the impact of outcome uncertainty on demand, the method had 
not been applied to both stadium and television demand for the Premier League before (to 
the author’s knowledge). 
 
The findings draw parallels to related studies but provide new insight in this area. Results 
from chapter three show that a low level of revenue sharing reduces the league 
competitive balance, this differs from existing evidence that find a dulling effect of revenue 
sharing (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004). The result also differs from the sharpening 
proposition indicated in Dietl et al. (2011). Although the dulling and sharpening affect can 
be replicated by the model, the impact on competitive balance depends on the size of 
revenue that is shared.  
 
Results from chapter four indicate a negative relationship between outcome uncertainty 
and stadium attendance and evidence of a positive relationship for television audiences. 
The results are in line with evidence from Forrest, Beaumont, et al. (2005) but differ to 
those of Buraimo (2008) who found no significant relationship when using points difference 
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between teams as the measure of uncertainty. The change in results between studies can 
be reconciled by the different measure of uncertainty used.  
 
The effect of live broadcasting on match day revenue is found to be not significant, similar 
to the existing studies reviewed. However, this estimate is found to be more significant for 
matches attracting less revenue than the median, and as such identifies heterogeneity in 
the impact of live broadcasts across the match popularity.  
 
The impact of wage expenditure is the largest significant factor influencing the match 
outcome but is far less important to teams positioned high in the league table compared to 
those at the bottom. The effect of participation in the FA Cup is found to be similar to the 
existing studies reviewed, albeit larger than the range of other studies. However, for 
matches hosted by teams in the top five league positions, the estimated impact refutes the 
findings from the literature.  Results also show evidence that participation in the 
Champions League has a positive impact on domestic league match results for travelling 
teams. Furthermore, no significant impact of Europa League participation is found, refuting 
the suggestion put forward by Cox et al. (2015) that participation in this competition 
reduces the number of points won in the Premier League for every match played in the 
Europa League. 
 
Stemming from these results, policy recommendations are made such that the Premier 
League, the member clubs and supporting fans may benefit. Enhancing the competitive 
balance of the Premier League requires a greater amount of revenue sharing (above 43.5 
per cent of total league revenue). Currently, no European football league offers this degree 
of revenue sharing, suggesting that the monies spent to enhance equality of teams in the 
Premier League are not just a futile gesture but detrimental to the cause.  
 
Increasing the competitive balance (increasing the match uncertainty) will reduce stadium 
demand but increase television audiences. An increase in stadium demand would require 
an increase in stadia capacity at over half the football matches in the data period reviewed. 
Policies to increase the team quality of clubs and capacity of stadia are better placed to 
promote demand, for example, attracting star playing talent or encouraging investment in 
stadia. Combining this conclusion with the conclusion that the current amount of revenue 
sharing will reduce competitive balance, indicates that the Premier League is currently 
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providing a policy that would help promote stadium demand (by reduction of outcome 
uncertainty).  
 
Results also show that teams lower in the league table are best to compete in the FA Cup 
to aid their chances of winning a Premier League match. Top teams are best focussing on 
participation in the Champions League, which positively impacts the participant’s chances 
of winning an away match, or participate in the Europa League which has no detrimental 
effect on league performance. This would provide an opportunity for participants to gain 
lucrative revenue streams without significant costs of doing so. As such, the conclusions 
highlight policies aimed at redistributing revenues in order to affect league competitive 
balance that do not consider revenues obtained by additional competitions are likely to 
never lead to a perfectly balanced competition.  
 
Since publication in the International Journal of the Economics of Business (3* on the ABS 
list), findings from chapter five received attention in popular media (Daily Mail, USA Today, 
Fox Sports, Four Four Two, World Football, and a variety of other sports websites (and 
translated into a number of languages). The paper won the Neil Rackham prize for research 
dissemination in 2012 and remains the International Journal of the Economics of Business’ 
third most read article with 1,127 views (July 2015). The Premier League later increased the 
number of matches available at broadcast rights auctions. The findings from chapter five 
indicate that the broadcast facility fee for selling broadcast rights to live matches outweighs 
the loss of gate revenue when the match is available on television. In other words, the 
benefit is greater than the cost and, as such, the market may well be made better off by an 
increase in Premier League matches shown live on TV. The increase was from 138 to 154 
matches for broadcast during the 2013-2016 and a resulting increase in revenue from 
£1.773 billion to £3.018 billion. In 2015, the corresponding auction for 2016-2019 seasons 
saw a further increase in available rights. An increase from 154 to 168 matches received 
£5.136 billion in revenue for the collective sale. This increase in revenues seen from the 
suggested policy change ratifies the conclusions drawn from this research and also provides 
an opportunity to further consider the monopoly power the Premier League holds whilst 
broadcasters compete with each other to purchase rights downstream. Furthermore, it is 
now evident that although consumers now have access to a greater number of matches to 
spectate on television, the cost of doing so involves subscription to two competing 
broadcasting channels.   
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 When considering these findings collectively, the results show three distinct themes that 
appear important to sports economics: Heterogeneity; endogeneity and balance. This 
thesis has shown that teams are found to behave differently depending on their placement 
in the league table. This suggests that there are a number of self-contained competitions 
within a professional sports league table. Stemming from this heterogeneity amongst clubs 
in the league, results have shown that variations in factors that are often beyond a club’s 
control are influenced by these behavioural differences between teams. The overarching 
issue that rises from the results in this thesis is the need for balancing finances and sport 
activities. The results have shown that there is a trade-off between the amount of money 
earned (and the way it is redistributed) and the quality of sporting activities in a 
professional club. This trade-off is discussed in part in more recent literature, such as the 
trade-off in investment decisions in Dietl et al. (2011), but other considerations such as the 
trade-off between TV and stadium audiences are novel. Thus, theories that aim to further 
understanding of the effects of policies without acknowledging these complications are 
likely to infer inaccurate recommendations. 
 
The conclusions from this research lead to more detailed hypotheses that can be tested by 
specific further work. This thesis tested the hypothesis that revenue sharing has a positive 
impact on competitive balance when the choice between profit and match wins is 
endogenised. In the modelling process, there are a number of other factors held 
exogenous, the most important factor is the cost of playing talent. Refining the hypothesis 
to consider the case when adding a supply side (of playing talent) to match the demand 
(investment in playing talent) in the market (a general equilibrium model) should provide 
further clarity to the debate. There are a number of market problems that are considered 
in terms of general equilibrium, matching demand with supply, when there is an influence 
of a governing body redistributing wealth. The sports market provides an ideal ground to 
use a model of a general equilibrium, in a similar way to any market with a government 
that redistributes wealth.  
 
To further understand the impact of outcome uncertainty on demand, the hypothesis can 
be refined to estimation of disaggregated attendance data that distinguish between season 
ticket holders and purchasers of individual tickets, and between home and away 
supporters. The majority of stadium attendance numbers are supporters of the home 
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team. Variance in attendance across matches may not distinguish the preferences for home 
success and outcome uncertainty. It would be possible to allow the three identified types 
of stadium goer (season ticket holder, on the day purchase, and away ticket holder) to be 
treated in a way to acknowledge their differences in buying behaviour. For example, season 
ticket holders are likely to be less sensitive to changes in prices or availability of a televised 
match as they paid in advance for tickets. Those that buy one off tickets, often on the day, 
are likely much more sensitive to these factors. In a similar light, Sky Sports viewing figures 
do not distinguish between viewers of private televisions and viewers in larger crowds, 
such as in public houses. Again disaggregated data would help provide a better estimate of 
the impact on TV audiences by allowing different types of consumers to behave differently. 
This type of information may also provide a useful insight for publicans deciding which 
matches are most important to show.   
 
Estimates of the impact on match day revenue could be enhanced by considering the 
market definition of the substitute good. Other leisure activities or other sporting events 
may be a strong substitute to watch a Premier League football match at the stadium or on 
television. For example, those interested in attending a football match may also play 
football at similar times to the Premier League schedule. There may also be other popular 
broadcast sporting events that clash with Premier League match times, for example, the 
2015 Rugby World Cup is held during part of the regular Premier League season. Including 
elements from a broader market definition than the direct substitute (broadcast Premier 
League matches) would further the understanding of consumer behaviour in the 
professional sports market. 
 
The estimation of match results could be further refined by the inclusion of information of 
clubs’ wage expenditures post 2016, when the Premier League financial policy becomes 
binding to all member clubs, providing an opportunity for further the understanding of 
return on wage expenditure. As the ability to spend becomes more homogenous from 
changes in policy, there is a need to further investigate club level specific information that 
goes beyond observing inputs and outputs. For example, a club with much more advanced 
use of sports science may perform better compared to a club without (holding other 
factors constant, such as wage expenditure).  
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Overall, this thesis has identified a unique contribution to existing studies in sports 
economics and provided an insight that has led to further refinement of the hypotheses, 
and thus provides a basis for further research.  
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Appendix A: Form UPR16 and Ethical Review Checklist and Approval 
 
FORM UPR16 
Research Ethics Review Checklist 
 
Please complete and return the form to Research Section, Quality Management 
Division, Academic Registry, University House, with your thesis, prior to 
examination 
 
 
 
Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information 
 
 
Student ID: 
 
314656 
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Department: 
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First Supervisor: 
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your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice.  Please note that it is your responsibility to 
follow the University’s Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or 
professional guidelines in the conduct of your study 
Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the 
final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s). 
 
       
 
UKRIO Finished Research Checklist: 
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or 
Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online version of the full 
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 a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, 
honestly and within a reasonable time frame? 
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b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged? 
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c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual 
property, publication and authorship? 
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d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible 
form and will it remain so for the required duration?  
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e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual 
requirements? 
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have successfully obtained the necessary ethical approval(s) 
 
 
Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or 
from NRES/SCREC): 
 
 
 
E331 
 
 
Signed:  
(Student) 
 
Date: 28/01/2015 
 
If you have not submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered 
‘No’ to one or more of questions a) to e), please explain why this is so: 
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(Student) 
 
Date:  
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 Ethical Review Checklist – Staff and Doctoral Students 
This checklist should be completed by the researcher (PhD students to have DoS check) 
and sent to Sharman Rogers who will coordinate Ethics Committee scrutiny. 
No primary data collection can be undertaken before the supervisor and/or Ethics 
Committee has given approval. 
If, following review of this checklist, amendments to the proposals are agreed to be 
necessary, the researcher must provide Sharman with an amended version for scrutiny. 
 
1. What are the objectives of the research project? 
 
This study aims to analyse the key arguments for collective behaviour and 
investigate the issues surrounding levels of debt of football clubs in the English 
Premier League (PL). The key objectives in this project are: 
1. To analyse the impact of the PL restricting the number of matches that are 
broadcast live. The PL restricts the number of matches broadcast live on TV 
as this may turn people away from watching live at the stadium.  
2. To analyse the impact of the PL sharing revenue earned from selling broadcast 
rights amongst the member clubs. The PL does so in belief that sharing 
revenue will enhance the financial equality of clubs in the league.  
3. To analyse the impact of the financial inequality of clubs in the league on the 
stadium attendance. The PL shares revenue based on the statement in 
objective 2 combined with the idea that better financial equality amongst 
member clubs would increase the spectator demand for matches. 
In each objective a statistical or a mathematical model is used to estimate the impact. 
These models are used to test collected data to make accurate estimates of the 
relationships postured by the hypotheses. All the data used in this project are 
collected from publicly available secondary sources. For example, the Office of 
National Statistics. Data are organised and analysed in a statistical software package 
such as, STATA. Conclusions are drawn from the interpretation of the relationships 
within the data collected shown by the statistical estimation. The conclusions directly 
relate to the objective set and discussion reflects upon the policy implications for the 
PL. 
 
2. Does the research involve NHS patients, resources or staff?    NO  
If YES, it is likely that full ethical review must be obtained from the NHS process before 
the research can start. 
3. Does the research involve MoD staff? NO 
If YES, then ethical review may need to be undertaken by MoD REC.  Please 
discuss your proposal with your Director of Studies and/or PBS Ethics 
Committee representative and, if necessary, include a copy of your MoD REC 
application for quality review.   
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4. Do you intend to collect primary data from human subjects or data that are 
identifiable with individuals? (This includes, for example, questionnaires and 
interviews.) NO  
If you do not intend to collect such primary data then please go to question 15. 
If you do intend to collect such primary data then please respond to ALL the questions 5 
through 14. If you feel a question does not apply then please respond with n/a (for not 
applicable). 
 
5. How will the primary data contribute to the objectives of the dissertation / 
research project? 
 
 
6. What is/are the survey population(s)? 
 
 
7. How big is the sample for each of the survey populations and how was this 
sample arrived at? 
 
8. How will respondents be selected and recruited? 
 
9. What steps are proposed to ensure that the requirements of informed consent 
will be met for those taking part in the research? If an Information Sheet for 
participants is to be used, please attach it to this form. If not, please explain how 
you will be able to demonstrate that informed consent has been gained from 
participants. 
 
10. How will data be collected from each of the sample groups? 
 
11. How will data be stored and what will happen to the data at the end of the 
research? 
 
12. What measures will be taken to prevent unauthorised persons gaining access to 
the data, and especially to data that may be attributed to identifiable individuals?  
 
 
13. What steps are proposed to safeguard the anonymity of the respondents? 
 
 
14. Are there any risks (physical or other, including reputational) to respondents 
that may result from taking part in this research?    YES / NO (please circle). 
If YES, please specify and state what measures are proposed to deal with these risks. 
 
15. Are there any risks (physical or other, including reputational) to the 
researcher or to the University that may result from conducting this research?    
NO  
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If YES, please specify and state what measures are proposed to manage these risks.37 
 
16. Will any data be obtained from a company or other organisation. NO  
For example, information provided by an employer or its employees. 
If NO, then please go to question 19. 
 
17. What steps are proposed to ensure that the requirements of informed consent 
will be met for that organisation? How will confidentiality be assured for the 
organisation, such that unauthorised persons will be prevented from accessing 
the data? 
 
18. Does the organisation have its own ethics procedure relating to the research you 
intend to carry out?   YES / NO (please circle). 
If YES, the University will require written evidence from the organisation that they have 
approved the research. 
 
19. Will the proposed research involve any of the following (please put a √ next to 
‘yes’ or ‘no’; consult your supervisor if you are unsure): 
       • Vulnerable groups (e.g. children) ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Particularly sensitive topics ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Access to respondents via ‘gatekeepers’ ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Use of deception ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Access to confidential personal data ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Psychological stress, anxiety etc ? YES   NO √ 
       
• Intrusive interventions ? YES   NO √ 
 
If answers to any of the above are “YES”, how will the associated risks be 
minimised? 
 
20. Are there any other ethical issues that may arise from the proposed research? 
No. 
 
Details of applicant 
The member of staff undertaking the research should sign and date the application, and 
submit it directly to the Ethics Committee. However, where the researcher is a supervised 
PhD candidate, the signature of the Director of Studies is also required prior to this form 
37 Risk evaluation should take account of the broad liberty of expression provided by 
the principle of academic freedom. The university’s conduct with respect  to academic 
freedom is set out in section 9.2 of the Articles of Government and its commitment to 
academic freedom is in section 1.2 of the Strategic Plan 2004-2008. 
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Appendix B: Regression Output Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 Estimation 1A (Home win prob) 
 
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      2964 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       906 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       3.3 
                                                               max =         8 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
                                                Wald chi2(68)      =  18854.22 
Log likelihood  =  642.34472                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Hwinprobadjusted |  -.2975264   .1003332    -2.97   0.003     -.494176   -.1008769 
              HWP_2 |   .3324356    .104504     3.18   0.001     .1276115    .5372598 
Previous_season_win |    .002736   .0420032     0.07   0.948    -.0795889    .0850608 
       HomePromoted |   .1187877   .0182365     6.51   0.000     .0830448    .1545307 
                HGS |   .0050713   .0008896     5.70   0.000     .0033276    .0068149 
                HGA |  -.0033489   .0009006    -3.72   0.000    -.0051141   -.0015836 
                AGS |   .0024504   .0009718     2.52   0.012     .0005456    .0043551 
                AGA |  -.0004577   .0007567    -0.60   0.545    -.0019407    .0010254 
            HwagePL |   .0894989   .0171607     5.22   0.000     .0558646    .1231333 
            AwagePL |   .0525103   .0087268     6.02   0.000     .0354062    .0696145 
           LNATTN_1 |   .3846087   .0365251    10.53   0.000      .313021    .4561965 
                 TV |  -.0132503    .006097    -2.17   0.030    -.0252002   -.0013004 
           Distance |   -.000511   .0001133    -4.51   0.000    -.0007331   -.0002889 
          Distance2 |   8.38e-07   3.91e-07     2.14   0.032     7.15e-08    1.61e-06 
             Monday |  -.0378949    .010872    -3.49   0.000    -.0592036   -.0165862 
            Tuesday |  -.0345699   .0117527    -2.94   0.003    -.0576048   -.0115349 
          Wednesday |  -.0631258    .009284    -6.80   0.000    -.0813221   -.0449294 
           Thursday |  -.1071677   .0501021    -2.14   0.032     -.205366   -.0089695 
             Friday |   .0440724   .0377731     1.17   0.243    -.0299615    .1181063 
             Sunday |  -.0090203   .0068706    -1.31   0.189    -.0224864    .0044458 
          September |  -.0027272   .0116695    -0.23   0.815    -.0255991    .0201447 
            October |   .0227908   .0114245     1.99   0.046     .0003991    .0451825 
           November |   .0037379   .0113514     0.33   0.742    -.0185103    .0259862 
           December |   .0300662   .0108774     2.76   0.006     .0087468    .0513856 
            January |  -.0024746   .0116068    -0.21   0.831    -.0252235    .0202744 
           February |   .0370432   .0118056     3.14   0.002     .0139045    .0601818 
              March |   .0121727    .011471     1.06   0.289    -.0103101    .0346556 
         AprilorMay |   .0658709   .0103974     6.34   0.000     .0454924    .0862495 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.4996987   .0404691   -12.35   0.000    -.5790167   -.4203807 
        Birmingham  |   -.670619   .0472369   -14.20   0.000    -.7632017   -.5780364 
         Blackburn  |  -.7860461   .0480422   -16.36   0.000     -.880207   -.6918852 
         Blackpool  |  -.6764001   .0798874    -8.47   0.000    -.8329765   -.5198237 
            Bolton  |  -.7709804   .0479314   -16.09   0.000    -.8649243   -.6770365 
           Burnley  |  -.7304919   .0633842   -11.52   0.000    -.8547226   -.6062612 
          Charlton  |   -.609433   .0488384   -12.48   0.000    -.7051545   -.5137115 
           Chelsea  |  -.3726307   .0473153    -7.88   0.000    -.4653669   -.2798945 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.7290849   .0577784   -12.62   0.000    -.8423286   -.6158412 
             Derby  |  -.5697381   .0514781   -11.07   0.000    -.6706334   -.4688428 
           Everton  |  -.5085847   .0413101   -12.31   0.000     -.589551   -.4276185 
            Fulham  |  -.7062218   .0496163   -14.23   0.000     -.803468   -.6089756 
              Hull  |  -.5479382   .0566519    -9.67   0.000    -.6589739   -.4369025 
         Liverpool  |   -.387755   .0383864   -10.10   0.000     -.462991   -.3125191 
          Man City  |  -.4052969   .0388776   -10.42   0.000    -.4814956   -.3290982 
           Man Utd  |  -.0643716   .0419921    -1.53   0.125    -.1466747    .0179315 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.6425596   .0450086   -14.28   0.000    -.7307749   -.5543443 
         Newcastle  |  -.2274531   .0404632    -5.62   0.000    -.3067595   -.1481466 
           Norwich  |  -.6790599   .0523335   -12.98   0.000    -.7816316   -.5764882 
        Portsmouth  |  -.7248809   .0541692   -13.38   0.000    -.8310506   -.6187112 
               QPR  |  -.9465412   .0593604   -15.95   0.000    -1.062886   -.8301969 
           Reading  |  -.5850192    .056626   -10.33   0.000    -.6960041   -.4740343 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.5517167     .05345   -10.32   0.000    -.6564767   -.4469567 
       Southampton  |  -.5811966   .0530371   -10.96   0.000    -.6851473   -.4772459 
             Stoke  |  -.6126966   .0489273   -12.52   0.000    -.7085924   -.5168008 
        Sunderland  |  -.4406314   .0419757   -10.50   0.000    -.5229022   -.3583606 
           Swansea  |  -.7531702   .0624814   -12.05   0.000    -.8756314    -.630709 
         Tottenham  |   -.469391    .041161   -11.40   0.000    -.5500652   -.3887168 
               WBA  |   -.711663   .0469771   -15.15   0.000    -.8037365   -.6195896 
           Watford  |  -.9039277   .0582811   -15.51   0.000    -1.018156   -.7896989 
          West Ham  |  -.4518672   .0430767   -10.49   0.000    -.5362961   -.3674384 
             Wigan  |   -.882964   .0543592   -16.24   0.000     -.989506   -.7764219 
            Wolves  |  -.6029068    .048555   -12.42   0.000    -.6980729   -.5077408 
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                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0619105    .010841    -5.71   0.000    -.0831584   -.0406626 
              _2007 |  -.0506537   .0115734    -4.38   0.000    -.0733371   -.0279702 
              _2008 |  -.0307939   .0114894    -2.68   0.007    -.0533127    -.008275 
              _2009 |  -.0439471   .0114955    -3.82   0.000    -.0664778   -.0214164 
              _2010 |  -.0659875   .0120503    -5.48   0.000    -.0896056   -.0423694 
              _2011 |  -.0780894   .0114773    -6.80   0.000    -.1005845   -.0555942 
              _2012 |  -.0533889   .0118414    -4.51   0.000    -.0765976   -.0301802 
              _cons |   6.958666   .3943005    17.65   0.000     6.185851    7.731481 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           /sigma_u |   6.54e-08   8.58e-09     7.62   0.000     4.85e-08    8.22e-08 
           /sigma_e |   .1106973   .0021625    51.19   0.000     .1064589    .1149357 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |   3.49e-13   9.26e-14                      2.07e-13    5.85e-13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1455     uncensored observations 
                            1509 right-censored observations 
                               0       interval observations 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Estimation 1B (Step function) 
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      2964 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       906 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       3.3 
                                                               max =         8 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(73)      =  18909.52 
Log likelihood  =  1542.2728                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
               HWP2 |  -.0042414   .0129843    -0.33   0.744    -.0296901    .0212073 
               HWP3 |  -.0072087   .0141591    -0.51   0.611      -.03496    .0205426 
               HWP4 |  -.0328138   .0153882    -2.13   0.033    -.0629742   -.0026534 
               HWP5 |   -.031596   .0171205    -1.85   0.065    -.0651517    .0019596 
               HWP6 |   -.016129   .0198509    -0.81   0.416     -.055036     .022778 
               HWP7 |  -.0232324   .0236859    -0.98   0.327    -.0696558    .0231911 
               HWP8 |   .0286879   .0291705     0.98   0.325    -.0284853     .085861 
Previous_season_win |   1.94e-06   .0420159     0.00   1.000    -.0823477    .0823516 
       HomePromoted |   .1183862   .0182166     6.50   0.000     .0826824      .15409 
                HGS |   .0049633   .0008841     5.61   0.000     .0032306     .006696 
                HGA |   -.003221   .0008989    -3.58   0.000    -.0049828   -.0014592 
                AGS |   .0023393   .0009647     2.42   0.015     .0004485    .0042301 
                AGA |  -.0004688   .0007534    -0.62   0.534    -.0019454    .0010079 
            HwagePL |   .0909299   .0173067     5.25   0.000     .0570093    .1248505 
            AwagePL |   .0513872   .0084859     6.06   0.000     .0347551    .0680193 
           LNATTN_1 |   .3830121    .036473    10.50   0.000     .3115263    .4544979 
                 TV |  -.0137315   .0060931    -2.25   0.024    -.0256739   -.0017892 
           Distance |  -.0005144   .0001132    -4.54   0.000    -.0007363   -.0002925 
          Distance2 |   8.50e-07   3.91e-07     2.18   0.030     8.40e-08    1.62e-06 
             Monday |  -.0370184   .0108772    -3.40   0.001    -.0583373   -.0156995 
            Tuesday |  -.0346776   .0117314    -2.96   0.003    -.0576707   -.0116844 
          Wednesday |  -.0627701    .009272    -6.77   0.000    -.0809428   -.0445974 
           Thursday |  -.1099635   .0497398    -2.21   0.027    -.2074516   -.0124753 
             Friday |   .0473386   .0376783     1.26   0.209    -.0265095    .1211867 
             Sunday |  -.0086904   .0068651    -1.27   0.206    -.0221458     .004765 
          September |  -.0034614   .0116721    -0.30   0.767    -.0263384    .0194156 
            October |   .0216046   .0114171     1.89   0.058    -.0007725    .0439817 
           November |   .0028512   .0113455     0.25   0.802    -.0193856     .025088 
           December |   .0297849   .0108787     2.74   0.006     .0084631    .0511067 
            January |  -.0036833   .0115954    -0.32   0.751    -.0264099    .0190434 
           February |   .0365776    .011822     3.09   0.002     .0134069    .0597484 
              March |   .0130251   .0114785     1.13   0.256    -.0094725    .0355226 
         AprilorMay |   .0656445   .0104016     6.31   0.000     .0452578    .0860313 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.4995769   .0408116   -12.24   0.000    -.5795663   -.4195876 
        Birmingham  |  -.6706599   .0474827   -14.12   0.000    -.7637243   -.5775956 
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         Blackburn  |  -.7865899   .0482754   -16.29   0.000    -.8812079   -.6919719 
         Blackpool  |   -.681616   .0798971    -8.53   0.000    -.8382115   -.5250205 
            Bolton  |  -.7711457    .048189   -16.00   0.000    -.8655944   -.6766969 
           Burnley  |  -.7284477   .0635023   -11.47   0.000    -.8529099   -.6039855 
          Charlton  |  -.6108115   .0490543   -12.45   0.000    -.7069562   -.5146668 
           Chelsea  |  -.3818487   .0477965    -7.99   0.000    -.4755282   -.2881693 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.7311595   .0578352   -12.64   0.000    -.8445143   -.6178046 
             Derby  |  -.5723791   .0516688   -11.08   0.000     -.673648   -.4711102 
           Everton  |  -.5092001   .0416733   -12.22   0.000    -.5908783   -.4275219 
            Fulham  |   -.707354   .0498227   -14.20   0.000    -.8050047   -.6097034 
              Hull  |  -.5538367   .0567045    -9.77   0.000    -.6649755    -.442698 
         Liverpool  |  -.3895566   .0386808   -10.07   0.000    -.4653695   -.3137437 
          Man City  |  -.4039001   .0392104   -10.30   0.000     -.480751   -.3270492 
           Man Utd  |  -.0701775   .0423962    -1.66   0.098    -.1532724    .0129175 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.6419832   .0452585   -14.18   0.000    -.7306883   -.5532782 
         Newcastle  |  -.2275722   .0408283    -5.57   0.000    -.3075941   -.1475502 
           Norwich  |  -.6788338    .052463   -12.94   0.000    -.7816594   -.5760083 
        Portsmouth  |  -.7265365   .0543248   -13.37   0.000     -.833011   -.6200619 
               QPR  |  -.9441873   .0594767   -15.87   0.000    -1.060759   -.8276152 
           Reading  |  -.5828197   .0568321   -10.26   0.000    -.6942085   -.4714309 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.5564473   .0535689   -10.39   0.000    -.6614404   -.4514542 
       Southampton  |  -.5825432   .0531458   -10.96   0.000    -.6867071   -.4783792 
             Stoke  |  -.6127576     .04915   -12.47   0.000    -.7090898   -.5164254 
        Sunderland  |  -.4411674   .0422727   -10.44   0.000    -.5240203   -.3583144 
           Swansea  |  -.7519115   .0625904   -12.01   0.000    -.8745865   -.6292366 
         Tottenham  |  -.4701559   .0414531   -11.34   0.000    -.5514024   -.3889094 
               WBA  |  -.7131263    .047199   -15.11   0.000    -.8056347    -.620618 
           Watford  |  -.9098293   .0584407   -15.57   0.000    -1.024371   -.7952877 
          West Ham  |  -.4504829   .0433759   -10.39   0.000    -.5354981   -.3654678 
             Wigan  |  -.8840707   .0545337   -16.21   0.000    -.9909549   -.7771866 
            Wolves  |  -.6008569   .0487679   -12.32   0.000    -.6964403   -.5052735 
                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0614631   .0108312    -5.67   0.000     -.082692   -.0402343 
              _2007 |  -.0501892   .0115513    -4.34   0.000    -.0728294    -.027549 
              _2008 |  -.0319505   .0114792    -2.78   0.005    -.0544494   -.0094516 
              _2009 |  -.0436034   .0114731    -3.80   0.000    -.0660902   -.0211165 
              _2010 |  -.0665529   .0120649    -5.52   0.000    -.0901997   -.0429061 
              _2011 |  -.0787545   .0114639    -6.87   0.000    -.1012234   -.0562855 
              _2012 |  -.0539706   .0118403    -4.56   0.000    -.0771772   -.0307641 
              _cons |   6.939849   .3935536    17.63   0.000     6.168498      7.7112 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           /sigma_u |   2.54e-08   1.08e-09    23.58   0.000     2.33e-08    2.75e-08 
           /sigma_e |   .1103553   .0021552    51.20   0.000     .1061313    .1145794 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |   5.29e-14   4.94e-15                      4.41e-14    6.36e-14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1455     uncensored observations 
                            1509 right-censored observations 
                               0       interval observations 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Estimation 1C (Draw Prob) 
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      2964 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       906 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       3.3 
                                                               max =         8 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(67)      =  18799.14 
Log likelihood  =  1389.4748                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        DrawProbAdj |   -.208017   .1092642    -1.90   0.057    -.4221709    .0061368 
Previous_season_win |   .0021711     .04196     0.05   0.959     -.080069    .0844111 
       HomePromoted |   .1195853   .0182377     6.56   0.000       .08384    .1553306 
                HGS |    .004972   .0008769     5.67   0.000     .0032532    .0066907 
                HGA |  -.0032903   .0008948    -3.68   0.000    -.0050442   -.0015365 
                AGS |   .0026824   .0009215     2.91   0.004     .0008762    .0044886 
                AGA |  -.0006038   .0007398    -0.82   0.414    -.0020538    .0008462 
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            HwagePL |   .0896114   .0169225     5.30   0.000     .0564439    .1227788 
            AwagePL |   .0612014   .0058046    10.54   0.000     .0498245    .0725782 
           LNATTN_1 |   .3838324   .0365154    10.51   0.000     .3122635    .4554012 
                 TV |  -.0127608   .0060958    -2.09   0.036    -.0247084   -.0008132 
           Distance |  -.0005184   .0001134    -4.57   0.000    -.0007405   -.0002962 
          Distance2 |   8.46e-07   3.92e-07     2.16   0.031     7.79e-08    1.61e-06 
             Monday |  -.0390732    .010875    -3.59   0.000    -.0603878   -.0177586 
            Tuesday |  -.0354031   .0117592    -3.01   0.003    -.0584508   -.0123554 
          Wednesday |  -.0626044   .0092901    -6.74   0.000    -.0808127   -.0443961 
           Thursday |  -.1096751   .0503363    -2.18   0.029    -.2083325   -.0110177 
             Friday |   .0425784   .0377824     1.13   0.260    -.0314739    .1166306 
             Sunday |  -.0100523   .0068748    -1.46   0.144    -.0235268    .0034222 
          September |  -.0030833   .0116837    -0.26   0.792    -.0259829    .0198163 
            October |   .0224805   .0114419     1.96   0.049     .0000548    .0449062 
           November |   .0033062   .0113655     0.29   0.771    -.0189698    .0255822 
           December |   .0301689   .0108933     2.77   0.006     .0088185    .0515193 
            January |  -.0025897   .0116171    -0.22   0.824    -.0253587    .0201794 
           February |   .0366849   .0118215     3.10   0.002     .0135151    .0598547 
              March |   .0119156   .0114881     1.04   0.300    -.0106006    .0344319 
         AprilorMay |   .0651587   .0104248     6.25   0.000     .0447266    .0855909 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.5013497   .0401771   -12.48   0.000    -.5800954    -.422604 
        Birmingham  |  -.6711234   .0469976   -14.28   0.000     -.763237   -.5790098 
         Blackburn  |  -.7872886   .0478357   -16.46   0.000    -.8810449   -.6935324 
         Blackpool  |  -.6759651   .0798136    -8.47   0.000    -.8323967   -.5195334 
            Bolton  |  -.7720462   .0477232   -16.18   0.000     -.865582   -.6785103 
           Burnley  |  -.7300131   .0632136   -11.55   0.000    -.8539094   -.6061168 
          Charlton  |  -.6098295   .0485832   -12.55   0.000    -.7050508   -.5146083 
           Chelsea  |  -.3688972   .0471704    -7.82   0.000    -.4613495   -.2764448 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.7300344   .0575386   -12.69   0.000     -.842808   -.6172609 
             Derby  |  -.5637882   .0506724   -11.13   0.000    -.6631043   -.4644722 
           Everton  |  -.5102753   .0410626   -12.43   0.000    -.5907564   -.4297941 
            Fulham  |  -.7071409    .049401   -14.31   0.000     -.803965   -.6103168 
              Hull  |  -.5473512    .056377    -9.71   0.000     -.657848   -.4368544 
         Liverpool  |  -.3879615   .0381294   -10.17   0.000    -.4626938   -.3132292 
          Man City  |  -.4064861   .0385252   -10.55   0.000    -.4819941   -.3309781 
           Man Utd  |  -.0617171   .0416747    -1.48   0.139    -.1433979    .0199638 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.6433347   .0447614   -14.37   0.000    -.7310654    -.555604 
         Newcastle  |  -.2284304   .0400306    -5.71   0.000    -.3068889   -.1499719 
           Norwich  |  -.6811443    .052073   -13.08   0.000    -.7832055   -.5790831 
        Portsmouth  |   -.725961   .0540002   -13.44   0.000    -.8317994   -.6201226 
               QPR  |  -.9479423   .0592034   -16.01   0.000    -1.063979   -.8319057 
           Reading  |  -.5857228   .0564083   -10.38   0.000    -.6962811   -.4751645 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.5515583   .0531514   -10.38   0.000    -.6557331   -.4473834 
       Southampton  |  -.5825542    .052678   -11.06   0.000    -.6858012   -.4793071 
             Stoke  |  -.6128269   .0486639   -12.59   0.000    -.7082064   -.5174475 
        Sunderland  |  -.4396959   .0415035   -10.59   0.000    -.5210412   -.3583505 
           Swansea  |  -.7549822   .0624167   -12.10   0.000    -.8773168   -.6326476 
         Tottenham  |  -.4708263   .0409229   -11.51   0.000    -.5510337   -.3906189 
               WBA  |  -.7119998   .0466891   -15.25   0.000    -.8035088   -.6204907 
           Watford  |  -.9024234   .0580709   -15.54   0.000     -1.01624   -.7886066 
          West Ham  |  -.4527657   .0426934   -10.61   0.000    -.5364432   -.3690881 
             Wigan  |  -.8834575   .0541892   -16.30   0.000    -.9896665   -.7772485 
            Wolves  |  -.6024183   .0482303   -12.49   0.000     -.696948   -.5078886 
                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0623731   .0108722    -5.74   0.000    -.0836822    -.041064 
              _2007 |  -.0511765   .0115887    -4.42   0.000    -.0738899   -.0284631 
              _2008 |  -.0310133    .011535    -2.69   0.007    -.0536214   -.0084051 
              _2009 |  -.0442386    .011541    -3.83   0.000    -.0668586   -.0216186 
              _2010 |  -.0650732   .0121145    -5.37   0.000    -.0888172   -.0413293 
              _2011 |  -.0787297   .0115332    -6.83   0.000    -.1013343   -.0561251 
              _2012 |  -.0538595   .0119482    -4.51   0.000    -.0772777   -.0304414 
              _cons |   6.958256   .3952982    17.60   0.000     6.183486    7.733026 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           /sigma_u |   2.62e-08   1.20e-09    21.86   0.000     2.38e-08    2.85e-08 
           /sigma_e |   .1108992   .0021667    51.18   0.000     .1066525    .1151459 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |   5.57e-14   5.54e-15                      4.58e-14    6.76e-14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                            1455     uncensored observations 
                            1509 right-censored observations 
                               0       interval observations 
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Chapter 4 Estimation 1D (Diff in Home win Prob) 
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      2964 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       906 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       3.3 
                                                               max =         8 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(67)      =  15166.02 
Log likelihood  =  581.03423                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           Probdiff |   .0456916   .0174612     2.62   0.009     .0114682     .079915 
Previous_season_win |   .0029836   .0403645     0.07   0.941    -.0761293    .0820965 
       HomePromoted |    .118479   .0176368     6.72   0.000     .0839115    .1530464 
                HGS |   .0048795   .0008581     5.69   0.000     .0031977    .0065612 
                HGA |  -.0032146    .000878    -3.66   0.000    -.0049354   -.0014938 
                AGS |   .0029193   .0009145     3.19   0.001     .0011268    .0047117 
                AGA |  -.0005614   .0007289    -0.77   0.441    -.0019901    .0008673 
            HwagePL |   .0896683   .0163381     5.49   0.000     .0576463    .1216904 
            AwagePL |   .0557282   .0062716     8.89   0.000      .043436    .0680203 
           LNATTN_1 |   .3746812   .0353955    10.59   0.000     .3053073     .444055 
                 TV |  -.0173246    .006069    -2.85   0.004    -.0292196   -.0054297 
           Distance |  -.0005167   .0001281    -4.03   0.000    -.0007677   -.0002657 
          Distance2 |   8.61e-07   4.38e-07     1.96   0.050     1.66e-09    1.72e-06 
             Monday |  -.0363304   .0107255    -3.39   0.001    -.0573521   -.0153087 
            Tuesday |   -.037479   .0116331    -3.22   0.001    -.0602795   -.0146785 
          Wednesday |  -.0654113   .0091435    -7.15   0.000    -.0833322   -.0474903 
           Thursday |  -.0902531   .0486846    -1.85   0.064    -.1856732     .005167 
             Friday |      .0399   .0373014     1.07   0.285    -.0332094    .1130095 
             Sunday |  -.0099213   .0068042    -1.46   0.145    -.0232573    .0034147 
          September |  -.0022428   .0114972    -0.20   0.845     -.024777    .0202914 
            October |    .021736   .0112751     1.93   0.054    -.0003629    .0438348 
           November |   .0036799   .0111424     0.33   0.741    -.0181588    .0255186 
           December |   .0294344   .0107362     2.74   0.006     .0083919    .0504768 
            January |  -.0033458   .0114315    -0.29   0.770    -.0257512    .0190595 
           February |   .0370948   .0116263     3.19   0.001     .0143078    .0598819 
              March |   .0130684   .0112948     1.16   0.247    -.0090691    .0352058 
         AprilorMay |   .0652008   .0102264     6.38   0.000     .0451574    .0852442 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.5035685   .0409781   -12.29   0.000    -.5838841   -.4232529 
        Birmingham  |  -.6769212   .0473261   -14.30   0.000    -.7696787   -.5841636 
         Blackburn  |  -.7973915   .0481182   -16.57   0.000    -.8917015   -.7030815 
         Blackpool  |  -.6883923   .0786668    -8.75   0.000    -.8425764   -.5342082 
            Bolton  |  -.7803375   .0479799   -16.26   0.000    -.8743763   -.6862987 
           Burnley  |  -.7404181    .062512   -11.84   0.000    -.8629394   -.6178968 
          Charlton  |  -.6160914   .0489828   -12.58   0.000     -.712096   -.5200868 
           Chelsea  |  -.3708489   .0480192    -7.72   0.000    -.4649648   -.2767331 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.7361743   .0572906   -12.85   0.000    -.8484618   -.6238868 
             Derby  |  -.5691932   .0507369   -11.22   0.000    -.6686357   -.4697507 
           Everton  |   -.511839   .0417974   -12.25   0.000    -.5937604   -.4299175 
            Fulham  |  -.7203347   .0495945   -14.52   0.000    -.8175382   -.6231312 
              Hull  |  -.5540823   .0563946    -9.83   0.000    -.6646137    -.443551 
         Liverpool  |  -.3920561   .0392184   -10.00   0.000    -.4689226   -.3151895 
          Man City  |  -.4059921   .0395074   -10.28   0.000    -.4834251   -.3285591 
           Man Utd  |  -.0602182   .0424256    -1.42   0.156    -.1433708    .0229343 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.6486862   .0452686   -14.33   0.000    -.7374111   -.5599614 
         Newcastle  |  -.2293608   .0408669    -5.61   0.000    -.3094584   -.1492631 
           Norwich  |  -.6837788   .0521773   -13.10   0.000    -.7860445   -.5815131 
        Portsmouth  |  -.7347406   .0541351   -13.57   0.000    -.8408435   -.6286377 
               QPR  |  -.9563988   .0586606   -16.30   0.000    -1.071372   -.8414262 
           Reading  |  -.5940609   .0564559   -10.52   0.000    -.7047124   -.4834093 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.5562154   .0531748   -10.46   0.000     -.660436   -.4519948 
       Southampton  |  -.5835809   .0528551   -11.04   0.000    -.6871751   -.4799868 
             Stoke  |  -.6171079    .048937   -12.61   0.000    -.7130228    -.521193 
        Sunderland  |  -.4424087    .042256   -10.47   0.000     -.525229   -.3595884 
           Swansea  |  -.7637354   .0618293   -12.35   0.000    -.8849185   -.6425522 
         Tottenham  |  -.4774233   .0417636   -11.43   0.000    -.5592785   -.3955681 
               WBA  |  -.7166824   .0470878   -15.22   0.000    -.8089728    -.624392 
           Watford  |  -.9097289   .0576877   -15.77   0.000    -1.022795   -.7966631 
          West Ham  |  -.4561432    .043397   -10.51   0.000    -.5411998   -.3710865 
             Wigan  |  -.8931874   .0540875   -16.51   0.000    -.9991969   -.7871779 
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            Wolves  |  -.6054326   .0485594   -12.47   0.000    -.7006073   -.5102579 
                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0617555   .0104704    -5.90   0.000    -.0822771   -.0412338 
              _2007 |  -.0497978   .0112113    -4.44   0.000    -.0717716   -.0278241 
              _2008 |  -.0305656   .0111413    -2.74   0.006    -.0524022   -.0087291 
              _2009 |  -.0449495   .0111646    -4.03   0.000    -.0668317   -.0230673 
              _2010 |  -.0641008   .0117011    -5.48   0.000    -.0870346   -.0411669 
              _2011 |  -.0789918   .0111716    -7.07   0.000    -.1008877   -.0570959 
              _2012 |  -.0558428   .0115193    -4.85   0.000    -.0784203   -.0332653 
              _cons |   6.993993   .3823941    18.29   0.000     6.244514    7.743472 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           /sigma_u |   .0356918   .0040496     8.81   0.000     .0277547    .0436289 
           /sigma_e |   .1047756   .0022796    45.96   0.000     .1003077    .1092434 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |   .1039767   .0226117                      .0662039    .1553507 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Chapter 4 Estimation 2A (Home win prob) 
 
. reg LnSkyViewers Hwinprobadjusted HWP_2 Previous_season_win HomePromoted HGS HGA 
AGS AGA HwagePL 
>  AwagePL LNATTN_1 Distance Distance2 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Sunday  September  
> October November December January February March AprilorMay i.HTeam1 _2006 _2007 
_2008 _2009 _20 
> 10 _2011 _2012 if SkySports == 1, vce(r) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     756 
                                                       F( 66,   688) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6604 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .26301 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
       LnSkyViewers |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Hwinprobadjusted |  -.4021162   .3003901    -1.34   0.181    -.9919074    .1876751 
              HWP_2 |  -.3103894   .2923289    -1.06   0.289    -.8843532    .2635743 
Previous_season_win |   .2546351   .1602108     1.59   0.112    -.0599256    .5691959 
       HomePromoted |  -.0420301   .0623767    -0.67   0.501    -.1645017    .0804414 
                HGS |   .0052968   .0028499     1.86   0.064    -.0002988    .0108924 
                HGA |   .0025394   .0040245     0.63   0.528    -.0053624    .0104413 
                AGS |   .0006251   .0034233     0.18   0.855    -.0060963    .0073465 
                AGA |  -.0051509   .0033989    -1.52   0.130    -.0118243    .0015226 
            HwagePL |   .1805225   .0482396     3.74   0.000     .0858081    .2752369 
            AwagePL |   .1597186   .0263031     6.07   0.000     .1080746    .2113625 
           LNATTN_1 |  -.1307887   .1154203    -1.13   0.258     -.357407    .0958297 
           Distance |  -.0000173    .000388    -0.04   0.964    -.0007791    .0007444 
          Distance2 |  -3.18e-07   1.42e-06    -0.22   0.823    -3.10e-06    2.47e-06 
             Monday |   .0327877   .0309543     1.06   0.290    -.0279885     .093564 
            Tuesday |   .0947598   .0465545     2.04   0.042     .0033538    .1861658 
          Wednesday |  -.0532369   .0678897    -0.78   0.433    -.1865328    .0800591 
           Thursday |   -.082237   .0588187    -1.40   0.163    -.1977227    .0332488 
             Friday |   .2294643   .0535428     4.29   0.000     .1243374    .3345912 
             Sunday |   .2532931   .0238224    10.63   0.000     .2065197    .3000665 
          September |   .0317386   .0471477     0.67   0.501    -.0608321    .1243094 
            October |   .1023356   .0487036     2.10   0.036     .0067101     .197961 
           November |   .1786533   .0461588     3.87   0.000     .0880242    .2692823 
           December |   .2032944   .0464793     4.37   0.000      .112036    .2945527 
            January |   .2558616   .0525056     4.87   0.000     .1527713     .358952 
           February |   .2395774   .0497831     4.81   0.000     .1418324    .3373223 
              March |   .1439748   .0528568     2.72   0.007     .0401947    .2477549 
         AprilorMay |   .0871427   .0473312     1.84   0.066    -.0057882    .1800737 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.2241549   .0724283    -3.09   0.002     -.366362   -.0819478 
        Birmingham  |  -.3455623   .1198049    -2.88   0.004    -.5807895   -.1103351 
         Blackburn  |   -.285375   .1149075    -2.48   0.013    -.5109864   -.0597635 
         Blackpool  |  -.4721694   .2186541    -2.16   0.031    -.9014788     -.04286 
            Bolton  |  -.3462225   .1224428    -2.83   0.005    -.5866289   -.1058162 
           Burnley  |   -.542654   .2196188    -2.47   0.014    -.9738575   -.1114505 
          Charlton  |  -.4001137   .1041601    -3.84   0.000    -.6046234   -.1956039 
           Chelsea  |  -.0827808   .0658063    -1.26   0.209    -.2119861    .0464245 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.4777999   .1966051    -2.43   0.015     -.863818   -.0917819 
             Derby  |  -.3941517   .1107603    -3.56   0.000    -.6116204   -.1766829 
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           Everton  |  -.2345864   .0829196    -2.83   0.005    -.3973921   -.0717806 
            Fulham  |  -.3637098   .1235991    -2.94   0.003    -.6063865    -.121033 
              Hull  |  -.3568144   .1589413    -2.24   0.025    -.6688826   -.0447462 
         Liverpool  |  -.0022576   .0590084    -0.04   0.969    -.1181158    .1136005 
          Man City  |  -.0760875   .0588689    -1.29   0.197    -.1916717    .0394968 
           Man Utd  |   .2462928   .0595382     4.14   0.000     .1293944    .3631912 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.3253054   .1111506    -2.93   0.004    -.5435406   -.1070703 
         Newcastle  |  -.1041387   .0691046    -1.51   0.132    -.2398199    .0315425 
           Norwich  |  -.5407209   .1251924    -4.32   0.000     -.786526   -.2949159 
        Portsmouth  |  -.3244827   .1335318    -2.43   0.015    -.5866616   -.0623039 
               QPR  |  -.3123088   .1811641    -1.72   0.085    -.6680097    .0433921 
           Reading  |   -.343506   .1678925    -2.05   0.041    -.6731492   -.0138628 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.1013226   .1355119    -0.75   0.455    -.3673892     .164744 
       Southampton  |  -.3952339   .1185346    -3.33   0.001    -.6279667    -.162501 
             Stoke  |  -.3212079   .1224158    -2.62   0.009    -.5615614   -.0808545 
        Sunderland  |  -.2725346   .0986147    -2.76   0.006    -.4661565   -.0789127 
           Swansea  |  -.3768276   .1744577    -2.16   0.031    -.7193611   -.0342942 
         Tottenham  |  -.0013988   .0761182    -0.02   0.985    -.1508506    .1480531 
               WBA  |  -.3923094   .1148204    -3.42   0.001    -.6177499   -.1668689 
           Watford  |   -.530982   .1756217    -3.02   0.003    -.8758009   -.1861631 
          West Ham  |  -.1490448    .089299    -1.67   0.096    -.3243761    .0262866 
             Wigan  |  -.4456848   .1625163    -2.74   0.006    -.7647723   -.1265973 
            Wolves  |  -.3464989    .124759    -2.78   0.006    -.5914529    -.101545 
                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0302211   .0382432    -0.79   0.430    -.1053085    .0448663 
              _2007 |  -.0357498   .0419273    -0.85   0.394    -.1180707     .046571 
              _2008 |   .0148235   .0401536     0.37   0.712    -.0640147    .0936617 
              _2009 |   .0363289   .0434725     0.84   0.404    -.0490258    .1216836 
              _2010 |   .0442835   .0529436     0.84   0.403    -.0596668    .1482339 
              _2011 |   .1689655   .0409982     4.12   0.000     .0884689    .2494621 
              _2012 |   .2711999   .0407005     6.66   0.000     .1912877    .3511121 
              _cons |    .882194   1.260398     0.70   0.484    -1.592495    3.356883 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Chapter 4 Estimation 2B (Step function) 
 
. reg LnSkyViewers HWP2 HWP3 HWP4 HWP5 HWP6 HWP7 HWP8 Previous_season_win 
HomePromoted HGS HGA AGS 
>  AGA HwagePL AwagePL LNATTN_1 Distance Distance2 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 
Friday Sunday 
>   September October November December January February March AprilorMay i.HTeam1 
_2006 _2007 _20 
> 08 _2009 _2010 _2011 _2012 if SkySports == 1,vce(r) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     756 
                                                       F( 71,   683) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6638 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .26268 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
       LnSkyViewers |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
               HWP2 |  -.0314345   .0465768    -0.67   0.500    -.1228853    .0600164 
               HWP3 |  -.0887801   .0488717    -1.82   0.070    -.1847369    .0071766 
               HWP4 |  -.1452382   .0508335    -2.86   0.004    -.2450469   -.0454296 
               HWP5 |  -.1861625   .0565859    -3.29   0.001    -.2972658   -.0750592 
               HWP6 |  -.3497733   .0699936    -5.00   0.000    -.4872017   -.2123448 
               HWP7 |  -.3371317    .080898    -4.17   0.000    -.4959704   -.1782931 
               HWP8 |  -.3932738   .0912322    -4.31   0.000     -.572403   -.2141445 
Previous_season_win |   .2570521   .1609258     1.60   0.111    -.0589166    .5730209 
       HomePromoted |  -.0354207   .0634092    -0.56   0.577    -.1599211    .0890797 
                HGS |   .0049908   .0027633     1.81   0.071    -.0004347    .0104163 
                HGA |   .0024936   .0039895     0.63   0.532    -.0053395    .0103267 
                AGS |   .0012014   .0034301     0.35   0.726    -.0055335    .0079362 
                AGA |  -.0053091   .0033605    -1.58   0.115    -.0119073     .001289 
            HwagePL |   .1712448   .0473731     3.61   0.000     .0782303    .2642593 
            AwagePL |   .1602193   .0252867     6.34   0.000     .1105704    .2098683 
           LNATTN_1 |  -.1059086   .1178586    -0.90   0.369    -.3373174    .1255001 
           Distance |   -.000011   .0003904    -0.03   0.977    -.0007775    .0007555 
          Distance2 |  -3.54e-07   1.40e-06    -0.25   0.801    -3.11e-06    2.40e-06 
             Monday |    .034033   .0312109     1.09   0.276    -.0272478    .0953138 
            Tuesday |   .0914441   .0461025     1.98   0.048     .0009244    .1819638 
          Wednesday |  -.0542799   .0674885    -0.80   0.422    -.1867896    .0782299 
           Thursday |  -.1019776   .0534987    -1.91   0.057    -.2070193    .0030641 
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             Friday |   .2602586   .0605064     4.30   0.000     .1414576    .3790595 
             Sunday |   .2519637   .0239622    10.52   0.000     .2049153    .2990121 
          September |   .0424532   .0486114     0.87   0.383    -.0529925    .1378988 
            October |    .102057   .0494764     2.06   0.040     .0049128    .1992011 
           November |   .1766789   .0475556     3.72   0.000     .0833061    .2700516 
           December |   .2065354   .0471009     4.38   0.000     .1140554    .2990154 
            January |   .2566151   .0524616     4.89   0.000     .1536097    .3596204 
           February |    .243329     .05133     4.74   0.000     .1425454    .3441125 
              March |   .1451349   .0534601     2.71   0.007     .0401691    .2501008 
         AprilorMay |   .0910109   .0471058     1.93   0.054    -.0014786    .1835005 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.2343628   .0739852    -3.17   0.002    -.3796285    -.089097 
        Birmingham  |  -.3559497   .1218159    -2.92   0.004    -.5951284    -.116771 
         Blackburn  |  -.2842169   .1174789    -2.42   0.016    -.5148801   -.0535537 
         Blackpool  |  -.4594277   .2221461    -2.07   0.039    -.8955989   -.0232564 
            Bolton  |   -.341358   .1244971    -2.74   0.006     -.585801   -.0969151 
           Burnley  |  -.5385347    .210603    -2.56   0.011    -.9520418   -.1250275 
          Charlton  |  -.4137567   .1064923    -3.89   0.000    -.6228482   -.2046652 
           Chelsea  |  -.0962947   .0668356    -1.44   0.150    -.2275226    .0349331 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.4741384     .20602    -2.30   0.022     -.878647   -.0696297 
             Derby  |  -.4139182   .1148716    -3.60   0.000     -.639462   -.1883744 
           Everton  |  -.2402848   .0846054    -2.84   0.005    -.4064028   -.0741668 
            Fulham  |  -.3530646   .1266956    -2.79   0.005    -.6018241    -.104305 
              Hull  |  -.3664681   .1646143    -2.23   0.026    -.6896788   -.0432573 
         Liverpool  |   .0004471   .0599673     0.01   0.994    -.1172953    .1181896 
          Man City  |  -.0822859   .0594364    -1.38   0.167    -.1989859    .0344141 
           Man Utd  |   .2233359   .0596488     3.74   0.000     .1062188     .340453 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.3260294   .1126248    -2.89   0.004    -.5471618    -.104897 
         Newcastle  |  -.1269017   .0702035    -1.81   0.071    -.2647424     .010939 
           Norwich  |  -.5517662   .1267096    -4.35   0.000    -.8005533    -.302979 
        Portsmouth  |  -.3246166    .136689    -2.37   0.018    -.5929978   -.0562354 
               QPR  |  -.3084093   .1840978    -1.68   0.094     -.669875    .0530563 
           Reading  |  -.3537986   .1711546    -2.07   0.039     -.689851   -.0177463 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.1119654   .1366841    -0.82   0.413     -.380337    .1564061 
       Southampton  |  -.3935675   .1187422    -3.31   0.001    -.6267111    -.160424 
             Stoke  |  -.3328364   .1247656    -2.67   0.008    -.5778066   -.0878661 
        Sunderland  |  -.2845767    .099082    -2.87   0.004    -.4791187   -.0900347 
           Swansea  |  -.3798384   .1784296    -2.13   0.034    -.7301749   -.0295019 
         Tottenham  |   .0005916   .0761048     0.01   0.994    -.1488358     .150019 
               WBA  |  -.3922992   .1160379    -3.38   0.001     -.620133   -.1644654 
           Watford  |  -.5298569   .1782328    -2.97   0.003    -.8798069   -.1799069 
          West Ham  |  -.1642923   .0915136    -1.80   0.073     -.343974    .0153894 
             Wigan  |  -.4411126   .1654081    -2.67   0.008    -.7658821   -.1163431 
            Wolves  |  -.3510593   .1266698    -2.77   0.006    -.5997682   -.1023503 
                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0162473   .0393531    -0.41   0.680    -.0935148    .0610202 
              _2007 |  -.0279132   .0431708    -0.65   0.518    -.1126766    .0568501 
              _2008 |   .0169073   .0407174     0.42   0.678     -.063039    .0968537 
              _2009 |   .0441429    .044287     1.00   0.319    -.0428122     .131098 
              _2010 |   .0524469   .0530305     0.99   0.323    -.0516754    .1565692 
              _2011 |   .1802613   .0414163     4.35   0.000     .0989427    .2615798 
              _2012 |   .2746502   .0418679     6.56   0.000      .192445    .3568554 
              _cons |   .5617543   1.289468     0.44   0.663    -1.970044    3.093552 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Chapter 4 Estimation 2C (Draw Prob) 
 
. reg LnSkyViewers DrawProbAdj Previous_season_win HomePromoted HGS HGA AGS AGA 
HwagePL AwagePL LN 
> ATTN_1 Distance Distance2 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Sunday  
September October Nov 
> ember December January February March AprilorMay i.HTeam1 _2006 _2007 _2008 _2009 
_2010 _2011 _2 
> 012 if SkySports == 1, vce(r) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     756 
                                                       F( 65,   689) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6515 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .26625 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
       LnSkyViewers |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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        DrawProbAdj |   .8295369   .3260828     2.54   0.011     .1893018    1.469772 
Previous_season_win |   .2009816   .1629938     1.23   0.218    -.1190425    .5210057 
       HomePromoted |      -.027   .0640201    -0.42   0.673    -.1526978    .0986978 
                HGS |   .0037497   .0028779     1.30   0.193    -.0019009    .0094003 
                HGA |   .0043223    .004015     1.08   0.282    -.0035609    .0122055 
                AGS |   .0057917   .0033802     1.71   0.087     -.000845    .0124283 
                AGA |  -.0084285   .0034454    -2.45   0.015    -.0151932   -.0016638 
            HwagePL |   .1417515   .0477403     2.97   0.003     .0480176    .2354854 
            AwagePL |   .2459623     .01738    14.15   0.000     .2118383    .2800864 
           LNATTN_1 |  -.1600575   .1188135    -1.35   0.178    -.3933375    .0732225 
           Distance |  -.0000882   .0003915    -0.23   0.822    -.0008568    .0006805 
          Distance2 |  -1.16e-07   1.43e-06    -0.08   0.935    -2.92e-06    2.69e-06 
             Monday |   .0182269    .031784     0.57   0.567    -.0441782    .0806321 
            Tuesday |   .0803505   .0480364     1.67   0.095    -.0139648    .1746658 
          Wednesday |  -.0476788   .0688323    -0.69   0.489    -.1828251    .0874675 
           Thursday |  -.0970417    .051106    -1.90   0.058    -.1973839    .0033005 
             Friday |   .2251989   .0532833     4.23   0.000     .1205819    .3298159 
             Sunday |   .2515002   .0239649    10.49   0.000     .2044472    .2985532 
          September |   .0198179   .0486015     0.41   0.684    -.0756069    .1152426 
            October |   .0947743   .0497002     1.91   0.057    -.0028077    .1923562 
           November |   .1713916   .0475265     3.61   0.000     .0780775    .2647057 
           December |   .1999527   .0478837     4.18   0.000     .1059373    .2939682 
            January |   .2357916   .0534174     4.41   0.000     .1309112    .3406719 
           February |   .2369849   .0511966     4.63   0.000     .1364649    .3375049 
              March |   .1368496   .0535005     2.56   0.011     .0318061    .2418931 
         AprilorMay |   .0874885   .0477288     1.83   0.067    -.0062228    .1811998 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.1815071   .0731484    -2.48   0.013    -.3251275   -.0378866 
        Birmingham  |  -.3069726   .1244923    -2.47   0.014    -.5514025   -.0625428 
         Blackburn  |  -.2387387   .1187623    -2.01   0.045    -.4719181   -.0055592 
         Blackpool  |  -.4018471   .2186262    -1.84   0.066    -.8311006    .0274064 
            Bolton  |  -.2963484   .1249554    -2.37   0.018    -.5416875   -.0510093 
           Burnley  |  -.4826095   .2263496    -2.13   0.033    -.9270273   -.0381917 
          Charlton  |  -.3516184   .1078512    -3.26   0.001    -.5633748    -.139862 
           Chelsea  |  -.0788815   .0667808    -1.18   0.238    -.2099998    .0522367 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.4105114   .2088816    -1.97   0.050    -.8206323   -.0003906 
             Derby  |  -.2625527   .1103173    -2.38   0.018    -.4791511   -.0459543 
           Everton  |  -.2135404   .0845366    -2.53   0.012    -.3795208   -.0475601 
            Fulham  |  -.3239868   .1269693    -2.55   0.011    -.5732799   -.0746936 
              Hull  |  -.2999213   .1682345    -1.78   0.075     -.630235    .0303924 
         Liverpool  |   .0045299   .0607914     0.07   0.941    -.1148288    .1238886 
          Man City  |  -.0290286   .0588838    -0.49   0.622    -.1446419    .0865846 
           Man Utd  |   .2442867   .0612342     3.99   0.000     .1240588    .3645147 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.2917455   .1140867    -2.56   0.011    -.5157448   -.0677461 
         Newcastle  |  -.0313228   .0693319    -0.45   0.652    -.1674498    .1048043 
           Norwich  |  -.4890794   .1275778    -3.83   0.000    -.7395673   -.2385915 
        Portsmouth  |  -.2732997   .1370563    -1.99   0.047    -.5423979   -.0042015 
               QPR  |  -.2433429    .181247    -1.34   0.180    -.5992057    .1125199 
           Reading  |  -.2835616   .1694928    -1.67   0.095     -.616346    .0492227 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.0116355   .1277234    -0.09   0.927    -.2624092    .2391382 
       Southampton  |  -.3400444   .1358546    -2.50   0.013    -.6067829   -.0733058 
             Stoke  |  -.2535653   .1258799    -2.01   0.044    -.5007195   -.0064111 
        Sunderland  |  -.1867818   .0960622    -1.94   0.052    -.3753916    .0018279 
           Swansea  |  -.3763185   .1663737    -2.26   0.024    -.7029787   -.0496584 
         Tottenham  |  -.0005643   .0773347    -0.01   0.994    -.1524043    .1512757 
               WBA  |  -.3127005   .1170585    -2.67   0.008    -.5425347   -.0828664 
           Watford  |  -.4719795   .1837197    -2.57   0.010     -.832697   -.1112619 
          West Ham  |  -.0816874   .0919274    -0.89   0.375    -.2621787     .098804 
             Wigan  |  -.3873743   .1668553    -2.32   0.021    -.7149802   -.0597683 
            Wolves  |   -.288911   .1245985    -2.32   0.021    -.5335493   -.0442726 
                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0257494   .0392847    -0.66   0.512    -.1028816    .0513827 
              _2007 |  -.0165912   .0428816    -0.39   0.699    -.1007856    .0676032 
              _2008 |   .0133855    .041011     0.33   0.744     -.067136     .093907 
              _2009 |   .0371545    .043513     0.85   0.393    -.0482795    .1225886 
              _2010 |   .0538806   .0540987     1.00   0.320    -.0523376    .1600987 
              _2011 |   .1710843   .0420678     4.07   0.000     .0884877    .2536808 
              _2012 |   .2663444   .0416635     6.39   0.000     .1845417    .3481472 
              _cons |   .6629931   1.301704     0.51   0.611     -1.89279    3.218777 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Chapter 4 Estimation 2D (Diff in Home win Prob) 
 
. reg LnSkyViewers Probdiff Previous_season_win HomePromoted HGS HGA AGS AGA HwagePL 
AwagePL LNATT 
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> N_1 Distance Distance2 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Sunday  September 
October Novemb 
> er December January February March AprilorMay i.HTeam1 _2006 _2007 _2008 _2009 
_2010 _2011 _2012 
>  if SkySports == 1, vce(r) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     756 
                                                       F( 65,   689) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6510 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .26645 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
       LnSkyViewers |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           Probdiff |  -.1401775   .0566115    -2.48   0.014    -.2513293   -.0290257 
Previous_season_win |   .2019489    .162881     1.24   0.215    -.1178539    .5217516 
       HomePromoted |  -.0285089   .0642228    -0.44   0.657    -.1546047    .0975869 
                HGS |   .0036709   .0028448     1.29   0.197    -.0019146    .0092563 
                HGA |   .0042831   .0040243     1.06   0.288    -.0036183    .0121845 
                AGS |   .0058644    .003379     1.74   0.083    -.0007699    .0124987 
                AGA |  -.0086125   .0034355    -2.51   0.012    -.0153578   -.0018673 
            HwagePL |   .1372273   .0476063     2.88   0.004     .0437565    .2306981 
            AwagePL |   .2479695   .0172163    14.40   0.000     .2141667    .2817723 
           LNATTN_1 |  -.1585751   .1196908    -1.32   0.186    -.3935775    .0764274 
           Distance |  -.0000954   .0003912    -0.24   0.807    -.0008635    .0006726 
          Distance2 |  -1.13e-07   1.43e-06    -0.08   0.937    -2.92e-06    2.69e-06 
             Monday |   .0162938   .0319951     0.51   0.611    -.0465258    .0791133 
            Tuesday |    .082229   .0483937     1.70   0.090    -.0127879    .1772459 
          Wednesday |  -.0486283   .0687215    -0.71   0.479    -.1835571    .0863004 
           Thursday |  -.1016229   .0542373    -1.87   0.061    -.2081132    .0048674 
             Friday |   .2228958   .0511759     4.36   0.000     .1224163    .3233753 
             Sunday |   .2496841   .0241208    10.35   0.000      .202325    .2970431 
          September |   .0233768   .0484256     0.48   0.629    -.0717026    .1184562 
            October |   .0973542   .0496012     1.96   0.050    -.0000335    .1947419 
           November |   .1719804   .0474472     3.62   0.000     .0788219    .2651389 
           December |   .2009528   .0479291     4.19   0.000     .1068482    .2950574 
            January |   .2357568   .0536318     4.40   0.000     .1304554    .3410582 
           February |     .24097   .0511705     4.71   0.000     .1405011    .3414388 
              March |   .1382552   .0535284     2.58   0.010     .0331568    .2433537 
         AprilorMay |     .08507   .0477602     1.78   0.075     -.008703     .178843 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |  -.1751549   .0732159    -2.39   0.017    -.3189079   -.0314019 
        Birmingham  |  -.3036145   .1250803    -2.43   0.015    -.5491988   -.0580301 
         Blackburn  |  -.2335495   .1196402    -1.95   0.051    -.4684527    .0013536 
         Blackpool  |  -.4090275   .2205235    -1.85   0.064    -.8420062    .0239512 
            Bolton  |  -.2931126   .1258408    -2.33   0.020    -.5401899   -.0460352 
           Burnley  |  -.4963675   .2277424    -2.18   0.030    -.9435199    -.049215 
          Charlton  |  -.3506539   .1079757    -3.25   0.001    -.5626549    -.138653 
           Chelsea  |  -.0762198   .0669986    -1.14   0.256    -.2077657    .0553262 
    Crystal Palace  |  -.4215452   .2143626    -1.97   0.050    -.8424275    -.000663 
             Derby  |  -.2519664   .1101895    -2.29   0.023    -.4683138   -.0356189 
           Everton  |  -.2079809   .0849658    -2.45   0.015    -.3748039    -.041158 
            Fulham  |  -.3189048   .1274561    -2.50   0.013    -.5691539   -.0686558 
              Hull  |    -.30848   .1706135    -1.81   0.071    -.6434649    .0265048 
         Liverpool  |   .0103614   .0609363     0.17   0.865    -.1092817    .1300045 
          Man City  |  -.0231178   .0588991    -0.39   0.695    -.1387611    .0925255 
           Man Utd  |   .2438077   .0613927     3.97   0.000     .1232685    .3643469 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.2858074   .1142841    -2.50   0.013    -.5101943   -.0614205 
         Newcastle  |  -.0269425   .0690322    -0.39   0.696    -.1624812    .1085961 
           Norwich  |  -.4883259   .1282846    -3.81   0.000    -.7402015   -.2364502 
        Portsmouth  |  -.2705933   .1385824    -1.95   0.051    -.5426878    .0015012 
               QPR  |  -.2397934   .1810206    -1.32   0.186    -.5952117    .1156248 
           Reading  |   -.280672   .1704918    -1.65   0.100    -.6154178    .0540737 
         Sheff Utd  |  -.0013541   .1293999    -0.01   0.992    -.2554195    .2527113 
       Southampton  |  -.3650397   .1398337    -2.61   0.009     -.639591   -.0904883 
             Stoke  |  -.2487479   .1266404    -1.96   0.050    -.4973953   -.0001004 
        Sunderland  |  -.1876256   .0964325    -1.95   0.052    -.3769625    .0017113 
           Swansea  |  -.3717721   .1665339    -2.23   0.026    -.6987469   -.0447973 
         Tottenham  |    .005448   .0774695     0.07   0.944    -.1466565    .1575526 
               WBA  |  -.3159583   .1179854    -2.68   0.008    -.5476124   -.0843042 
           Watford  |  -.4776567   .1851957    -2.58   0.010    -.8412724    -.114041 
          West Ham  |  -.0764954   .0919237    -0.83   0.406    -.2569795    .1039887 
             Wigan  |   -.386039   .1677442    -2.30   0.022    -.7153901   -.0566878 
            Wolves  |  -.2899197   .1248387    -2.32   0.021    -.5350297   -.0448098 
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                    | 
              _2006 |  -.0273511    .039611    -0.69   0.490    -.1051238    .0504216 
              _2007 |   -.019674   .0431227    -0.46   0.648    -.1043417    .0649936 
              _2008 |   .0088111   .0413777     0.21   0.831    -.0724305    .0900528 
              _2009 |   .0333134   .0437554     0.76   0.447    -.0525965    .1192233 
              _2010 |   .0478932   .0539825     0.89   0.375    -.0580969    .1538832 
              _2011 |   .1638093   .0422635     3.88   0.000     .0808286    .2467899 
              _2012 |   .2573093   .0417886     6.16   0.000     .1752611    .3393575 
              _cons |   .9142494   1.313388     0.70   0.487    -1.664473    3.492972 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Chapter 4 Diagnostic tests for Estimation 1C (Stadium attendance, Draw Prob) 
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                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |    Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   2964    0.96461     59.975    10.560    0.00000 
 
 
Chapter 4 Diagnostic tests for Estimation 2C (Television Audience, Draw Prob) 
 
 
 
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
D
en
si
ty
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Residuals
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0530
Kernel density estimate
 211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
N
or
m
al
 F
[(r
-m
)/s
]
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
R
es
id
ua
ls
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Inverse Normal
 212 
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |    Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
           r |    756    0.94579     26.511     8.023    0.00000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
 DrawProbAdj |      1.50    0.666613 
Previous_s~n |      6.49    0.154092 
HomePromoted |      5.32    0.188005 
         HGS |      1.82    0.550915 
         HGA |      1.57    0.636846 
         AGS |      1.50    0.668216 
         AGA |      1.49    0.673133 
     HwagePL |     13.13    0.076179 
     AwagePL |      1.79    0.559946 
    LNATTN_1 |     28.73    0.034806 
    Distance |     14.99    0.066692 
   Distance2 |     15.56    0.064256 
      Monday |      1.66    0.603076 
     Tuesday |      1.39    0.721263 
   Wednesday |      1.35    0.741316 
    Thursday |      1.10    0.905537 
      Friday |      1.16    0.865592 
      Sunday |      1.84    0.544096 
   September |      2.06    0.484851 
     October |      2.31    0.432338 
    November |      2.42    0.412959 
    December |      2.82    0.354774 
     January |      2.27    0.440890 
    February |      2.15    0.465805 
       March |      2.22    0.450234 
  AprilorMay |      3.32    0.301466 
      HTeam1 | 
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          2  |      3.04    0.328641 
          3  |      3.47    0.288164 
          4  |      6.61    0.151325 
          5  |      3.82    0.261923 
          6  |      6.57    0.152293 
          7  |      1.92    0.522058 
          8  |      2.53    0.395175 
          9  |      3.73    0.268002 
         10  |      1.82    0.549023 
         11  |      1.18    0.846122 
         12  |      3.28    0.304633 
         13  |      7.85    0.127467 
         14  |      2.20    0.455469 
         15  |      2.33    0.430045 
         16  |      2.60    0.384301 
         17  |      3.87    0.258342 
         18  |      2.64    0.378544 
         19  |      2.44    0.410144 
         20  |      2.40    0.417525 
         21  |      4.53    0.220894 
         22  |      2.63    0.380581 
         23  |      2.69    0.372297 
         24  |      1.37    0.728479 
         25  |      1.57    0.635273 
         26  |      4.80    0.208461 
         27  |      2.74    0.365104 
         28  |      2.40    0.417118 
         29  |      3.76    0.265839 
         30  |      4.00    0.250116 
         31  |      2.34    0.426942 
         32  |      3.29    0.304074 
         33  |      8.14    0.122787 
         34  |      3.43    0.291330 
       _2006 |      2.02    0.495103 
       _2007 |      2.20    0.453840 
       _2008 |      2.18    0.459664 
       _2009 |      2.14    0.467258 
       _2010 |      2.35    0.424943 
       _2011 |      2.55    0.391415 
       _2012 |      2.77    0.360666 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.79 
 
 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of LnSkyViewers 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 686) =      2.59 
                  Prob > F =      0.0520 
 
 
Appendix C: Regression Output Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 Estimation of Revenue (with fixed effects) 
 
. reg LNREVENUE TV Hpopden Apopden  Distance Distance2 Hmaleearnings Amaleearnings 
HUNN AU 
> NN Rival HwagePL AwagePL DrawProbAdj  LNATTN_1 Hageofclub Aageofclub 
Previous_season_win 
>  HomePromoted  Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Sunday  September October November 
Dece 
> mber January February March AprilorMay i.HTeam1 _2006 _2007 _2008 _2009 _2010 _2011 
_201 
> 2, vce(r) 
note: _2009 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _2010 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _2012 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1520 
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                                                       F( 60,  1459) =  710.09 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9375 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .13316 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
          LNREVENUE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 TV |  -.0084777   .0080683    -1.05   0.294    -.0243044    .0073489 
            Hpopden |  -2.11e-06   8.35e-06    -0.25   0.800    -.0000185    .0000143 
            Apopden |   1.92e-07   1.77e-06     0.11   0.914    -3.29e-06    3.67e-06 
           Distance |  -.0009538   .0001914    -4.98   0.000    -.0013293   -.0005783 
          Distance2 |   2.03e-06   5.21e-07     3.90   0.000     1.01e-06    3.05e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0013137   .0002111    -6.22   0.000    -.0017278   -.0008997 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0000969   .0000525    -1.84   0.065       -.0002    6.14e-06 
               HUNN |  -.0176777   .0056678    -3.12   0.002    -.0287957   -.0065598 
               AUNN |   .0004113    .002991     0.14   0.891    -.0054557    .0062783 
              Rival |   .0402382   .0172401     2.33   0.020     .0064202    .0740562 
            HwagePL |   .1412315   .0609484     2.32   0.021     .0216756    .2607875 
            AwagePL |   .1148414   .0089661    12.81   0.000     .0972536    .1324291 
        DrawProbAdj |  -.4268492   .1332559    -3.20   0.001    -.6882428   -.1654556 
           LNATTN_1 |   .3893859   .0609324     6.39   0.000     .2698613    .5089104 
         Hageofclub |  -.1160981   .0676545    -1.72   0.086    -.2488085    .0166123 
         Aageofclub |   .0001774   .0002381     0.74   0.456    -.0002897    .0006445 
Previous_season_win |  -.1396662   .0720036    -1.94   0.053    -.2809079    .0015755 
       HomePromoted |   .1611268   .0248733     6.48   0.000     .1123356    .2099181 
            Tuesday |   .0005639   .0174568     0.03   0.974    -.0336793     .034807 
          Wednesday |  -.0390195   .0119539    -3.26   0.001    -.0624682   -.0155707 
           Thursday |  -.0390165   .0673708    -0.58   0.563    -.1711705    .0931375 
             Friday |   .0226842   .0208115     1.09   0.276    -.0181394    .0635078 
             Sunday |  -.0052426   .0097992    -0.54   0.593    -.0244646    .0139793 
          September |   .0049455   .0205818     0.24   0.810    -.0354276    .0453186 
            October |   .0185679   .0213943     0.87   0.386    -.0233989    .0605348 
           November |   .0289998   .0222237     1.30   0.192     -.014594    .0725936 
           December |   .0302994   .0192757     1.57   0.116    -.0075117    .0681105 
            January |   .0216759   .0196984     1.10   0.271    -.0169643     .060316 
           February |   .0476859   .0207274     2.30   0.022     .0070272    .0883446 
              March |   .0237368   .0201218     1.18   0.238    -.0157339    .0632074 
         AprilorMay |   .0556143   .0197049     2.82   0.005     .0169614    .0942672 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |   .1600703   .8250474     0.19   0.846    -1.458336    1.778476 
        Birmingham  |   .3235128   .7650354     0.42   0.672    -1.177174      1.8242 
         Blackburn  |  -.6097658    .764915    -0.80   0.425    -2.110216    .8906847 
            Bolton  |  -.0207109   .8282313    -0.03   0.980    -1.645362     1.60394 
          Charlton  |  -3.793728   1.280595    -2.96   0.003    -6.305732   -1.281723 
           Chelsea  |    -2.5355   1.307562    -1.94   0.053    -5.100402    .0294026 
    Crystal Palace  |   -3.49043   1.287332    -2.71   0.007     -6.01565   -.9652101 
             Derby  |  -.8157888   .2003933    -4.07   0.000    -1.208878   -.4226991 
           Everton  |  -.1632245   .5575201    -0.29   0.770    -1.256851     .930402 
            Fulham  |   .0934428   .5160735     0.18   0.856    -.9188825    1.105768 
         Liverpool  |  -1.703787   .4433834    -3.84   0.000    -2.573524   -.8340495 
          Man City  |  -1.190104   .1549014    -7.68   0.000    -1.493957   -.8862506 
           Man Utd  |   .1130213   .5200522     0.22   0.828    -.9071086    1.133151 
     Middlesbrough  |  -.2278168   .6989468    -0.33   0.745    -1.598865    1.143231 
         Newcastle  |  -.3156705   .3496241    -0.90   0.367     -1.00149    .3701491 
           Norwich  |  -3.506968   1.087135    -3.23   0.001    -5.639483   -1.374453 
        Portsmouth  |  -2.700219   .8086819    -3.34   0.001    -4.286522   -1.113915 
           Reading  |   .7154527   1.034414     0.69   0.489    -1.313645     2.74455 
         Sheff Utd  |  -1.756387   .2678545    -6.56   0.000    -2.281809   -1.230966 
       Southampton  |  -1.373782   .1647943    -8.34   0.000    -1.697041   -1.050523 
        Sunderland  |  -.5450866   .4862536    -1.12   0.262    -1.498917    .4087442 
         Tottenham  |  -.1355941   .2890848    -0.47   0.639    -.7026602    .4314721 
               WBA  |  -.5365517   .5998011    -0.89   0.371    -1.713116     .640013 
           Watford  |  -1.083744   .3779434    -2.87   0.004    -1.825114   -.3423736 
          West Ham  |  -1.838381   .6145154    -2.99   0.003    -3.043809   -.6329529 
             Wigan  |  -6.998792   3.112429    -2.25   0.025    -13.10411   -.8934776 
                    | 
              _2006 |   .1099685   .0676924     1.62   0.104    -.0228163    .2427533 
              _2007 |   .2839945   .1348888     2.11   0.035     .0193979    .5485911 
              _2008 |   .4006721    .204089     1.96   0.050      .000333    .8010113 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   25.45604   7.905217     3.22   0.001     9.949239    40.96285 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Chapter 5 Estimation of Attendance (Tobit with fixed effects) 
  
 
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      1520 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       638 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       2.4 
                                                               max =         4 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(60)      =  10184.82 
Log likelihood  =  402.23047                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 TV |    -.03546   .0079941    -4.44   0.000    -.0511282   -.0197919 
            Hpopden |   .0000296   8.70e-06     3.41   0.001     .0000126    .0000467 
            Apopden |   2.93e-06   2.01e-06     1.46   0.144    -1.00e-06    6.87e-06 
           Distance |  -.0006203    .000213    -2.91   0.004    -.0010379   -.0002028 
          Distance2 |   1.17e-06   6.59e-07     1.78   0.075    -1.20e-07    2.46e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0000144   .0002449    -0.06   0.953    -.0004943    .0004656 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0001956   .0000559    -3.50   0.000    -.0003051   -.0000861 
               HUNN |   -.010456   .0049486    -2.11   0.035    -.0201551   -.0007568 
               AUNN |   .0077528   .0029623     2.62   0.009     .0019468    .0135588 
              Rival |   .0061784   .0169493     0.36   0.715    -.0270416    .0393983 
            HwagePL |   .1361136   .0661379     2.06   0.040     .0064856    .2657416 
            AwagePL |   .1036459   .0078085    13.27   0.000     .0883415    .1189503 
        DrawProbAdj |   -.551669   .1715049    -3.22   0.001    -.8878125   -.2155255 
           LNATTN_1 |   .2865001   .0620857     4.61   0.000     .1648144    .4081857 
         Hageofclub |  -.1483563    .050921    -2.91   0.004    -.2481595    -.048553 
         Aageofclub |   .0002169   .0002563     0.85   0.397    -.0002854    .0007192 
Previous_season_win |   .0568391   .0647355     0.88   0.380    -.0700401    .1837182 
       HomePromoted |   .1019502   .0283148     3.60   0.000     .0464542    .1574461 
            Tuesday |   -.023782   .0164235    -1.45   0.148    -.0559714    .0084074 
          Wednesday |  -.0639335    .012665    -5.05   0.000    -.0887564   -.0391106 
           Thursday |  -.1287316   .0520917    -2.47   0.013    -.2308295   -.0266337 
             Friday |   .0575283   .0727648     0.79   0.429    -.0850881    .2001447 
             Sunday |  -.0086972   .0095773    -0.91   0.364    -.0274684     .010074 
          September |  -.0076095   .0157047    -0.48   0.628    -.0383901    .0231712 
            October |   .0131222   .0155242     0.85   0.398    -.0173046    .0435491 
           November |   .0134832   .0152457     0.88   0.376    -.0163978    .0433643 
           December |   .0222235   .0138498     1.60   0.109    -.0049216    .0493685 
            January |  -.0008252   .0151786    -0.05   0.957    -.0305747    .0289243 
           February |   .0559098   .0158497     3.53   0.000      .024845    .0869747 
              March |   .0056454   .0153657     0.37   0.713    -.0244708    .0357616 
         AprilorMay |   .0662836   .0137929     4.81   0.000     .0392501    .0933172 
                    | 
             HTeam1 | 
       Aston Villa  |   1.168488   14.57421     0.08   0.936    -27.39645    29.73342 
        Birmingham  |   .8237859   14.57246     0.06   0.955    -27.73771    29.38529 
         Blackburn  |   .6871643   14.57277     0.05   0.962    -27.87493    29.24926 
            Bolton  |   .8754171   14.57471     0.06   0.952    -27.69049    29.44132 
          Charlton  |  -3.633981   14.59141    -0.25   0.803    -32.23262    24.96466 
           Chelsea  |  -3.706796   14.59435    -0.25   0.800    -32.31121    24.89761 
    Crystal Palace  |  -3.781782   14.59155    -0.26   0.795    -32.38069    24.81713 
             Derby  |  -.4536486   14.56144    -0.03   0.975    -28.99355    28.08625 
           Everton  |   .6030774   14.56693     0.04   0.967    -27.94758    29.15374 
            Fulham  |  -.1547645   14.56605    -0.01   0.992    -28.70371    28.39418 
         Liverpool  |  -1.393191   14.56433    -0.10   0.924    -29.93876    27.15237 
          Man City  |  -.6366855   14.56102    -0.04   0.965    -29.17577     27.9024 
           Man Utd  |   .9847586   14.56576     0.07   0.946     -27.5636    29.53312 
     Middlesbrough  |   .6974601   14.57058     0.05   0.962    -27.86035    29.25527 
         Newcastle  |   .5376846   14.56308     0.04   0.971    -28.00544     29.0808 
           Norwich  |  -3.317796   14.58278    -0.23   0.820    -31.89953    25.26393 
        Portsmouth  |  -2.772814   14.57246    -0.19   0.849    -31.33432    25.78869 
           Reading  |   1.418925   14.58229     0.10   0.922    -27.16185     29.9997 
         Sheff Utd  |  -1.060222   14.56182    -0.07   0.942    -29.60087    27.48042 
       Southampton  |  -.5555871   14.56119    -0.04   0.970    -29.09499    27.98381 
        Sunderland  |   .5043239   14.56547     0.03   0.972    -28.04348    29.05212 
         Tottenham  |   .0709493   14.56227     0.00   0.996    -28.47058    28.61248 
               WBA  |   .4235984   14.56808     0.03   0.977    -28.12931    28.97651 
           Watford  |   -.444803    14.5636    -0.03   0.976    -28.98893    28.09933 
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          West Ham  |  -2.001717    14.5676    -0.14   0.891    -30.55369    26.55026 
             Wigan  |  -7.814701    14.7437    -0.53   0.596    -36.71183    21.08243 
                    | 
              _2006 |   .0721381   .0501276     1.44   0.150    -.0261102    .1703863 
              _2007 |   .2334833   .1010546     2.31   0.021     .0354199    .4315468 
              _2008 |   .4067322   .1539852     2.64   0.008     .1049267    .7085377 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   25.78681   15.67539     1.65   0.100    -4.936398    56.51001 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           /sigma_u |   5.90e-08   1.20e-08     4.90   0.000     3.54e-08    8.26e-08 
           /sigma_e |   .1046934   .0028447    36.80   0.000     .0991178     .110269 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |   3.18e-13   1.31e-13                      1.41e-13    7.08e-13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Observation summary:         0  left-censored observations 
                             727     uncensored observations 
                             793 right-censored observations 
                               0       interval observations 
 
Chapter 5 Estimation of Revenue by quantiles (0.1 to 0.9) 
 
. sqreg LNREVENUE TV Hpopden Apopden  Distance Distance2 Hmaleearnings Amaleearnings 
HUNN AUNN Rival HwagePL AwagePL DrawProbAdj  LNATTN_1 
>  Hageofclub Aageofclub Previous_season_win HomePromoted  Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 
Friday Sunday  September October November December J 
> anuary February March AprilorMay  _2006 _2007 _2008 _2009 _2010 _2011 _2012, 
quantile(.10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .90) 
note: _2009 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _2010 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _2012 omitted because of collinearity 
(fitting base model) 
 
Bootstrap replications (20) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
.................... 
 
Simultaneous quantile regression                     Number of obs =      1520 
  bootstrap(20) SEs                                  .10 Pseudo R2 =    0.5731 
                                                     .20 Pseudo R2 =    0.5772 
                                                     .30 Pseudo R2 =    0.5945 
                                                     .40 Pseudo R2 =    0.6174 
                                                     .50 Pseudo R2 =    0.6349 
                                                     .60 Pseudo R2 =    0.6480 
                                                     .70 Pseudo R2 =    0.6562 
                                                     .80 Pseudo R2 =    0.6596 
                                                     .90 Pseudo R2 =    0.6464 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |              Bootstrap 
          LNREVENUE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q10                 | 
                 TV |   -.011066   .0242604    -0.46   0.648    -.0586542    .0365222 
            Hpopden |   .0000972   8.56e-06    11.35   0.000     .0000804    .0001139 
            Apopden |  -1.48e-06   4.44e-06    -0.33   0.739    -.0000102    7.23e-06 
           Distance |  -.0019361   .0006928    -2.79   0.005    -.0032951   -.0005771 
          Distance2 |   4.88e-06   2.00e-06     2.45   0.015     9.67e-07    8.80e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0007392   .0002045    -3.61   0.000    -.0011403   -.0003381 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0000478   .0001611    -0.30   0.767    -.0003637    .0002682 
               HUNN |    .022018   .0172387     1.28   0.202    -.0117967    .0558327 
               AUNN |  -.0005972   .0082298    -0.07   0.942    -.0167404     .015546 
              Rival |  -.0699775    .057148    -1.22   0.221    -.1820769    .0421219 
            HwagePL |   .0310158   .0666623     0.47   0.642    -.0997464    .1617781 
            AwagePL |   .0912275   .0300388     3.04   0.002     .0323045    .1501505 
        DrawProbAdj |   .3301171   .4763173     0.69   0.488    -.6042092    1.264443 
           LNATTN_1 |   1.125448   .0702283    16.03   0.000     .9876908    1.263205 
         Hageofclub |   .0036761   .0009169     4.01   0.000     .0018777    .0054746 
         Aageofclub |    .000848    .000527     1.61   0.108    -.0001859    .0018818 
Previous_season_win |   .4822719   .2221952     2.17   0.030      .046422    .9181218 
       HomePromoted |   .0098232   .0678973     0.14   0.885    -.1233616     .143008 
            Tuesday |   .0401309   .0567198     0.71   0.479    -.0711286    .1513904 
          Wednesday |  -.0447555   .0411868    -1.09   0.277     -.125546     .036035 
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           Thursday |   .0663728   .1184765     0.56   0.575    -.1660262    .2987719 
             Friday |   .2989148   .0729255     4.10   0.000     .1558669    .4419627 
             Sunday |   .0022028   .0238535     0.09   0.926    -.0445874     .048993 
          September |   .0287062    .049285     0.58   0.560    -.0679693    .1253818 
            October |   .0290225   .0380489     0.76   0.446    -.0456128    .1036578 
           November |   .0410866   .0380981     1.08   0.281    -.0336451    .1158183 
           December |   .0372167   .0374278     0.99   0.320    -.0362003    .1106337 
            January |    .036221   .0455725     0.79   0.427    -.0531723    .1256143 
           February |   .0654186   .0413585     1.58   0.114    -.0157087     .146546 
              March |   .0315622   .0410401     0.77   0.442    -.0489405    .1120649 
         AprilorMay |   .0683937   .0306937     2.23   0.026      .008186    .1286014 
              _2006 |  -.0264571   .0290819    -0.91   0.363    -.0835032     .030589 
              _2007 |   .0431829   .0351748     1.23   0.220    -.0258146    .1121804 
              _2008 |   .0430217    .040004     1.08   0.282    -.0354486     .121492 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   .9522922   .8097971     1.18   0.240    -.6361757     2.54076 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q20                 | 
                 TV |  -.0315544   .0194698    -1.62   0.105    -.0697456    .0066367 
            Hpopden |   .0000722   9.21e-06     7.84   0.000     .0000541    .0000902 
            Apopden |  -1.85e-06   4.19e-06    -0.44   0.659    -.0000101    6.37e-06 
           Distance |  -.0014376   .0006116    -2.35   0.019    -.0026373   -.0002378 
          Distance2 |   3.68e-06   1.88e-06     1.96   0.050    -2.91e-09    7.36e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0002909   .0002405    -1.21   0.227    -.0007627    .0001808 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0000916   .0001287    -0.71   0.477     -.000344    .0001608 
               HUNN |  -.0082521   .0125027    -0.66   0.509     -.032777    .0162728 
               AUNN |  -.0030378   .0065291    -0.47   0.642    -.0158451    .0097694 
              Rival |  -.0070928   .0421317    -0.17   0.866    -.0897368    .0755512 
            HwagePL |   -.009903   .0476676    -0.21   0.835     -.103406       .0836 
            AwagePL |   .1221031   .0185547     6.58   0.000     .0857069    .1584993 
        DrawProbAdj |  -.3075585   .2818124    -1.09   0.275    -.8603513    .2452343 
           LNATTN_1 |   1.218702   .0582369    20.93   0.000     1.104466    1.332937 
         Hageofclub |   .0024553   .0017439     1.41   0.159    -.0009654     .005876 
         Aageofclub |   .0003513   .0007475     0.47   0.638    -.0011149    .0018175 
Previous_season_win |   .3309117   .1634387     2.02   0.043     .0103165    .6515069 
       HomePromoted |   .0594143   .0681979     0.87   0.384    -.0743601    .1931888 
            Tuesday |   .0017715   .0361075     0.05   0.961    -.0690557    .0725987 
          Wednesday |  -.0140717   .0484534    -0.29   0.772    -.1091161    .0809727 
           Thursday |    -.08885   .1082379    -0.82   0.412    -.3011654    .1234654 
             Friday |   .1338352   .0505774     2.65   0.008     .0346246    .2330459 
             Sunday |   .0065959   .0247687     0.27   0.790    -.0419893    .0551812 
          September |   .0167227   .0469852     0.36   0.722    -.0754418    .1088872 
            October |   .0106472   .0412543     0.26   0.796    -.0702757    .0915702 
           November |   .0234924   .0400924     0.59   0.558    -.0551515    .1021362 
           December |   .0426611   .0348872     1.22   0.222    -.0257724    .1110946 
            January |   .0339806    .034107     1.00   0.319    -.0329224    .1008836 
           February |   .0824312   .0331345     2.49   0.013     .0174358    .1474266 
              March |   .0397459   .0530883     0.75   0.454    -.0643902    .1438819 
         AprilorMay |    .057449   .0318907     1.80   0.072    -.0051066    .1200046 
              _2006 |  -.0026426   .0255275    -0.10   0.918    -.0527164    .0474311 
              _2007 |    .057826   .0251272     2.30   0.022     .0085374    .1071146 
              _2008 |   .0522544    .026302     1.99   0.047     .0006615    .1038474 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   .5511854   .6099618     0.90   0.366     -.645293    1.747664 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q30                 | 
                 TV |  -.0330729   .0143459    -2.31   0.021    -.0612133   -.0049325 
            Hpopden |   .0000656   8.02e-06     8.18   0.000     .0000499    .0000814 
            Apopden |  -7.87e-07   2.78e-06    -0.28   0.777    -6.25e-06    4.67e-06 
           Distance |  -.0014856    .000384    -3.87   0.000    -.0022389   -.0007323 
          Distance2 |   4.34e-06   1.21e-06     3.59   0.000     1.97e-06    6.71e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0003536   .0001938    -1.82   0.068    -.0007337    .0000266 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0001193   .0000659    -1.81   0.071    -.0002485    9.99e-06 
               HUNN |   .0016667   .0071244     0.23   0.815    -.0123083    .0156416 
               AUNN |   .0037156   .0058703     0.63   0.527    -.0077994    .0152306 
              Rival |   .0041223   .0299305     0.14   0.890    -.0545884    .0628329 
            HwagePL |   .0152188   .0355245     0.43   0.668    -.0544648    .0849024 
            AwagePL |   .1268306   .0138833     9.14   0.000     .0995976    .1540635 
        DrawProbAdj |  -.4484093   .2681756    -1.67   0.095    -.9744525    .0776339 
           LNATTN_1 |   1.137242   .0599519    18.97   0.000     1.019643    1.254842 
         Hageofclub |   .0002342   .0008141     0.29   0.774    -.0013626     .001831 
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         Aageofclub |  -.0001179    .000652    -0.18   0.856    -.0013968    .0011609 
Previous_season_win |   .2186958    .117334     1.86   0.063    -.0114621    .4488538 
       HomePromoted |    .056306   .0512785     1.10   0.272    -.0442801    .1568921 
            Tuesday |   .0163822   .0239546     0.68   0.494    -.0306063    .0633707 
          Wednesday |  -.0213426   .0280429    -0.76   0.447    -.0763504    .0336653 
           Thursday |   -.106975   .1075677    -0.99   0.320    -.3179758    .1040257 
             Friday |   .0422444   .0538155     0.78   0.433    -.0633182    .1478069 
             Sunday |  -.0186846   .0199634    -0.94   0.349    -.0578441    .0204749 
          September |   .0090064   .0350603     0.26   0.797    -.0597666    .0777794 
            October |   .0019956   .0277417     0.07   0.943    -.0524216    .0564127 
           November |   .0207816   .0264401     0.79   0.432    -.0310824    .0726455 
           December |   .0196472   .0236343     0.83   0.406     -.026713    .0660074 
            January |  -.0036631   .0323761    -0.11   0.910    -.0671709    .0598447 
           February |   .0478309    .027671     1.73   0.084    -.0064475    .1021093 
              March |   .0345964   .0347499     1.00   0.320    -.0335676    .1027605 
         AprilorMay |   .0497657   .0265181     1.88   0.061    -.0022513    .1017827 
              _2006 |   .0073394    .018031     0.41   0.684    -.0280296    .0427085 
              _2007 |   .0395893   .0199822     1.98   0.048     .0003929    .0787857 
              _2008 |   .0346002   .0200439     1.73   0.085    -.0047172    .0739176 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   1.866816   .5803678     3.22   0.001     .7283885    3.005244 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q40                 | 
                 TV |  -.0163611   .0116362    -1.41   0.160    -.0391862    .0064639 
            Hpopden |   .0000745   8.00e-06     9.31   0.000     .0000588    .0000902 
            Apopden |   9.39e-07   3.44e-06     0.27   0.785    -5.81e-06    7.69e-06 
           Distance |  -.0012916   .0002757    -4.69   0.000    -.0018323   -.0007508 
          Distance2 |   3.65e-06   8.60e-07     4.25   0.000     1.96e-06    5.34e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0005772   .0001824    -3.16   0.002     -.000935   -.0002194 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0001015   .0000802    -1.27   0.206    -.0002587    .0000558 
               HUNN |  -.0012474   .0071877    -0.17   0.862    -.0153465    .0128516 
               AUNN |   .0036845   .0064435     0.57   0.568    -.0089548    .0163239 
              Rival |   .0288472   .0290371     0.99   0.321    -.0281109    .0858052 
            HwagePL |  -.0001838   .0381082    -0.00   0.996    -.0749354    .0745677 
            AwagePL |   .1126639   .0107705    10.46   0.000     .0915369    .1337909 
        DrawProbAdj |  -.3071541   .2682633    -1.14   0.252    -.8333694    .2190612 
           LNATTN_1 |   1.131156   .0619358    18.26   0.000     1.009665    1.252647 
         Hageofclub |  -.0008066   .0008971    -0.90   0.369    -.0025663    .0009532 
         Aageofclub |    .000032   .0006147     0.05   0.958    -.0011738    .0012378 
Previous_season_win |   .2438524   .1176253     2.07   0.038     .0131231    .4745818 
       HomePromoted |   .0712674   .0516438     1.38   0.168    -.0300352      .17257 
            Tuesday |   .0119345   .0226539     0.53   0.598    -.0325025    .0563716 
          Wednesday |  -.0140898   .0296011    -0.48   0.634    -.0721542    .0439745 
           Thursday |   .0764652   .1086523     0.70   0.482    -.1366631    .2895935 
             Friday |   .1041496   .0687449     1.52   0.130    -.0306979     .238997 
             Sunday |  -.0075604   .0184753    -0.41   0.682    -.0438009      .02868 
          September |  -.0011115   .0338447    -0.03   0.974    -.0674999     .065277 
            October |  -.0072798   .0263321    -0.28   0.782    -.0589318    .0443722 
           November |   .0054997   .0317195     0.17   0.862    -.0567201    .0677196 
           December |   .0091625    .022907     0.40   0.689    -.0357711     .054096 
            January |  -.0050943   .0297264    -0.17   0.864    -.0634046     .053216 
           February |    .026452   .0242355     1.09   0.275    -.0210875    .0739914 
              March |   .0116729   .0297535     0.39   0.695    -.0466905    .0700362 
         AprilorMay |   .0347633   .0252524     1.38   0.169    -.0147708    .0842973 
              _2006 |   .0024682   .0166198     0.15   0.882    -.0301326    .0350689 
              _2007 |   .0388408   .0199143     1.95   0.051    -.0002224    .0779039 
              _2008 |   .0429176   .0168044     2.55   0.011     .0099547    .0758806 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   2.130391   .6267253     3.40   0.001     .9010301    3.359752 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q50                 | 
                 TV |  -.0307933   .0110368    -2.79   0.005    -.0524427    -.009144 
            Hpopden |   .0000766   3.20e-06    23.98   0.000     .0000704    .0000829 
            Apopden |   2.70e-06   3.60e-06     0.75   0.453    -4.36e-06    9.76e-06 
           Distance |  -.0009312   .0002969    -3.14   0.002    -.0015135   -.0003488 
          Distance2 |   2.42e-06   8.94e-07     2.71   0.007     6.69e-07    4.18e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0006646   .0000933    -7.12   0.000    -.0008475   -.0004816 
      Amaleearnings |   -.000131   .0001013    -1.29   0.196    -.0003297    .0000676 
               HUNN |   .0061343   .0055927     1.10   0.273    -.0048361    .0171048 
               AUNN |   .0012905   .0049791     0.26   0.796    -.0084762    .0110573 
              Rival |   .0335376   .0286194     1.17   0.241    -.0226011    .0896763 
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            HwagePL |   .0210691   .0317947     0.66   0.508    -.0412982    .0834364 
            AwagePL |   .1158407   .0124659     9.29   0.000     .0913881    .1402934 
        DrawProbAdj |  -.1519156   .1970918    -0.77   0.441    -.5385236    .2346925 
           LNATTN_1 |   1.090805   .0427083    25.54   0.000      1.00703     1.17458 
         Hageofclub |  -.0016045   .0008252    -1.94   0.052    -.0032232    .0000142 
         Aageofclub |  -.0002034   .0004692    -0.43   0.665    -.0011237    .0007169 
Previous_season_win |   .1841148   .1027059     1.79   0.073    -.0173492    .3855788 
       HomePromoted |    .206436    .033595     6.14   0.000     .1405373    .2723348 
            Tuesday |  -.0082258   .0278683    -0.30   0.768    -.0628913    .0464397 
          Wednesday |  -.0349633   .0248835    -1.41   0.160    -.0837739    .0138473 
           Thursday |   .0390277   .1332767     0.29   0.770    -.2224028    .3004583 
             Friday |    .086069   .0683577     1.26   0.208    -.0480189    .2201569 
             Sunday |  -.0113268   .0161719    -0.70   0.484     -.043049    .0203954 
          September |   .0075518   .0319456     0.24   0.813    -.0551116    .0702152 
            October |   .0052037    .022001     0.24   0.813    -.0379527    .0483602 
           November |   .0349114    .035341     0.99   0.323    -.0344122     .104235 
           December |   .0283573   .0197183     1.44   0.151    -.0103214    .0670361 
            January |   .0026849   .0286546     0.09   0.925    -.0535229    .0588926 
           February |   .0394959   .0275857     1.43   0.152    -.0146152     .093607 
              March |   .0382855   .0253478     1.51   0.131    -.0114358    .0880068 
         AprilorMay |   .0525053   .0240435     2.18   0.029     .0053426    .0996681 
              _2006 |   .0040153   .0143552     0.28   0.780    -.0241434     .032174 
              _2007 |   .0400068   .0162349     2.46   0.014     .0081611    .0718526 
              _2008 |   .0329983   .0175828     1.88   0.061    -.0014915    .0674882 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   2.676002   .4514945     5.93   0.000     1.790367    3.561637 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q60                 | 
                 TV |   -.020875   .0133606    -1.56   0.118    -.0470827    .0053327 
            Hpopden |   .0000754   2.80e-06    26.96   0.000     .0000699    .0000809 
            Apopden |   3.73e-06   2.13e-06     1.76   0.079    -4.38e-07    7.90e-06 
           Distance |  -.0009899   .0002608    -3.80   0.000    -.0015015   -.0004783 
          Distance2 |   2.16e-06   7.08e-07     3.06   0.002     7.75e-07    3.55e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0005874   .0000671    -8.75   0.000    -.0007191   -.0004557 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0001823    .000069    -2.64   0.008    -.0003176    -.000047 
               HUNN |   .0090774   .0042006     2.16   0.031     .0008376    .0173173 
               AUNN |  -.0007752   .0048518    -0.16   0.873    -.0102923    .0087419 
              Rival |   .0120996   .0236159     0.51   0.608    -.0342245    .0584237 
            HwagePL |   .0122425   .0207754     0.59   0.556    -.0285097    .0529947 
            AwagePL |   .1133338   .0124895     9.07   0.000     .0888349    .1378327 
        DrawProbAdj |  -.0964988   .2015606    -0.48   0.632    -.4918725    .2988749 
           LNATTN_1 |    1.08165   .0284114    38.07   0.000     1.025919    1.137381 
         Hageofclub |  -.0011201   .0005921    -1.89   0.059    -.0022816    .0000414 
         Aageofclub |   -.000134    .000358    -0.37   0.708    -.0008362    .0005682 
Previous_season_win |   .1825854   .1019334     1.79   0.073    -.0173634    .3825342 
       HomePromoted |     .21699   .0253322     8.57   0.000     .1672993    .2666806 
            Tuesday |   .0068606   .0211924     0.32   0.746    -.0347096    .0484307 
          Wednesday |  -.0447555   .0229822    -1.95   0.052    -.0898365    .0003255 
           Thursday |  -.0021762   .1288807    -0.02   0.987    -.2549838    .2506314 
             Friday |   .0520327   .0533578     0.98   0.330    -.0526319    .1566973 
             Sunday |  -.0087121   .0133778    -0.65   0.515    -.0349534    .0175292 
          September |   .0326897   .0281696     1.16   0.246    -.0225667    .0879461 
            October |   .0172568    .019982     0.86   0.388    -.0219392    .0564528 
           November |   .0404023   .0192454     2.10   0.036     .0026513    .0781533 
           December |   .0417569   .0232554     1.80   0.073    -.0038601    .0873738 
            January |   .0165371   .0230887     0.72   0.474    -.0287528    .0618271 
           February |   .0564038   .0219444     2.57   0.010     .0133585     .099449 
              March |   .0408557   .0208345     1.96   0.050    -.0000124    .0817238 
         AprilorMay |   .0633614   .0229845     2.76   0.006     .0182759    .1084469 
              _2006 |   .0164885   .0163455     1.01   0.313    -.0155742    .0485512 
              _2007 |   .0348653   .0170693     2.04   0.041     .0013828    .0683478 
              _2008 |   .0401725   .0188405     2.13   0.033     .0032157    .0771294 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   2.728326   .2706696    10.08   0.000      2.19739    3.259261 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q70                 | 
                 TV |  -.0177888   .0115619    -1.54   0.124    -.0404683    .0048906 
            Hpopden |   .0000719   2.88e-06    24.98   0.000     .0000663    .0000776 
            Apopden |   3.47e-06   1.89e-06     1.84   0.067    -2.37e-07    7.17e-06 
           Distance |  -.0007486   .0002522    -2.97   0.003    -.0012433    -.000254 
          Distance2 |   1.59e-06   6.16e-07     2.58   0.010     3.79e-07    2.80e-06 
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      Hmaleearnings |  -.0005046   .0000703    -7.18   0.000    -.0006425   -.0003666 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0001153   .0000729    -1.58   0.114    -.0002584    .0000277 
               HUNN |   .0112586   .0037579     3.00   0.003     .0038873    .0186299 
               AUNN |  -.0001349   .0035218    -0.04   0.969    -.0070432    .0067734 
              Rival |    .048287   .0265907     1.82   0.070    -.0038723    .1004463 
            HwagePL |   .0042305   .0177507     0.24   0.812    -.0305886    .0390496 
            AwagePL |   .0996422   .0115918     8.60   0.000     .0769042    .1223803 
        DrawProbAdj |  -.0300801   .2131002    -0.14   0.888    -.4480895    .3879292 
           LNATTN_1 |    1.07663   .0237648    45.30   0.000     1.030014    1.123247 
         Hageofclub |  -.0006952   .0006146    -1.13   0.258    -.0019007    .0005104 
         Aageofclub |   -.000022   .0002733    -0.08   0.936    -.0005581    .0005141 
Previous_season_win |   .2360372   .0843561     2.80   0.005     .0705675    .4015069 
       HomePromoted |   .2355147    .021245    11.09   0.000     .1938412    .2771882 
            Tuesday |  -.0083269   .0245107    -0.34   0.734    -.0564062    .0397523 
          Wednesday |  -.0357152    .024861    -1.44   0.151    -.0844816    .0130512 
           Thursday |  -.0278391   .1142238    -0.24   0.807    -.2518962    .1962181 
             Friday |   .0048359   .0378883     0.13   0.898    -.0694843    .0791561 
             Sunday |  -.0080768   .0137373    -0.59   0.557    -.0350234    .0188699 
          September |   .0289286   .0287353     1.01   0.314    -.0274375    .0852946 
            October |   .0191819   .0241808     0.79   0.428    -.0282504    .0666141 
           November |   .0330312   .0229682     1.44   0.151    -.0120223    .0780846 
           December |   .0378209   .0198095     1.91   0.056    -.0010366    .0766784 
            January |   .0262428   .0260398     1.01   0.314    -.0248359    .0773215 
           February |   .0482454   .0251369     1.92   0.055    -.0010621     .097553 
              March |   .0314208   .0232334     1.35   0.176    -.0141529    .0769946 
         AprilorMay |   .0568203   .0231598     2.45   0.014     .0113909    .1022497 
              _2006 |    .026706   .0148293     1.80   0.072    -.0023825    .0557945 
              _2007 |   .0164079   .0159673     1.03   0.304     -.014913    .0477289 
              _2008 |   .0371154   .0161662     2.30   0.022     .0054044    .0688264 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   2.647088   .1835059    14.43   0.000     2.287129    3.007046 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q80                 | 
                 TV |  -.0117447   .0110222    -1.07   0.287    -.0333655    .0098762 
            Hpopden |   .0000683   3.66e-06    18.68   0.000     .0000611    .0000755 
            Apopden |   1.40e-06   2.47e-06     0.56   0.572    -3.45e-06    6.24e-06 
           Distance |  -.0008401   .0001652    -5.09   0.000    -.0011642   -.0005161 
          Distance2 |   1.87e-06   4.39e-07     4.27   0.000     1.01e-06    2.73e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0003744   .0000794    -4.71   0.000    -.0005303   -.0002186 
      Amaleearnings |  -.0000266    .000072    -0.37   0.711    -.0001679    .0001146 
               HUNN |    .014355   .0042475     3.38   0.001     .0060232    .0226868 
               AUNN |   .0015128   .0034139     0.44   0.658    -.0051838    .0082094 
              Rival |   .0625779   .0286155     2.19   0.029     .0064468    .1187089 
            HwagePL |    .002011   .0247156     0.08   0.935    -.0464702    .0504922 
            AwagePL |   .1006417   .0114311     8.80   0.000     .0782189    .1230645 
        DrawProbAdj |   .0108567   .2184479     0.05   0.960    -.4176424    .4393559 
           LNATTN_1 |   1.040557   .0264236    39.38   0.000     .9887255    1.092389 
         Hageofclub |   .0000424   .0007714     0.05   0.956    -.0014707    .0015555 
         Aageofclub |  -.0001771   .0003069    -0.58   0.564    -.0007792    .0004249 
Previous_season_win |   .2548297   .0761676     3.35   0.001     .1054221    .4042373 
       HomePromoted |   .2403324   .0273387     8.79   0.000     .1867057     .293959 
            Tuesday |   .0065791   .0276113     0.24   0.812    -.0475822    .0607404 
          Wednesday |  -.0321611   .0182227    -1.76   0.078    -.0679061    .0035839 
           Thursday |  -.0512456   .1044571    -0.49   0.624    -.2561448    .1536536 
             Friday |  -.0175529    .045486    -0.39   0.700    -.1067766    .0716708 
             Sunday |   -.008502   .0145528    -0.58   0.559    -.0370482    .0200443 
          September |   .0191907    .028279     0.68   0.497    -.0362803    .0746617 
            October |   .0084794   .0301459     0.28   0.779    -.0506536    .0676124 
           November |    .026963   .0234925     1.15   0.251     -.019119     .073045 
           December |   .0202527   .0195278     1.04   0.300    -.0180523    .0585578 
            January |    .016288   .0341307     0.48   0.633    -.0506615    .0832375 
           February |   .0325275   .0280559     1.16   0.246    -.0225058    .0875609 
              March |   .0063265   .0248282     0.25   0.799    -.0423756    .0550285 
         AprilorMay |   .0301735   .0247271     1.22   0.223    -.0183303    .0786773 
              _2006 |   .0509895    .018468     2.76   0.006     .0147633    .0872157 
              _2007 |   .0118712   .0245349     0.48   0.629    -.0362554    .0599979 
              _2008 |   .0157493   .0113394     1.39   0.165    -.0064937    .0379923 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |   2.885213   .2400765    12.02   0.000     2.414288    3.356138 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q90                 | 
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                 TV |  -.0178442   .0151494    -1.18   0.239    -.0475607    .0118723 
            Hpopden |   .0000732   4.30e-06    17.04   0.000     .0000648    .0000816 
            Apopden |   8.35e-07   2.99e-06     0.28   0.780    -5.03e-06    6.70e-06 
           Distance |  -.0006331   .0002731    -2.32   0.021    -.0011688   -.0000974 
          Distance2 |   1.07e-06   7.61e-07     1.41   0.160    -4.23e-07    2.56e-06 
      Hmaleearnings |  -.0002769   .0001552    -1.78   0.075    -.0005813    .0000275 
      Amaleearnings |   .0000111   .0000916     0.12   0.903    -.0001685    .0001907 
               HUNN |   .0158904   .0045356     3.50   0.000     .0069935    .0247872 
               AUNN |   -.004166   .0035661    -1.17   0.243    -.0111611     .002829 
              Rival |   .0682689    .028952     2.36   0.019     .0114777    .1250601 
            HwagePL |    .121308   .0572035     2.12   0.034     .0090998    .2335163 
            AwagePL |   .1200289   .0146534     8.19   0.000     .0912853    .1487726 
        DrawProbAdj |   -.127423    .301732    -0.42   0.673    -.7192893    .4644433 
           LNATTN_1 |   .9092908   .0526258    17.28   0.000     .8060619     1.01252 
         Hageofclub |   .0010535    .001036     1.02   0.309    -.0009787    .0030856 
         Aageofclub |   .0002994   .0004908     0.61   0.542    -.0006634    .0012622 
Previous_season_win |   -.153588   .1500249    -1.02   0.306    -.4478713    .1406952 
       HomePromoted |   .3723898   .0478269     7.79   0.000     .2785743    .4662053 
            Tuesday |   .0225236   .0454943     0.50   0.621    -.0667163    .1117634 
          Wednesday |  -.0460955   .0228893    -2.01   0.044    -.0909943   -.0011967 
           Thursday |   .0022992   .0923821     0.02   0.980    -.1789141    .1835125 
             Friday |   -.021779   .0716964    -0.30   0.761    -.1624159    .1188579 
             Sunday |   .0033509   .0147149     0.23   0.820    -.0255133    .0322151 
          September |  -.0188789   .0273929    -0.69   0.491    -.0726117     .034854 
            October |  -.0230419   .0272662    -0.85   0.398    -.0765263    .0304424 
           November |   -.005016   .0215587    -0.23   0.816    -.0473047    .0372727 
           December |  -.0016013   .0177446    -0.09   0.928    -.0364084    .0332058 
            January |    .001368   .0364151     0.04   0.970    -.0700624    .0727984 
           February |   .0043636    .026856     0.16   0.871    -.0483161    .0570433 
              March |  -.0055792   .0306925    -0.18   0.856    -.0657844     .054626 
         AprilorMay |     .00624   .0229712     0.27   0.786    -.0388195    .0512995 
              _2006 |    .032178   .0157382     2.04   0.041     .0013066    .0630494 
              _2007 |   .0616805   .0335298     1.84   0.066    -.0040904    .1274513 
              _2008 |  -.0260261   .0191239    -1.36   0.174    -.0635389    .0114867 
              _2009 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2010 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2011 |          0  (omitted) 
              _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
              _cons |    4.14061      .5083     8.15   0.000     3.143548    5.137673 
 
 
Chapter 5 Diagnostic tests for estimation of Revenue (with fixed effects) 
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                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |    Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1520    0.95995     36.998     9.091    0.00000  
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    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
          TV |      1.29    0.773831 
     Hpopden |     71.01    0.014082 
     Apopden |      4.11    0.243387 
    Distance |     27.69    0.036111 
   Distance2 |     22.84    0.043790 
Hmaleearni~s |     62.47    0.016008 
Amaleearni~s |      4.64    0.215501 
        HUNN |      3.20    0.312879 
        AUNN |      1.23    0.815279 
       Rival |      2.81    0.356365 
     HwagePL |     98.79    0.010122 
     AwagePL |      1.50    0.665288 
 DrawProbAdj |      2.18    0.458627 
    LNATTN_1 |     35.44    0.028215 
  Hageofclub |  49210.11    0.000020 
  Aageofclub |      1.13    0.886693 
Previous_s~n |      6.77    0.147769 
HomePromoted |      6.92    0.144538 
     Tuesday |      1.13    0.887537 
   Wednesday |      1.10    0.911870 
    Thursday |      1.05    0.951609 
      Friday |      1.04    0.962047 
      Sunday |      1.29    0.775292 
   September |      1.85    0.540898 
     October |      1.90    0.525809 
    November |      1.89    0.528921 
    December |      2.30    0.434865 
     January |      1.94    0.515370 
    February |      1.80    0.556188 
       March |      1.89    0.528267 
  AprilorMay |      2.53    0.394644 
      HTeam1 | 
          2  |   1978.33    0.000505 
          3  |   1299.39    0.000770 
          4  |   1745.51    0.000573 
          6  |   2031.43    0.000492 
          8  |   3429.75    0.000292 
          9  |   4796.11    0.000209 
         10  |   1182.08    0.000846 
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         11  |     37.99    0.026320 
         12  |    932.44    0.001072 
         13  |    775.98    0.001289 
         15  |    541.32    0.001847 
         16  |     82.93    0.012059 
         17  |    793.04    0.001261 
         18  |   1441.15    0.000694 
         19  |    385.89    0.002591 
         20  |    847.63    0.001180 
         21  |   1774.68    0.000563 
         23  |   1591.90    0.000628 
         24  |     53.10    0.018832 
         25  |     27.80    0.035977 
         27  |    372.53    0.002684 
         29  |    264.03    0.003787 
         30  |    555.76    0.001799 
         31  |    115.73    0.008641 
         32  |    791.14    0.001264 
         33  |  20302.46    0.000049 
       _2006 |     47.76    0.020937 
       _2007 |    196.81    0.005081 
       _2008 |    452.26    0.002211 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |   1640.55 
 
 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of LNREVENUE 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 1456) =     31.04 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
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Appendix D: Regression Output Chapter 6 
 
Chapter 6 Estimation match results (ordered Probit) 
 
 
Random-effects ordered probit regression        Number of obs      =      1824 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       708 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       2.6 
                                                               max =         5 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(16)      =    279.91 
Log likelihood  = -1766.4458                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ResultOP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     HwagePL |   .4665098     .08169     5.71   0.000     .3064003    .6266194 
     AwagePL |  -.4786584   .0626468    -7.64   0.000    -.6014439   -.3558728 
        HCup |    .012183   .0806813     0.15   0.880    -.1459494    .1703154 
        ACup |  -.0949744   .0810329    -1.17   0.241     -.253796    .0638473 
         HCL |   .1172582   .1476362     0.79   0.427    -.1721035    .4066199 
         ACL |  -.2627922   .1476908    -1.78   0.075    -.5522609    .0266764 
         HEL |   .0180644   .1491973     0.12   0.904     -.274357    .3104858 
         AEL |  -.0154391   .1447692    -0.11   0.915    -.2991815    .2683034 
       HForm |   .0321094   .0271791     1.18   0.237    -.0211607    .0853795 
       AForm |  -.0512875   .0273486    -1.88   0.061    -.1048898    .0023149 
    MatchAtt |   6.68e-06   3.05e-06     2.19   0.029     7.00e-07    .0000127 
    Distance |   .0003088   .0003447     0.90   0.370    -.0003668    .0009844 
       _2006 |          0  (omitted) 
       _2007 |          0  (omitted) 
       _2008 |   .0365565   .0867091     0.42   0.673    -.1333902    .2065032 
       _2009 |   .0192859    .088608     0.22   0.828    -.1543825    .1929544 
       _2010 |   .1975725   .0908063     2.18   0.030     .0195955    .3755495 
       _2011 |   .1144935   .0867284     1.32   0.187     -.055491    .2844781 
       _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -.4349811   .1405505    -3.09   0.002    -.7104549   -.1595073 
       /cut2 |   .3567679     .14062     2.54   0.011     .0811578     .632378 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   /sigma2_u |   .0193987   .0301352                      .0009236    .4074562 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test vs. oprobit regression:  chibar2(01) =     0.45 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.2512 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 Estimation match results (ordered Probit) top 5 clubs  
 
 
Random-effects ordered probit regression        Number of obs      =       434 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       199 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       2.2 
                                                               max =         5 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(16)      =     79.97 
Log likelihood  = -344.77512                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ResultOP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     HwagePL |   .4252399   .1163898     3.65   0.000     .1971202    .6533597 
     AwagePL |  -.6410399   .1355697    -4.73   0.000    -.9067518   -.3753281 
        HCup |  -.2406412   .1823999    -1.32   0.187    -.5981384     .116856 
        ACup |   .0560231   .1735558     0.32   0.747    -.2841399    .3961862 
         HCL |  -.0189584   .1887954    -0.10   0.920    -.3889905    .3510738 
         ACL |  -.1445781   .3090139    -0.47   0.640    -.7502342    .4610781 
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         HEL |  -.5116014   .3642846    -1.40   0.160    -1.225586    .2023833 
         AEL |    .137575   .3518049     0.39   0.696      -.55195    .8271001 
       HForm |   .0486362   .0771861     0.63   0.529    -.1026458    .1999183 
       AForm |   .0390127   .0572506     0.68   0.496    -.0731964    .1512219 
    MatchAtt |   .0000149   4.82e-06     3.10   0.002     5.49e-06    .0000244 
    Distance |  -.0001847   .0007115    -0.26   0.795    -.0015793    .0012098 
       _2006 |          0  (omitted) 
       _2007 |          0  (omitted) 
       _2008 |   .1174918   .1983403     0.59   0.554    -.2712482    .5062317 
       _2009 |  -.2079174   .1951793    -1.07   0.287    -.5904619     .174627 
       _2010 |   .0407271   .1981513     0.21   0.837    -.3476423    .4290966 
       _2011 |   .0406151   .1929883     0.21   0.833     -.337635    .4188653 
       _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -.2559301   .4487258    -0.57   0.568    -1.135417    .6235564 
       /cut2 |   .6178819   .4491731     1.38   0.169    -.2624812    1.498245 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   /sigma2_u |   1.03e-32   3.36e-17                             .           . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test vs. oprobit regression:      chi2(0) =     0.00   Prob > chi2 =      . 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 Estimation match results (ordered Probit) bottom 5 clubs  
 
Random-effects ordered probit regression        Number of obs      =       598 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       384 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       1.6 
                                                               max =         5 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(16)      =     71.71 
Log likelihood  =  -611.5505                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    ResultOP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     HwagePL |   .7030151   .2601377     2.70   0.007     .1931546    1.212876 
     AwagePL |  -.4587291   .1050789    -4.37   0.000      -.66468   -.2527782 
        HCup |   .2851729   .1583157     1.80   0.072    -.0251201     .595466 
        ACup |   -.276124   .1635837    -1.69   0.091    -.5967422    .0444941 
         HCL |   6.388487   62191.36     0.00   1.000    -121886.4    121899.2 
         ACL |  -.2535619   .2623612    -0.97   0.334    -.7677805    .2606567 
         HEL |    .033229     .23685     0.14   0.888    -.4309885    .4974464 
         AEL |    .014291   .2286571     0.06   0.950    -.4338688    .4624507 
       HForm |  -.0137391   .0485018    -0.28   0.777    -.1088008    .0813227 
       AForm |  -.0486875   .0467027    -1.04   0.297    -.1402231     .042848 
    MatchAtt |  -8.78e-06   7.33e-06    -1.20   0.231    -.0000231    5.59e-06 
    Distance |   .0011721   .0006068     1.93   0.053    -.0000173    .0023615 
       _2006 |          0  (omitted) 
       _2007 |          0  (omitted) 
       _2008 |   .1637573   .1514687     1.08   0.280    -.1331159    .4606304 
       _2009 |   .3612512   .1574583     2.29   0.022     .0526387    .6698637 
       _2010 |   .4472464   .1614905     2.77   0.006     .1307309    .7637619 
       _2011 |   .3871512   .1507986     2.57   0.010     .0915914     .682711 
       _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -.4100227     .23098    -1.78   0.076    -.8627351    .0426897 
       /cut2 |   .3344421    .230929     1.45   0.148    -.1181705    .7870546 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   /sigma2_u |   1.09e-29   8.47e-15                             .           . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test vs. oprobit regression:  chibar2(01) =  5.8e-06 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.9981 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 Estimation match results (ordered Probit with fixed effects) 
 
 
Random-effects ordered probit regression        Number of obs      =      1824 
Group variable: TEAMAB1                         Number of groups   =       708 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       2.6 
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                                                               max =         5 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration points =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(58)      =    371.82 
Log likelihood  = -1725.9958                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       ResultOP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        HwagePL |   .5799546   .1829941     3.17   0.002     .2212928    .9386165 
        AwagePL |  -.4490596   .0630161    -7.13   0.000    -.5725688   -.3255503 
           HCup |  -.0280365   .1091465    -0.26   0.797    -.2419596    .1858866 
           ACup |   -.079431   .1031065    -0.77   0.441     -.281516    .1226539 
            HCL |   .0968999    .153825     0.63   0.529    -.2045916    .3983914 
            ACL |  -.2477644   .1503226    -1.65   0.099    -.5423912    .0468625 
            HEL |  -.1822993   .1601648    -1.14   0.255    -.4962166     .131618 
            AEL |  -.0627048   .1543372    -0.41   0.685    -.3652002    .2397906 
          HForm |  -.0570665   .0304375    -1.87   0.061    -.1167229    .0025898 
          AForm |  -.0707823   .0277096    -2.55   0.011    -.1250921   -.0164725 
       MatchAtt |  -.0000158   .0000133    -1.19   0.235     -.000042    .0000103 
       Distance |   .0004277   .0003684     1.16   0.246    -.0002943    .0011498 
         Monday |  -.0752183   .1317802    -0.57   0.568    -.3335027     .183066 
        Tuesday |  -.1372062   .1412522    -0.97   0.331    -.4140554    .1396429 
      Wednesday |   .1221284   .1107336     1.10   0.270    -.0949054    .3391622 
       Thursday |  -.2730683   .6591877    -0.41   0.679    -1.565053    1.018916 
         Friday |   .0031032   .3696099     0.01   0.993    -.7213188    .7275252 
         Sunday |   .0878227   .0754853     1.16   0.245    -.0601258    .2357712 
      September |   .0521018   .1368529     0.38   0.703     -.216125    .3203286 
        October |   .1037175   .1324819     0.78   0.434    -.1559423    .3633773 
       November |  -.0542946   .1299831    -0.42   0.676    -.3090568    .2004676 
       December |   .0121481   .1241141     0.10   0.922    -.2311112    .2554073 
        January |    .166103   .1409823     1.18   0.239    -.1102172    .4424231 
       February |   .1179677    .157474     0.75   0.454    -.1906756     .426611 
          March |   .0780018   .1760057     0.44   0.658     -.266963    .4229666 
     AprilorMay |  -.0066406   .1787201    -0.04   0.970    -.3569256    .3436444 
                | 
         HTeam1 | 
   Aston Villa  |  -.6459199   .3458166    -1.87   0.062    -1.323708    .0318682 
    Birmingham  |  -.5596962   .5147982    -1.09   0.277    -1.568682    .4492897 
     Blackburn  |  -.7567136   .5114606    -1.48   0.139    -1.759158    .2457308 
     Blackpool  |  -1.238709    .664286    -1.86   0.062    -2.540685    .0632678 
        Bolton  |  -.9636106    .531528    -1.81   0.070    -2.005386    .0781652 
       Burnley  |   -.831006   .6209688    -1.34   0.181    -2.048083    .3860705 
       Chelsea  |  -.6981388   .3595125    -1.94   0.052     -1.40277    .0064927 
         Derby  |  -1.768365   .5177429    -3.42   0.001    -2.783123   -.7536078 
       Everton  |  -.2283764   .3820541    -0.60   0.550    -.9771886    .5204357 
        Fulham  |   -.587612   .5050448    -1.16   0.245    -1.577482    .4022576 
          Hull  |  -1.241773   .5334935    -2.33   0.020    -2.287401   -.1961451 
     Liverpool  |  -.3528281   .2812312    -1.25   0.210    -.9040312     .198375 
      Man City  |  -.1939132   .2821194    -0.69   0.492     -.746857    .3590306 
       Man Utd  |   .7838677   .2901628     2.70   0.007     .2151589    1.352576 
 Middlesbrough  |  -.6909032   .4989576    -1.38   0.166    -1.668842    .2870358 
     Newcastle  |  -.4845541   .2530515    -1.91   0.056    -.9805259    .0114177 
       Norwich  |  -.4699323   .5552552    -0.85   0.397    -1.558212    .6183478 
    Portsmouth  |  -.8242014   .6104914    -1.35   0.177    -2.020743    .3723398 
           QPR  |  -1.004633   .6310736    -1.59   0.111    -2.241515    .2322483 
       Reading  |  -.8990839   .5852009    -1.54   0.124    -2.046057    .2478889 
         Stoke  |  -.4171642   .4925317    -0.85   0.397    -1.382509    .5481801 
    Sunderland  |   -.559232   .3332002    -1.68   0.093    -1.212292    .0938284 
       Swansea  |  -.3536601   .6103156    -0.58   0.562    -1.549857    .8425366 
     Tottenham  |  -.2580435    .386275    -0.67   0.504    -1.015129    .4990416 
           WBA  |  -.8088556   .5142641    -1.57   0.116    -1.816795    .1990835 
      West Ham  |  -.9243248   .3985655    -2.32   0.020    -1.705499   -.1431506 
         Wigan  |  -.8968693   .5848179    -1.53   0.125    -2.043091    .2493526 
        Wolves  |  -1.039721   .4952193    -2.10   0.036    -2.010333   -.0691088 
                | 
          _2006 |          0  (omitted) 
          _2007 |          0  (omitted) 
          _2008 |   .1554183   .1000278     1.55   0.120    -.0406325    .3514692 
          _2009 |   .0918846   .0957617     0.96   0.337     -.095805    .2795741 
          _2010 |   .2973843   .0994874     2.99   0.003     .1023926    .4923761 
          _2011 |   .1998267   .0933004     2.14   0.032     .0169612    .3826922 
          _2012 |          0  (omitted) 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          /cut1 |  -1.872472   .8320239    -2.25   0.024    -3.503209   -.2417348 
          /cut2 |  -1.064096   .8315029    -1.28   0.201    -2.693812    .5656193 
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----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma2_u |   1.03e-31   8.07e-17                             .           . 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test vs. oprobit regression:      chi2(0) =     0.00   Prob > chi2 =      . 
 
 
Chapter 6 Diagnostic tests for estimation of match results (ordered Probit) 
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                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |    Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1824    0.98899     12.007     6.301    0.00000 
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